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There is great expectation that oil development in Ghana will catapult the nation 
towards prosperity and lead to drastic improvement in the wellbeing of Ghanaians. 
However, there is also concern that Ghana could fail to achieve these due to the 
resource curse notwithstanding the fact that scholars of the curse have yet to agree on 
the inevitability of the curse. Resource curse scholars adduce different reasons for its 
occurrence or absence. One thing common among the scholars, however, is that none 
discusses environmental justice in the context of the curse. In this dissertation, I 
examine Ghana’s attempts at avoiding the resource curse through policymaking and 
implementation using the Guidelines on Environmental Assessment and Management 
of Ghana’s offshore oil sector as a case study. I argue that a strong environmental 
justice frame is required to avert the curse in Ghana. Specifically, I assess the policy 
process in Ghana’s oil sector, the institutional framework for managing the sector, and 
analyze the perception of environmental justice for policymaking. The outcome of these 
assessments show that although the policy process requires broadening for full and 
effective participation, Ghana has checks and balances policies to avert the resource 
curse and to deliver environmental justice in the oil sector. In addition, Ghana has an 
institutional framework that requires strengthening, in various way, in order for it to 
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1.1 The Promise of Oil  
The Government of Ghana, international financial institutions, and the people of 
Ghana all anticipate that the 2007 discovery of oil off Ghana’s shores will make the 
country richer. This dissertation examines the policy context of Ghana’s oil industry in 
order to assess that promise in terms of the impacts of oil development on the people of 
Ghana. In short, will Ghana avert the curse of oil wealth or not? Moreover, how might 
governance and ensuing policy approaches ensure Ghana averts the curse? I argue 
that failure to consider an appropriate environmental justice frame renders policymaking 
and governance inadequate to ensure that Ghana’s oil benefits its peoples. 
In this introduction, I first situate anticipation of the benefits to Ghana’s economy 
of oil development against its economic realities. Then I provide a brief explanation of 
the resource curse debate, which I analyze in detail in Chapter 2. Next, I explain the 
objectives of the case study of Ghana and I then assess Ghana’s previous experience 
with resource development in its gold and diamond mining industries. Finally, I describe 
my theoretical framework and research methods before providing an overview and 
rationale for the chapters to come.  
 
1.2 Ghana’s Economy after Oil Production  
In 2004, Ghana reached the completion point of the International Monetary 
Fund’s Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) (IMF 2004). The 
World Bank sets the threshold between HIPC and middle-income countries at a per 
capita national income of between $1006 and $3, 975 USD (United Nations, 2012, cf. 
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Felipe, Abnon, and Kumar 2012). In 2011, Ghana climbed out of HIPC status to become 
a lower middle-income country after the country recorded the per capita gross national 
income required for this change in status (World Bank 2013). This achievement was 
largely due to 2010 production and export of crude oil that injected revenue into 
Ghana’s economy. This newfound wealth, however, did not alleviate Ghanaian poverty. 
Because the middle-income status does not reflect the living conditions of Ghanaians, it 
cannot be considered ‘real’; it is ‘artificial’ in the sense that Ghana’s economy was not 
yet productive enough to mature into a middle-income economy.  
Indeed, since 2009, Ghana’s currency, the Ghana Cedi, has depreciated steeply 
against its major trading partners. For instance, the Cedi depreciated against the US 
Dollar by 29.3% in 2013 and 31.2% by the end of September in 2014 (Government of 
Ghana 2015, 13), and experienced a cumulative depreciation of 9.6% in 2016 
(Government of Ghana 2017, 17). In addition to the depreciating Cedi, Ghana’s public 
debt stock continued to rise steeply since 2009. The country’s public debt stock as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2009 was 36.3%, rising to 48.03% and 
55.53% in 2012 and 2013 respectively. At the end of 2016, Ghana’s public debt stock 
stood at 73% of GDP (Government of Ghana 2017, 28). Signs of Ghana’s deteriorating 
economy are also reflected in rising inflation attributable to the depreciating Cedi. 
Inflation rose from 13.5% in 2013 to 16.9% at the end of October of 2014 (Government 
of Ghana 2015, 13), rising further to a peak of 19.2% in March 2016 before a slight 
decline to 17.7% at end of 2016 (Government of Ghana 2017, 14).  
In view of the dismal performance of Ghana’s economy since 2009, the country 
approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an economic bailout in 
September 2014 (Ghana Web, 2014). This situation has led to suggestions that Ghana 
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has already started experiencing effects of the Dutch Disease (Center for Policy 
Analysis 2012), i.e., the resource curse. This situation also buttresses the argument that 
Ghana’s attainment of lower middle-income status is artificial.  
 
1.3 The Resource Curse  
The ultimate goal of this project is to engender discussion on ways Ghana can 
mainstream environmental justice in oil policymaking. I undertake this exercise by 
highlighting the dearth of environmental justice in discourses on natural resources 
management. Discourse on the role natural resources play in the development of 
natural resource-endowed countries is one that will not go away soon, despite having a 
long history. This discourse has taken the form of a debate. At one end of this debate is 
a group that defends a position that natural resource wealth is disadvantageous to the 
development of resource-endowed countries (resource curse). At the other end of the 
debate is another group that is skeptical of the resource curse argument, holding the 
position that natural resources have a positive impact on the development of resource-
endowed countries. Often based on econometric analyses, the former group argues that 
there is a tendency for resource-endowed countries to fail to harness their natural 
resources for national development with concomitant harm caused to their economies. 
Conversely, the latter group advances the argument, also supported by empirical 
studies, that on balance, there is a positive effect of a large endowment of natural 
resources on the long-term economic growth of resource-endowed countries. In 
Chapter 2, I provide a detailed discussion of these two positions.  
Notwithstanding these positions, as to whether natural resources are a curse or 
not to resource-endowed countries, it is undeniable that natural resources affect the 
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development of countries that possess these resources, and that certain factors 
determine whether the resources would lead to a curse or not. Hence, it is important to 
gain better and deeper understanding of these conditions in order to obtain a sense of 
direction of how natural resources can contribute to the development of countries 
endowed. The importance of this task cannot be overemphasized considering that many 
developing countries depend on natural resources for their national income. 
Furthermore, literature on this subject emphasizes the political factor (governance) as 
the key factor that resource-endowed countries must address in order to avoid the 
resource curse. Meanwhile, analyses of experiences of countries that have pursued this 
path, to serve as valuable lessons to natural resource-endowed poor countries seeking 
to reduce poverty levels of their citizens, are non-existent. 
Furthermore, the resource-curse debate spells out conditions that make possible 
the curse or not. Most of these conditions fall into three categories—economic, political, 
and the nature of the resource. In economic terms, a common explanation is that oil 
booms promote temporary economic busts that affect economic growth of resource-
endowed countries in the long-term by crowding out other productive sectors of the 
economy. This phenomenon is widely known as the “Dutch disease” effect (Barbier 
2003, 264). Several versions of the Dutch disease exist. The expression, “the Dutch 
disease,” was coined in 1977 to describe a decline in manufacturing in the 
Netherlands following discovery of a large natural gas field. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
there is likewise increasing evidence of negative impacts of resource wealth. 
Countries with abundant resources have been shown to experience less 
socioeconomic growth than those with fewer (Auty 2001; Gylfason 2001; Humphreys, 
Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007; Karl 1997; Karl 1999), and oil wealth impacts appear 
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especially severe (Sachs and Warner 2001). McFerson (2009) blames weak public 
integrity and “hyper-corruption” that restricts political and civil rights and causes 
excessive, discretionary regulation of economic activity. Thus, exacerbating effects of 
the Dutch disease are political conditions of poor governance and corruption (Shaxson 
2007), and conditions of the third category of explanation—nature of the resource. 
Boschini et al. (2007) explain that the type of natural resource a country possesses 
plays an influential role in determining whether the country would encounter curse or not 
Many reported cases of the resource curse are in developing countries in sub-
Sahara Africa. Some of these countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sierra Leone, the Sudan, and Nigeria, are rich in different types of natural resources 
(mostly minerals); yet they are among the poorest countries in the world. It is therefore 
important that the world community assist these countries, and many others in the 
world, to find poverty reduction strategies through positive contributions from natural 
resources. This is imperative, considering that poverty eradication was the number one 
goal of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and is the first 
target of the Sustainable Development Goals. Hence, the resource curse debate is not 
only a theoretical academic exercise; it is a debate that could yield practical outcomes 
for poverty reduction. 
Finally, in the resource curse discourse, one important issue—environmental 
justice—has been overlooked; environmental justice is not among the list of factors 
adduced by either side of the resources curse debate. Yet, although environmental 
justice issues are rife in many of the countries reported as facing the resource curse, 
the phenomenon does not get as much attention in the resources curse discourse as 
compared to other issues such as natural resources revenue management, political 
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governance, and corruption. I argue that analysis from the framework of environmental 
justice can provide deeper understanding of the factors responsible for the curse of 
natural resources, and accordingly suggest ways to address environmental justice 
issues. Thus, I argue that one strategy of poverty reduction by avoiding the curse of 
natural resources is to address environmental justice issues in natural resources 
management—from exploration, extraction, processing, to exporting 
 
1.4 Objectives  
In this case study of Ghana, I seek mainly to examine the process of establishing 
governance frameworks, i.e., policies, plans, programs, regulations, and guidelines for 
Ghana’s oil sector. Using the Guidelines on Environmental Assessment and 
Management of Offshore Oil and Gas Development in Ghana (GEAM) as my focus of 
analysis of policy documents, I investigate the extent to which and how environmental 
justice issues are captured in governance frameworks of Ghana’s oil sector. My choice 
of the GEAM is for the purposes of using the document to trace the trajectory of policy 
formulation in Ghana’s oil sector pertaining to environmental management. Moreover, I 
am of the conviction that the GEAM is an important document that ought to articulate 
environmental justice issues. Hence, the GEAM, and the process leading to its 
development constitute a major case study to investigate the role of the social process 
of policymaking in anticipating, identifying and addressing environmental justice issues 
in Ghana’s oil sector. In addition to the GEAM, I analyze other governance frameworks 
to identify and assess environmental justice issues in Ghana’s embryonic oil sector.  
A cross-cutting theme and general goal for this study is identification of 
challenges and lessons in Ghana’s oil policymaking process with respect to 
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mainstreaming environmental justices into policies. The specific objectives to achieve 
for the case study are: 
∑ Mapping policymaking process in Ghana’s oil sector while identifying how the 
GEAM fit in that context; 
∑ Assessing Ghana’s institutional framework for addressing, overall, 
environmental issues in the oil sector; and 
∑ Analyzing the perception of environmental justice among policymaking 
institutions in Ghana. 
I commence the case study by mapping the policy process of the GEAM in order 
to understand the rationale behind policy choices while drawing attention to gaps in the 
process as well as the GEAM itself. I show that the process was inadequate because it 
was not participatory enough and did not consider environmental justice. Hence, the 
document produced from the process does not adequately articulate a complete framing 
of environmental justice, just as the other governance documents I analyze. I argue that 
environmental justice issues are important components that can affect the direction of 
whether oil becomes curse in Ghana or not, and that environmental justice issues must 
be brought into the spotlight and stated clearly in future policies, regulations, and 
guidelines for Ghana’s oil and gas sector.  
 
1.5 Why Ghana? 
Ghana is a developing country that joined the ranks of oil-producing nations in 
2010. Ghana’s entry into commercial oil production in 2010 was met with great 
expectations across the lengths and breadths of the country. When production started, 
projections suggested the country could be reaping more than a billion dollars per year 
from the 2007 discovery alone. But oil has been identified elsewhere in Africa as a 
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curse rather than being a blessing due to its role in corruption, conflict, and 
environmental devastation (Glazebrook and Kola-olusanya 2011; Glazebrook and Story 
2012). In view of this, the Government of Ghana set out to avoid the curse by proposing 
policy initiatives to ensure Ghanaians benefit from the burgeoning business of the 
nascent industry.  
One outcome of the policy initiatives by Government of Ghana is the production 
of Guidelines on Environmental Assessment and Management (GEAM) of Offshore Oil 
and Gas Development in Ghana, prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency of 
Ghana. The purpose of the GEAM is “to ensure the sustainable development of 
[Ghana’s] offshore oil sector and also contribute towards the sound environmental 
management in the oil sector” (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, v). The GEAM 
and other policy documents set Ghana on the path of establishing governance 
frameworks to govern and manage oil resources as a way to avoid the curse of natural 
resource-endowment. Ghana is therefore a suitable case study to investigate whether 
neglect of environmental justice issues weakens governance approaches and make 
them ineffective to prevent the resource curse.  
I examine Ghana’s experiences so that other sub-Sahara African nations would 
take lessons from Ghana. Ghana is one of many African countries that depend on 
natural resources for national income. The Ghanaian experience affords opportunity to 
argue that processes aiming to establish governance frameworks, i.e., policies, 
regulations, and guidelines, in the oil sector perpetuate the status quo of overemphasis 
on avoiding conflict and corruption, and overlooking environmental justice issues 
evident in natural resources extraction elsewhere in sub-Sahara Africa. Given its history 
with mining, even Ghana is at risk of encountering the resource curse if the country 
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does not take deliberate and proactive steps to address environmental justice issues in 
its oil development policies and programs. The next section provides a brief overview of 
the impacts and challenges of Ghana’s mining sector to identify environmental justice 
issues that should not be reproduced in the oil industry. 
 
1.6 Mining Impacts in Ghana 
In 2011, Ghana was ranked as the 10th and 13th largest producer of gold and 
diamonds respectively (US Geological Survey 2013). Natural resources constituted the 
largest share of Ghana’s GDP until the service sector eclipsed natural resource 
industries. In spite of the services sector contributing more to Ghana’s GDP than any 
other sector, Ghana’s major export earnings still come from natural resources. Gold, 
cocoa, crude oil, and timber accounted for 82% of total export earnings in 2012 (KPMG 
2013, 3). This trend does not look likely to reverse any time soon. Rather, projections 
indicate that natural resources will continue to fetch most of Ghana’s foreign earnings, 
with crude oil expected to lead in the near future given the discovery of more oil 
deposits in Ghana.  
Though Ghana’s oil production is expected to double in the next decade (World 
Bank 2013), gold presently leads in terms of contributions to Ghana’s foreign exchange 
earnings. The metal is not the only mineral extracted in the country; Ghana is rich in 
other minerals including manganese, diamond, bauxite, limestone, silica salt, and salt. 
These are mined in commercial quantities, while there are deposits of iron ore and other 
industrial metals in the country that have yet to be exploited (Akabzaa, 2009). Thus, 
Ghana’s mineral extraction industry is wide, and it has a long history.  
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In spite of a long history of mining in Ghana, it was only after reforms in the 
country’s mining sector in the 1980s that the country saw exuberant activity in the 
sector. The recent exuberant activity and interests in Ghana’s offshore oil resources 
mirrors the experience of the mining sector in the 1980s. For example, the oil sector is 
experiencing significant increase in foreign direct investment, as happened in the 1980s 
in the mining sector. This increase has given rise to the perception in Ghana that the oil 
sector will alleviate poverty in Ghana. Consequently, there is a general national 
expectation of better returns from the oil sector than has been obtained from mining so 
far. Yet, mining in Ghana has produced mixed impacts in the country. 
In 1983, under the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF, Ghana undertook 
macroeconomic reforms that included sector-specific reforms, including the mining 
sector. Between 1984 and 1995, there were major institutional and policy reforms in the 
mining sector that gave considerable incentives to investors (Amponsah-Tawiah and 
Dartey-Baah, 2011). As a result, the sector grew and did not only impact Ghana’s 
overall economy, but it also impacted the social, economic, and ecological aspects of 
communities in which mineral extraction took place.  
The nature of impacts from mineral extraction on communities in Ghana is not 
straightforward. No consensus exists on the net benefits of mining to Ghana, either to 
the overall national development or to the development of communities in which mining 
takes place. Mineral extraction has had positive and negative impacts on communities, 
and no consensus exists as to whether the overall impact is positive or negative. Mining 
companies, government agencies promoting mining, mining sector consultants, some 
academics, and some traditional rulers share the opinion that mining contributes 
immensely to national development and poverty reduction. Benefits include 
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employment; promoting commerce; provision of infrastructure such as schools, roads, 
drinking water, and electricity; and payment of royalties to chiefs on behalf of 
communities.  
Yet there is consensus that communities have not benefited as much as they 
should have from local mineral wealth. For example, mining activities have failed to 
meet the aspirations of the local people in providing employment: most are surface 
mining that is not labor intensive and employs few people (Akabzaa and Abdulai 2001). 
Further aggravating this situation is that employees of many mining companies were 
laid-off after the Government of Ghana divested interests in mining companies following 
the sector reforms, and there continues to be retrenchment in the mining sector 
whenever prices of minerals decline on the international market. The result has been 
increased unemployment and a widened income gap in mining communities.  
Several anecdotal and empirical studies report that mining communities in Ghana 
have been afflicted with further negative impacts from mining activities on local 
economies and livelihoods, social organization, and health and environment (cf. 
Akabzaa and Abdulai, 2001). Concerning economic impacts, skeptics accordingly argue 
that mining has not led to integrated development and livelihood security in Ghana 
(Akabzaa, 2009). For instance, in a case study of mining communities in the Asutifi 
District of the Brong Ahafo Region, Lawson and Bentil (2013) report of communities 
displaced from their lands. This displacement denies members of the communities their 
source of livelihoods and presents them with the discomfort of having to relocate and 
abandon land they have dwelled on from generations—land that also has cultural 
significance and value to them.  
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Exacerbating problems of displacement and denial of homesteads and 
agricultural lands, displaced communities are often dissatisfied with the levels, 
coverage, and eligibility criteria set up for paying compensations to them for losing their 
lands to mining. Lawson and Bentil (2013) report of communities’ discontent with the 
amount of compensation paid to them and the items considered during their property 
valuations process. In addition, Akabzaa (2009) reports that, compensations to mining 
communities often treat women unfairly and alienate tenant members of communities. 
These economic impacts manifest disregard for distributive justice, especially with 
respect to gender justice.  
Concerning negative social impacts, mineral extraction has had adverse impacts. 
Appiah and Buaben (2012) report a rise in social problems in mining communities that 
they attribute to mining activities. Their report buttresses observations by Akabzaa and 
Abdulai (2001) that the social organization and cultural values of the people of Tarkwa 
township have been adversely impacted my mining operations in and around the town. 
Inhabitants of the township have raised concerns about inadequate housing due to the 
influx of migrant workers, youth unemployment, family disorganization, increasing rate 
of school dropout, and illicit drug use in the township (Amponsah-Tawiah and Dartey-
Baah 2011; Akabzaa and Abdulai 2001). All these factors contribute adversely to mining 
community economies. 
With respect to health and environmental impacts, moreover, studies carried out 
in four major river basins (Ankobra, Bia, Prah, and Tano) in the mining enclave of 
Ghana concluded that mining effluents were discharged into rivers that drain these 
basins (Amakye, Larmie, and Smit 2007). Most of Ghana’s gold comes from mining 
areas that are drained by the Ankobra, Pra, and Tano Rivers (Donkor, Bonzongo, 
13 
 
Nartey, and Adotey, 2006). The Prah River has higher levels of arsenic than 
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) for safe drinking (Amakye, 
Larmie, and Smit 2007, 10). A study of the drinking water of Tarkwa, Ghana’s historic 
mining township, discovered arsenic and manganese contamination above the WHO’s 
guidelines, thus putting human health in Tarkwa at risk (Asante et al. 2007). Momade 
and Darabor (2007)  made similar findings in the Ashanti Gold Belt that concentrations 
of iron, manganese, and mercury in some surface water bodies, wells, and boreholes 
exceeded WHO safety guidelines. They also discovered increased acidity. High 
concentrations of heavy metals and arsenic in drinking water are detrimental to human 
health and correlated with higher incidence of cancers (Fernández-luqueño et al.(2013).  
Health risks from mineral extraction in Ghana arise not only from contamination 
of drinking water, but also from other mining activities. In Akwatia, the historic diamond-
mining township of Ghana, health risks associated with diamond mining were reported 
although diamond mining does not require use of chemicals. In a case study of mining 
and health in Ghana, Yelpaala (2004) questioned the extent to which mining activities 
had improved the quality of life in Akwatia and concluded that diamond mining in 
Akwatia had led to land degradation, which resulted in  negative impacts on the health 
of inhabitants of Akwatia. Specifically, Yelpaala (2004) reported the incidence of malaria 
cases in Akwatia, which he related to the creation of ponds associated with diamond 
mining. These ponds held water conducive as breeding grounds for mosquitoes that 
transmit the malaria parasite. In addition, Yelpaala (2004) reported increased incidence 
of respiratory tract ailments due to dust particulate matter suspended in the air in 
Akwatia, a situation also associated with mining activities in other parts of Ghana as 
well (Amponsah-Tawiah and Dartey-Baah, 2011).  
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In outlining adverse impacts, I am not denying positive impacts mining activities 
have had on surrounding communities and on Ghana’s national economy; rather, I 
argue that negative impacts obliterate the positive. In a breach of distributive justice, 
mining communities bear the cost of mining disproportionately with respect to their 
livelihood, community thriving, health, and life satisfaction, while reaping little from the 
benefits mining provides. The harms are caused by exploitation of natural resources 
that contaminates local environments. Environmental justice is, as discussed below, the 
thesis that environmental issues are also social issues, and Ghana’s environmental 
damage caused by mining has brought with it economic and livelihood losses as well as 
social deterioration of communities, on top of issues in human and ecosystem health. 
Hence, the assessment of mining in Ghana reveals the presence of negative impact of 
mining activities in Ghana that constitute environmental justice issues that require 
attention.  
My argument may be questioned to the extent that the impacts of mining 
operations on surrounding communities are localized and limited to those mining 
communities, and insignificant in light of the mining sector’s substantial contribution to 
the national economy through foreign exchange earnings. Such criticism is flawed, 
because Ghana is not comparable to countries such as South Africa and Australia 
whose economies and infrastructures were built on mining and have been sufficiently 
developed and successfully raised the standard of living for the majority of their citizens. 
Ghana is still developing, and its gains are not sufficient to justify the harms to some 
people. Moreover, the negatively affected communities in Ghana are rural and poor; this 
criticism precisely breaches the principle of distributive justice by attempting to justify 
benefit elsewhere at expense of marginalized populations.  
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In summary, I have provided evidence that Ghana has not benefited from mineral 
extraction as much as the country should have. I have presented macroeconomic 
indicators that show that Ghana remains poor in spite of substantial mineral resources 
endowment. And I have documented how communities where mines are located suffer 
negative externalities with respect to environmental degradation, economic status, 
social well-being, and health. 
The issue at stake in this dissertation is whether oil wealth will likewise do more 
harm than good for the people of Ghana. The issues I have discussed show that the 
negative externalities of mining are environmental justice issues. Civil society 
organizations, such as the Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining 
(WACAM), for example, have raised environmental justice issues in the wake of 
numerous negative externalities affecting mining communities. WACAM was in fact 
formed in response to community experience of just such negative environmental 
justice impacts. Yet theorists and policymakers have rarely acknowledged 
environmental justice as a fundamental issue in managing mineral extraction industries. 
Mistakes, oversights, and injustice in Ghana’s mining sector are likely to be replicated in 
oil development if deliberate action is not taken to address issues of environmental 
justice through policy and governance processes. At present, Ghana’s oil production is 
offshore; however, the associated gas is piped onshore for processing. Furthermore, 
plans are far advanced to explore and develop oil deposits onshore in the Volta Basin 
(Nyavor 2016), and Ghana’s oil sector is growing steadily. Addressing environmental 




1.7 Theoretical Framework  
Most existing analyses of the resource curse in connection to Ghana’s oil 
development are from the economic perspective of enclave theory. Although the 
enclave theory is good for identifying problems with natural resources development, the 
theory falls short in providing means to address the problems. Ferguson (2005) argues 
that extractive industries in Africa operate in secured enclaves that insulate these 
industries from the rest of society. Ackah-Baidoo (2012; 2013) argues that Ghana’s 
current oil industry operates as an enclave that makes it difficult to integrate the industry 
activities and economic returns into the broader Ghanaian society. For instance, Ackah-
Baidoo (2012, 158) argues that because Ghana’s oil industry is an enclave, oil 
companies would find it difficult developing and targeting communities with their 
corporate social responsibility programs. Moreover, there is a tendency of the enclave 
industry to shield oil operators within it from the daily concerns of local communities, 
which requires government to bridge the gap (Ackah-Baidoo 2013).  
My original contribution is to assess relations among governmental (agencies), 
local communities, and oil companies in the context of participation, broader impacts on 
public health, safety, benefits, and harms in the frame of environmental justice. This 
assessment is warranted in view of limitations of the enclave analyses of oil 
development in Ghana, which I find environmental justice a fitting theoretical framework 
for this dissertation. In what follows, I provide a clear understanding of what I mean 




1.8 Conceptualizing and Framing Environmental Justice 
Environmental justice comprises theoretical underpinnings that emanate from 
philosophy, cultural studies, social sciences and biology, and thus provides a number of 
notions (Figueroa 2008). From a philosophical perspective, environmental justice’s 
pursuit of “principles of distributive fairness” (Figueroa 2008, 342) can be perfectly 
situated in the ideas of justice postulated by Aristotle. For instance, in Book V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses two forms of justice. One being distributive in 
which benefits and burdens are divided among members of the society in a fair manner, 
and the other being corrective justice that seeks restoration of lost fair balance in 
interpersonal relationship (Aristotle 1999). As would be seen in the following, 
conceptualizing environmental justice relies on the Aristotle’s perspective. 
However, in spite of the continuity from Aristotle’s perspective of justice in 
conceptualizing environmental justice, there are several points of differences between 
Aristotle’s definition and the environmental justice frame. For instance, “Environmental 
justice” is a fluid and flexible concept that is framed differently over space and time 
(Walker 2012). As a consequence, several definitions and understandings of 
environmental justice exist (Callewaert 2011). Furthermore, complicating the multiplicity 
of definitions of the concept are the different understandings  of “justice” in 
environmental justice, for which Schlosberg (2007) attempts to clarify what “justice” 
means in environmental justice. In addition to the geographic and temporal contexts, 
social issues affect the conception and scope of an understanding of environmental 
justice. Environmental justice issues are local and thus require an understanding of the 
concept that reflects the unique local context of usage. Apart from these, the history of 
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environmental justice, as it emerged in the United States (U.S.), played a significant role 
in its (different) framing and scope around the world presently. 
Accounts of the history of environmental justice as it emerged in the U.S. as a 
movement (cf. Figueroa [2008] and Schlosberg [2007] for an expanded account of the 
history of environmental justice in the United States), identify elements of environmental 
justice as far back in history as the 1800s  in public health initiatives. In the United Farm 
Workers’ activities in the 1960s and in activities relating to the Love Canal in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Schlosberg 2007; Gottlieb 1993), environmental justice concerns were 
raised. However, the environmental justice movement was born in the 1980s after “the 
relationship between social and environmental reforms became the focus of political 
controversy” in the U.S. Ever since, there has been a growing interest in environmental 
justice (Figueroa, 2008; Figueroa and Mills, 2001, p. 428). Apart from environmental 
justice, “environmental racism” is another term that surfaced in the 1980s (Fredericks 
2012, 117). Although this phrase was used interchangeably with environmental justice 
in the past, Schlosberg (2007) notes that the environmental racism movement 
popularized environmental justice.  
At present, and despite its many definitions, “environmental justice” has been 
used: as an objective of policy formulation; as a campaign slogan for activism; and to 
describe a field of academic study. However, though emerging as a movement, 
“environmental justice” is often defined in academic, activist, and policy literature as an 
objective: "something that is sought after and for which certain conditions are specified" 
(Walker 2012, 8). For instance, according to Bryant (1995): 
Environmental justice refers to those cultural norms, values, rules, regulations, 
behaviours (sic), policies and decisions to support sustainable communities, 
where people can interact with confidence that their environment is safe, 
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nurturing and productive. Environmental justice is served when people can 
realize their highest potential, without experiencing the ‘isms’. Environmental 
justice is supported by decent paying and safe jobs, quality schools and 
recreation; decent housing and adequate health care; democratic decision 
making and personal empowerment; and communities free of violence, drugs 
and poverty.(Bryant 1995, 6) 
 
Thus, the objective in this definition is for people to achieve “their highest 
potential.” Although whatever that potential may be is open to contentious debate, the 
point is that Bryant (1995) sees environmental justice as an objective to pursue; and to 
achieve this objective, there are “certain conditions” such as rules, regulations, cultural 
values and norms, and policies that must support communities.  
In addition, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) operates with an 
objective-based definition of “environmental justice” as: 
Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies … EPA's goal is to provide an environment where all 
people enjoy the same degree of protection from environmental and health 
hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to maintain a healthy 
environment in which to live, learn, and work.(U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 2017, n.p.) 
 
There are multiple objectives in the USEPA’s definition. The objectives include to attain 
equal level of treatment and participation that ensure same level of environmental and 
health protection for all persons, and provision of equal access to all persons of the 
environmental decision-making process.  
Figueroa (2008) discusses environmental justice as a movement; yet he provides 
an objective-based definition of the concept to say: “environmental justice, in theory and 
in practice, addresses a wide range of issues, combining the concerns of social justice 
and environmentalism” (341). Thus, for Figueroa (2008), the objectives in environmental 
justice are reflected as issues cutting across social and environmental concerns that 
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need attention, with the environment seen not only as a physical entity, but also as a 
construct of political and social relationships. For Fredericks (2012), the principal 
objective of environmental justice is the quest for justice—reversal of injustice—for 
certain marginalized populations. Thus, according to Fredericks (2012):  
Environmental justice counters distributive and participatory injustice, in which 
certain demographic groups, generally people of color and the poor, are harmed 
by environmental burden without significantly benefiting from or participating in 
activities that caused the damage to environments, human bodies, and 
communities. (Fredericks 2012, 117) 
 
Fredericks (2012) identifies the injustices in environmental justice to manifest in 
two principal ways: burden of environmental harm, and denial of benefits from activities 
causing harm. However, it is not always easy to discern what is at stake for which 
justice is being sought in environmental justice. Often, contestations arise about the 
state of affairs and claims of what is unjust. In this regard, Walker (2012) argues that 
evidence for what is considered unjust in environmental justice is often tainted with 
politics: “disputes can open up due to different claims…such disputes are often 
ideological or political” (8). In making a claim of injustice under the auspices of 
environmental justice, one needs to be aware of and navigate the political and 
ideological nuances.  
Moreover, three elements need accounting for when making environmental 
justice claims, namely, justice, evidence, and process. Justice, here, is the normative 
aspect of environmental justice that addresses the question “how things ought to be.” 
Evidence is the descriptive aspect that shows “how things are.” And process provides 
explanations for “why things are the way they are” (Walker 2012, 40).  
At the core of environmental justice is “justice”; yet, several theoretical 
understandings and conceptions of “justice” exist. As pointed out earlier, the idea of 
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justice was of importance to the ancient Greek philosophers. For the contemporary 
ideas of justice, I contrasts ideas of John Rawls and Amartya Sen. Rawls (1971) looks 
at justice as fairness—a distributive perspective of justice—in A Theory of Justice. 
Rawls' (1971) perspective on justice relies on an ideal society, in which he presents his 
conception of justice in a systematic manner. This understanding of justice has been 
described as idealistic. In this perspective, Rawls (1971) outlines principles of justice 
that he says “provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of 
society and…define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens” in society 
(Rawls 1971, 4). Thus, in Rawls’s ideal society, the principles of justice should be 
capable of distributing environmental benefits and burdens. But this has not been the 
case in practice, as is evident in view of numerous reports of environmental justice 
concerns worldwide.  
Sen (2009) critiques the idealistic conceptions of justice, which he calls 
transcendental institutionalism of justice (italics in original) (Sen 2009, 7). For Sen 
(2009, 5), transcendental institutionalism cites and defends principles of justice in 
search for a “perfect justice.” In addition, transcendental institutionalism focuses on 
basic institutions, not on “the actual societies that would ultimately emerge” (Sen 2009, 
6). Sen (2009, 7-8) investigates the concept of justice as “a realization-focused 
comparison … [which] focuses on the advancement and retreat of justice” (Sen 2009, 
8). Thus, Sen (2009) is concerned about what social organizations could actually 
emerge, and then compares these social organizations in search for a better just 
realization that focuses on  “advancement,” i.e., improvement of justice, rather than 
“retreat,” i.e., decrease in justice an increase in injustice. Here we are, then, with two 
perspectives of “justice” that, somehow, are at variance. Whereas Rawls (1971) 
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espouses an ideal conception of “justice,” Sen presents what I would call a practical 
perspective of “justice.” Yet both perspectives are useful for the present assignment.  
Notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties surrounding “justice,” the common 
understanding of “justice” in environmental justice literature is ‘trivalent’ (Schlosberg 
2004, 521): justice as distributive, procedural, and recognition. Distributive justice deals 
with allocations of burdens and benefits in the environment. In dealing with distributive 
justice, typically, one must address three begging questions (Bell 2004): who are the 
recipients? What is to be allocated? On what basis/principle is the allocation done? In 
environmental justice, concern is not only about who has and who has not; but there is 
also concern for who determines who gets and who doesn’t. Problems of distributive 
justice are sometimes the outcomes of procedural injustice where stakeholders have no 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Hence, procedural justice is “a 
necessary second concept of environmental justice” in addition to distributive justice 
(Walker 2012, 47).  
Often, a third arm of justice in environmental justice claims—recognition justice—
is over-looked when discussing or making claims. However, in arguing that the justice in 
environmental justice is trivalent, Schlosberg (2004), makes a case for the inclusion of 
recognition justice in equal measure as the other two (distributive and procedural), 
because misrecognition has the potential to lead to stereotypes, stigmatization, and 
exclusion of some groups of people. All these combine to affect the meaningful 
participation of people and their sharing of outcomes from decision-making processes.  
In making claims for environmental justice, one has to describe how things are. 
Evidence must be given of what is unequal, how this inequality is unjust, and the 
patterns in which the inequality manifest are required in order to make a claim for 
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environmental justice. The nexus between evidence of inequality and claims of 
(in)justice is at the heart of environmental justice practice (Walker 2012). Quite often, an 
interpretation of evidence for environmental justice claim making is about stating the 
facts. However, stating the facts is not without controversy and contestations. Indeed, 
Shrader-Frechette (2002, 194) notes that “facts alone never determine all aspects of a 
situation…. and [ facts are] saddled with implicit interpretations.” In the same breath, 
Shrader-Frechette (2002) cautions those who would want to claim objectivity  and un-
biasness by staying neutral that they should be wary. For a neutral position in itself is 
not objective: “there is no wholly neutral or value-free inquiry” (Shrader-Frechette 2002, 
194).  
There is no value free inquiry to provide evidence for environmental inequality 
claims, because such inquiry is a social process, a process noted for “selections, 
contingencies, and uncertainties” (Walker 2012, 54). Given this, then, how can evidence 
be useful in environmental justice claim making? Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
predominant source of evidence comes from empirical inquiry. In addition, since there 
are contestations even for empirical evidence, what would become of normative 
insights? Though they may have epistemic bases, it is important to understand that 
epistemic contestations of evidence for environmental justice claim-making, “has a 
politics, just as do other dimensions of claim-making” (Walker 2012, 63). Thus, 
delineating and understating the politics is important regarding how the evidence could 
be utilized.  
Process is the third element linked to evidence and justice in environmental 
justice claim-making. In process, explanations are provided about the sources, causes, 
nature, and patterns of environmental inequality and (in)justice. However, it would be 
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difficult to explain environmental inequalities simply because environmental inequalities 
arise from several interacting processes (Walker 2012). Process is not only useful for 
making claims of environmental (in)justice, but also for policymaking, because it is in 
identifying causal relationships or correlations that policy interventions can be made 
regarding environmental justice. Although I have discussed the three elements of 
environmental justice claim-making in isolation, it is important to underscore the fact that 
these three elements—justice, evidence, and process—are not mutually exclusive. 
They are interwoven in a complex process to achieve an objective—environmental 
justice, and this process in itself is environmental justice.  
From the foregoing, it is evident that environmental justice can be defined as an 
objective, and I adopt its trivalent conception that seeks to attain distributive, procedural, 
and recognition justice (see Fig. 1). It is my argument that defining environmental justice 
as an objective – something to seek for – is the best way. I would argue this way 
because, by adopting an objective-based definition, milestones and other parameters 
could be established to gauge, analyze, and review the rate and scale at which 
(environmental) justice is being achieved. An objective-based definition allows for 
political and social mobilization around a phenomenon of common interest among a 
diversity of population; environmental justice could become the basis of common 
interest to organize people to achieve inclusiveness. That is, action or activist 
engagement in which environmental justice would be a process. In here, I am using the 
theoretical concept of justice as it pertains to environment as a framework for analyzing 
oil governance in Ghana. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that 
environmental justice appeared in the U.S. in the second half of the 20th century first 
(and still) as an activist movement aimed at protecting “where we live, work and play” 
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(Novotny 2000, 3), so this analysis is focused on the environmental impacts of oil that 
affect Ghanaians on-the-ground, where they “live, work and play.” 
Fig. 1. The trivalent environmental justice frame 
 
Furthermore, in an objective-based definition and understanding, environmental 
justice could be used to articulate different visions and set different missions relating to 
well-being (Walker 2012). The objective-based definition of environmental justice is 
appealing because it would be easier to design a just policy as against a just state of 
society (Noonan 2008). It is against this background—an objective-based 
understanding of environmental justice—that I seek to move away from the economic 
perspective of enclave theory towards an environmental justice analysis of the resource 
curse and Ghana’s oil development 
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1.9 Methods  
I have adopted two methods to address the objectives of this project: literature 
analysis and interview. One method is the review and interpretation of already existing 
texts: books, published and unpublished papers, reports, theses and dissertations, 
media and online sources, and any other texts I deem relevant to the objectives of the 
project. Chapter 2 presents a large part of the text analysis, including detailed analysis 
of the blessing-curse debate. The second method is field research in which I collected 
qualitative data through semi-structured interviews with identified key personnel in 
leadership positions who have knowledge of Ghana’s oil industry and policy contexts. 
Since this study involves human participants, the project received approval from the 
University of North Texas’ Institutional Review Board (UNT IRB approval number 
14452) before fieldwork commenced.1 The analyses I conduct in Chapters 3 and 4 are 
based on existing government reports, media coverage and laws about Ghana’s oil 
industry, and qualitative data from the interviews I conducted in Ghana.  
The methodology of this project represents some variations of hermeneutics as 
applied in qualitative research. Though philosophical arguments regarding acceptability 
of outcomes from qualitative research has waned, there remains some skepticism about 
outcomes of qualitative research methodologies. Therefore, it is pertinent to recall some 
of the reasons for which qualitative methods are useful for research in general and 
relevant for this project in particular.  
First, qualitative research permits in-depth exploration of phenomena for deeper 
understanding (Babbie and Rubin 2011). For this project, I was able to ask interviewees 
                                                     
1 Find the approval letters in Appendix A. 
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follow-up questions for clarity and better understanding of responses they were giving. 
Furthermore, qualitative research interview method suits my data collection process 
because the interviews allow me to obtain not only a description of the policymaking 
process in Ghana from the perspective of particular professions (or institutions), but it 
also allows me to gain a deeper understanding of what the policymaking process means 
or represents to the interviewees (professionals/institutions). In fact, the nature of the 
research is not census-style survey of a large sample group, but targetted information 
gathering from expert informants. 
In comparison with quantitative data, the qualitative data obtained from the 
qualitative interviews possesses depth and “presuppositionless descriptions 
of…relevant themes” (Kvale 1983, 176). Descriptions are presuppositionless in terms of 
the interviewees not being overly influenced or induced by the researcher’s own 
standardized questions. Thus, by adopting the qualitative research interview for this 
study, I am able to obtain deeper understanding of the policymaking process in Ghana 
from the perspective of different institutions that participate in the process without 
having to induce them with leading questions. 
Second, qualitative research using semi-structured interviews focuses on 
themes; not strictly on structured questionnaire as with some quantitative methods. 
Semi-structured interviews allow interviewees to direct the research in a way the 
interviewer (researcher) may not have anticipated. Indeed, this was the case in my 
experience. Since I had questions to guide my interviews, there were instances that my 
interviewees discussed very pertinent issues relating to oil development in Ghana that I 
did not anticipate to ask about before the research commenced. Thus, qualitative 
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research interview allows for the discovery of unexpected, yet relevant knowledge 
during research.  
Last, but not the least, qualitative research methods are flexible and cost-
effective (Babbie and Rubin 2011), enabling the researcher to easily adapt the research 
given practical fieldwork or epistemic constraints. The flexibility feature was useful for 
my fieldwork as in some cases, I had to tailor some of the questions I had on my 
interview question guide. I did not have to ask all the questions on my question guide, 
because the structure of the interview allowed the interviewee to have a dialogue with 
the researcher. Because qualitative research does not require specialized equipment, 
the methods are cost-effective. 
Qualitative research methods have their weaknesses and challenges that must 
be avoided. For instance, the method is imprecise, which means that interviewees may 
vary their description of phenomena within the same interview, thus yielding differing 
data to the researcher. Thus, qualitative data methods have issues relating to 
trustworthiness (Babbie and Rubin 2011). However, by interviewing other people and 
triangulating an interviewee’s account with multiple sources and existing literature, the 
researcher should be able to overcome this weakness of qualitative research interviews.  
Another challenge associated with qualitative research interviews is settling on 
the minimum number of interviews required for reaching understanding. Whereas in 
quantitative research there is agreement that a sample of thirty participants is the 
minimum required for analysis and conclusions to be drawn for research (normality); it is 
not the case with qualitative research. There are divergent views regarding the 
minimum number of interviewees required for qualitative research. Whereas 
researchers conducting quantitative research usually have an idea of the number of 
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participants they need in order to test their hypotheses, qualitative researchers often do 
not have this knowledge before they embark on their research (Baker and Edwards 
2012). This is a challenge for qualitative research, especially when it is critiqued in 
contrast to quantitative research: that the number of participants in the interview is 
insufficient to draw any meaningful conclusion. Yet, for practitioners of qualitative 
research, the number of participants depends on the researcher’s epistemological and 
methodological perspective in addition to a number of practical factors like resources, 
and time availability (Baker and Edwards, 2012). In spite of these challenges, it is 
qualitative research interviews that suit the present project.  
Qualitative research interviews have been accepted as sources of (scientific) 
knowledge with some philosophical justification situated in hermeneutics. Moreover, the 
two methods I adopt for this project entail hermeneutic approaches since I am 
interpreting already existing text in the first place and interview material in the second. 
Originally used to interpret theological texts, hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation 
has been extended to other kinds of texts. For this reason, Ricoeur (1973) defines 
“hermeneutics” as “the rules required for the interpretation of the written documents of 
our culture” (91). In this sense, hermeneutics applies only to already existing texts. Also 
significant about Ricoeur’s definition is that hermeneutics is a system of rules, which 
means the approach to interpretation of texts is systematic, not haphazard. 
Hermeneutics has not only been extended to existing texts, it has been extended 
to encompass all human activity. Thus, according to Radnitzky (1970), “Hermeneutic 
human sciences study the objectivations of human cultural activity…with a view to 
interpreting them” (22). Hermeneutics, thus, extends to conversations as Gadamer 
(1975/2004) also argues. According to Gadamer (1975/2004), the process of arriving at 
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understating is conversation, and in the process of understanding (conversation) two 
people would have to completely “open [themselves] to the other” so much so that one 
“accepts the point of view” of the other. The culmination of this is that an understanding 
is reached whereby one understands not the person, but what the person has said. 
(Gadamer 1975/2004, 387). Although this is about conversation, Gadamer concludes 
that this applies to understating texts too. 
 
1.10 Structure of the Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation comprises four chapters treated as follows. In 
Chapter 2, I discuss the resource curse debate in detail by reviewing the literature. 
Here, I survey existing literature to shed light on the two sides of the debate as to 
whether the curse is real or not. I present and analyze arguments from scholars who 
posit that natural resource abundance is a curse to countries so endowed and analyses 
from scholars who argue that there is no curse of natural resources. I do not claim that 
that this review is exhaustive in terms of the authors I review; however, I review authors 
whose works are relevant to the objectives of this study and in a chronological manner. 
To complete the review, I add my own verdict about the resource curse debate, which is 
that no necessary causality exists between natural resource abundance and 
development since the positive or negative contribution of natural resources is 
contingent on several factors adduced by resource curse scholars. Moreover, since the 
literature overwhelmingly suggests that policy choice for good governance is key to 
averting the curse, I add that such policy choice must involve environmental justice.  
 Having established the theoretical basis of this dissertation in Chapter 1 and 
discussed the resource curse in Chapter 2, I begin to focus on Ghana as a case study 
31 
 
in Chapter 3. At the core of this chapter is an assessment of Ghana’s policymaking 
process. Understanding the process is imperative to making judgements or 
assessments about whether the process is adequate or not in delivering specific goods, 
goods such as environmental justice in natural resources extraction. Furthermore, 
understanding the policymaking process enables analyses of specific policies, such as 
the Guidelines on Environmental Assessment and Management of Offshore Oil and 
Gas Development in Ghana (GEAM), in context. In the assessment, I discuss ways in 
which Ghana’s policy process has affected the social process of the GEAM. Following 
from this, I assess the GEAM document to find ways in which it addresses 
environmental justice, and serves as a mechanism for checks and balances and good 
governance of Ghana’s oil sector; I then provide a critique of the GEAM policymaking 
process and complete the chapter by highlighting key challenges facing Ghana’s 
policymaking process. Although on face value the GEAM is unenforceable, I show in 
Chapter 4 that its background documents are enforceable which makes the GEAM’s 
unenforceability trivial. Because the GEAM to a large extent is a collection of 
approaches that are enforceable and thus support accountability in the oil sector. 
In Chapter 4, I continue with the case study analyses begun in Chapter 3. Here, I 
analyze the institutional framework for managing Ghana’s oil sector and the 
environment. This analysis is important in view of the argument that a good institutional 
design is imperative for good governance of the natural resources sector. Moreover, I 
argue in Chapter 3 that the GEAM is an important tool that serves as checks and 
balances in Ghana’s oil sector, although, in order for the GEAM to be effective in 
performing this role, there is need for a strong institutional framework that backs the 
GEAM. Hence, in Chapter 4, I analyze the extent to which elements of the framework 
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complement the GEAM to improve good governance in Ghana’s oil sector, and the 
extent to which the elements are capable of identifying and addressing environmental 
justice issues in Ghana’s oil sector. I divide the institutional framework into two: 
legislative and policy documents, on one hand, and administrative structure, on the 
other. The document-based element of the framework comprises three international 
documents that have been assimilated into practices of Ghana’s oil sector, and five 
national documents. Together, these broadly seek to function as checks and balances 
in Ghana’s oil sector to distribute benefits. The administrative element of the framework 
comprises ministries, departments, agencies, and commissions designated to ensure 
the implementation of legislations, regulations, and policies (including the GEAM). To 
end this chapter, I present an assessment of the level of understanding that players in 
Ghana’s oil sector have about “environmental justice.” The assessment, based on field 
interviews, is important to gauging the extent to which Ghana’s institutional framework is 
capable of using the implicit provisions it has for addressing environmental justice.  
In the last and concluding chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 5, I draw 
syntheses from among the preceding chapters to conclude on the goal of the project 
that the trivalent environmental justice (distributive, procedural, and recognition justice) 
is not in mainstream natural resources policymaking. Furthermore, I conclude that 
Ghana as an institutional framework in place to govern the oil sector; the framework 
comprises international conventions, national laws and policies, and an organizational 
structure; the framework has provisions that implicitly address environmental justice; 
and as a mechanism for checks and balances, the framework needs to be strengthened 





THE RESOURCE CURSE DEBATE  
2.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I laid out the problem at hand that needs addressing—
neglect of environmental justice concerns in the resource curse discourse. In this 
chapter, I review the literature to analyze the resource curse debate in detail. In this 
review, I analyze ideas and arguments in favor of the resource curse on one hand and 
those against the resource curse on the other. I complement this analysis with my own 
verdict about the resource curse debate to complete the chapter. 
 
2.2 The Natural Resource Curse: Real or Myth? 
In spite of awareness that natural resources constitute part of the economic 
system, much still has to be learned about their roles and impacts on economies of 
resource-endowed countries. This learning process faces two critical challenges. One 
challenge is determining methods of accounting for natural resources in economic 
development, typically measured as gross domestic product (GDP). The other 
challenge is coming to terms with ways of ascertaining the exact roles natural resources 
play in the development of countries. Thus, whereas the first challenge deals with 
methods of capturing contributions of natural resources to the economic system, the 
second challenge deals with determining the nature of contributions natural resources 
bring to bear on economic systems. In my view, one challenge has direct implications 
for the other. For example, by determining and establishing a method for capturing 
natural resources in the GDP of a country, it would be possible to also establish the 
trajectory of natural resources in the economic system and thereby possibly determine 
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its role in development. Thus, the two challenges are not mutually exclusive, although 
scholars in natural resources management, particularly economists, tend to separate 
these two challenges leading to more problems, such as the oversimplification of the 
drivers of development. 
Given that concerns have been raised about the first challenge (method of 
capturing contributions of natural resources to the economic system), there arose a 
growing body of literature on ways to calculate aggregate national income taking into 
consideration natural resources. If the standard measure of national income using GDP 
is to take into consideration natural resources, GDP cannot provide a true indication of 
economic growth because such a measure often fails to account for the reduction in 
stock of the natural resource (Winter-Nelson 1995). Winter-Nelson (1995) further argues 
that a measure of national income in a given period should not reduce opportunities for 
future consumption; however, since natural resources are fixed stock (in the long term), 
using revenues from natural resources without considering the impact of lost stock on 
future consumptions is wrong.  
However, the first challenge is not the focus of this dissertation, it is only 
important to acknowledge its existence at this stage. Moreover, I believe that the two 
challenges are connected such that by finding a solution to one, the other could be 
resolved thereafter. Therefore, the second challenge—determining the role natural 
resources play in (economic) development—and how evaluations of its role lead to 
conflicting views are paramount and would be the subject of further analyses.  
In the 1950s, a dominant view was that natural resources were essential for 
economic development. Ideas of Ginsburg (1957) epitomize this thought, and although 
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he recognizes that a definition of “natural resources” is “elusive,” he uses it to refer to 
mean: 
All the freely given material phenomena of nature within the zone of men's 
activities, at present a zone extending about twelve miles above the surface of 
the earth and about four miles below it, plus the additional non-material quality of 
situation or location. (Ginsburg 1957, 204) 
 
Ginsburg’s definition captures many things not captured in subsequent definitions 
and references to “natural resources” in the context of the resource curse discourse. 
Ginsburg’s definition suggests the inclusion of air, landmass (even barren land), and 
geology (even if containing no mineral or oil resources). The definition is very general 
and not specific; however, in contemporary discussion of the resource curse, most 
references to “natural resources” are largely associated with mineral, crude oil, and 
forest and agricultural resources such as fertile soil and water. There is need to specify 
the type of resources, because resource type highly affects the nature of the resource’s 
impact in the economic system. The focus of my study is on oil resources. In spite of 
Ginsburg's (1957) observation in the 1950s that natural resources were important for 
economic development, there existed counter observations, including claims that 
several natural resource-endowed countries have failed to harness their resources for 
the development of those countries.  
Singer (1950) had argued that countries reliant on natural resources were at a 
disadvantage in view of the global economy and international commodity markets. 
Singer’s ideas, although articulated in the 1950s, obtained greater attention in the 1980s 
onwards and into the present day. Thus, based on Singer’s observation that natural 
resources are disadvantageous to countries so endowed, several scholars, including, 
Sachs and Warner (2001)  would later conclude that a “curse of natural resources” 
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exists in countries with “great natural resources wealth” (827). To champions of the 
resource curse, evidence abounds with respect to its reality. However, for opponents, 
the resource curse remains elusive with their position gaining renewed attention in the 
21st Century, after Ginsburg (1957).  
In view of these two sides, a myriad of studies exists that seeks to provide 
evidence for the existence of the “curse of natural resources,” on one hand, and, on the 
other, evidence that point to the nonexistence of the curse. In what follows, I lay out the 
arguments of defenders of the resource curse in sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.7, followed by 
arguments from skeptics of the resource curse in sections 2.2.8 to 2.2.16. For each side 
of the debate, my analyses follow a chronological order of authorship, beginning with 
the oldest to the newest. The ensuing discussion does not suggest the completeness of 
empirical studies supporting or denying existence of the resource curse; this review is 
only to provide examples of such studies and to highlight some of the arguments 
scholars present, particularly the causes they attribute to the resource curse. 
Furthermore, I chose these studies because references to natural resources in these 
works include oil resource, the focus of my study. 
 
2.2.1 Alan Gelb (1988) 
In a landmark study focusing on the management of windfall gains from oil 
resources, Gelb (1988) attempts to provide empirical evidence that prove the existence 
of the curse of natural resources. Gelb (1988) seeks to demonstrate that retardation in 
economic growth occurs in resource-endowed countries, and not in resource-poor 
countries. In studying six oil-endowed countries, Gelb (1988) finds that availability of 
windfall gains from oil exports to the six countries led to relaxation of “three constraints 
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of economic growth”—“foreign exchange, domestic savings, and fiscal revenues” (7). 
The effect of this was the conversion of windfall gains by the six countries into domestic 
capital in the public sector where usage of the revenue showed a political need “to 
spend rapidly” (Gelb 1988, 11). This rapid expenditure then led to a concentration of 
investments in infrastructure, some ill-thought social investments, and large-scale 
industrial projects. These projects had peculiar features: they were projects conducive 
for rapid disbursements; projects poorly planned with cost overruns; and projects based 
on poor feasibility studies. In addition, these investments did not require participatory 
decision-making processes or elaborate institutional changes for implementation (Gelb 
1988). In other words, profligacy is the name of the practice in terms of how the six 
countries spent their windfall incomes, with no corresponding return on disbursements 
of the windfalls. 
Apart from dissipating their windfall incomes, the six oil-exporting countries 
studied by Gelb (1988) suffered from effects of international market volatility. Declining 
oil prices together with rising interest rates exposed vulnerabilities of the six oil-
exporting countries’ economies: the non-oil sectors of their economies collapsed; the 
countries became more reliant on imports while they faced growing international debt 
stocks. The overall effect was declining and negative economic growths of the six 
economies in comparison to economies of non-oil exporting countries. In addition, and 
to compound all these difficulties, Gelb (1988) observes that benefits from the large 
infrastructural investments embarked upon in most of the countries diminished. 
I would concur with Gelb (1988) on the three features he associates with 
investments in infrastructure in oil-exporting countries, particularly the feature of projects 
being conducive for rapid disbursement. This feature has the added effect of 
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perpetuating corrupt activities in the management of oil windfall incomes. However, it 
may not be true to conclude that no corresponding returns are obtainable from 
investments or expenditure on social projects. After all, it is possible to have some 
social (and ecological) returns not captured in the assessment of returns on investment, 
because it is difficult and time-consuming to capture such impacts that may require 
normative valuation; not quantitative valuation. Indeed, such is the case of 
environmental justice, which relies mostly on normative values rather than quantitative 
values for assessment of outcomes.  
Also, Gelb (1988) considers the role political systems play in the use of oil 
windfalls. In this regard, he points out a difficulty in identifying any linkage therein. 
Nonetheless, he makes two broad conclusions on the interaction between political 
structure and oil. First, higher income countries with political systems amenable to 
electoral competition tend to use oil income for subsidies as compared to poorer 
countries, and second, the number of years in terms of governments and extent of 
centralization of political power are important determinants of a windfall cycle. So, 
countries that have the most centralized and lasting policymaking systems achieve high 
growth rates, he argues. A decentralized policymaking system reduces the chances of 
countries spending their windfall revenues cautiously; however, an extremely 
centralized policymaking system can reduce investment efficiency (Gelb 1988, 139).  
Gelb's (1988) difficulty in identifying a link between political systems and oil 
revenue must have arisen because he was perhaps looking for a quantitatively 
measurable variable that was non-existent. By going ahead to still make two broad 
conclusions is an implicit, if not tacit, admission that there is some nexus between 
political systems and use of windfall revenue from oil. Furthermore, an important 
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illustration of this link is Gelb's (1988) observation that oil-endowed countries dissipate 
their windfall revenue on ill-informed projects. This, clearly is an assumption on the part 
of Gelb (1988) of irrational political decision-making resulting in dissipation of public 
funds. 
Gelb's (1988) conclusion that a decentralized policymaking system could reduce 
chances of countries spending oil revenues cautiously is counter to a general appeal in 
the literature that broadening participation in terms of decision-making is better. For one 
thing, broadening participation through decentralization can ensure checks and 
balances, to prevent abuse of power, in addition to ensuring multiple perspectives 
(especially the perspective of women, the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable in society) 
are brought to bear on the policymaking process and reflected in policies. Thus, 
broadening participation ensures decisions are made for a much wider common 
interest. 
In terms of assessing the judicious use of oil windfalls over all, Gelb (1988) 
argues that in the end, consumption level and its distribution across groups in a country 
should be the utmost criteria for determining whether a country has used its windfall 
income wisely. Here, I find Gelb alluding to some aspect of environmental justice—
distributive justice—and I am in total agreement with him on that. However, it may be 
difficult to achieve this distribution if participation in policymaking is limited, as he 
argues. In his view, resource-endowed countries enjoying windfalls from oil should 
adjust their spending levels against rises in income from oil cautiously (Gelb 1988).  
Due to resource-endowed countries’ zeal to spend and the resulting problems, 
for instance, income dissipation, Gelb (1988) recommends the participation of 
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“nonresident equity” (foreign direct investments) in resource-based projects, since such 
participation could have profound benefits. Benefits he identifies that include: 
a) Check[s] on the realism and feasibility studies [of projects] by scrutinizing the 
assessment of rate of return and risk;  
b) Facilitates construction, start up, and operation [of projects]; and  
c) Reduces [projects’] risk by securing markets and lowering the government's 
stake. (Gelb 1988, 140) 
 
In addition to these, Gelb (1988) recommends use of oil income to fund 
improvements in public administration. However, expansion in public sector expenditure 
is one of the problems associated with availability of windfall income. Therefore, this 
recommendation ought to be considered with greater caution.  
The benefits of "non-resident equity" may be profound; however, Gelb's (1988) 
recommendations simply constitute a basis for an argument that he does not go as far 
as to make, for  granting control of natural resources industries to transnational 
corporations. The problem with this recommendation is that Rugraff, Sanchez-
Ancochea, and Sumner (2009) find transnational corporations’ control of natural 
resources not to favor the promotion of economic growth and poverty reduction. They 
point out that in spite of the absence of a universal linkage, a mixture of positive and 
negative impacts is discernible on a country-by-country basis of the presence of 
transnational corporations in natural resources sectors of poor countries. In Chapter 1, I 
argued that the impact of transnational corporations in Ghana’s mining sector, though 
mixed, is generally negative. The account of Gelb (1988), with respect to the resource 
curse does not answer all questions about the curse; it nonetheless contributes by 




2.2.2 Richard Auty (1994) 
Following Gelb's (1988) analysis of the effects of windfall income from oil exports, 
Auty (1994) carries out another landmark study in which he compares the economic 
performances of resources-endowed countries with the performances of resources-poor 
countries. In this study, Auty seeks to explain differences in levels of industrialization 
observed between countries in South East Asia on one hand, and countries in Latin 
America and Sub-Sahara Africa on the other. Auty (1994) seems to equate 
industrialization with (economic) development. However, (economic) development may 
not necessarily be industrialization although I agree with Szirmai (2012) that 
industrialization can lead to development. Auty (1994) is not arguing in this direction. 
According to Auty (1994), natural resource-endowment is the variable accounting 
for differences in levels of industrialization since returns on the sale of natural resources 
to resource-endowed countries serve as disincentives preventing these countries from 
investing in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors of their economies in order to 
become internationally competitive. Auty concludes that favorable natural resource 
endowment produces four impacts on resource-endowed countries. There is: 
a) Longer toleration of lax macro policies;  
b) Less pressure on the country (and industries) to achieve industrial maturation;  
c) A longer period of tolerating rent-seeking groups; and  
d) Tremendous increase in chances of declining and erratic economic 
growth.(Auty 1994, 24) 
 
Thus, in Auty's (1994) conclusion, in a country endowed with natural resources 
and obtaining windfall revenues from the resource, that country’s administration, 
supervisory institutions, and the general populace of that country become more 
accommodating and tolerant of national policies that are neither productive nor efficient 
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in spearheading economic development of that country. Auty (1994) provides two 
reasons: first, the country becomes over optimistic about the prospects of the natural 
resource meeting the revenue needs of the country; and second, availability of windfall 
income from resource extraction reduces the extent the state taxes its population. This 
in turn reduces the extent to which the population exerts pressure on the state to 
formulate and implement efficient national policies (Auty, 1994). Furthermore, Auty 
(1994) concludes that in a country endowed with natural resources, there is tolerance 
for rent-seeking behavior that includes individuals and institutions seeking to increase 
their wealth from the natural resource without creating any new wealth. This can involve 
overexploitation of natural resources without thinking about future generations. In Auty's 
(1994) conclusion, resource-endowed countries tolerate such behavior for a long time 
culminating in the suppression of economic growth in the country. Hence the ‘curse.’  
Auty's (1994) conclusion may apply in some other resource-endowed countries, 
but my observation of the Ghanaian context is a bit different with respect to taxation. 
Although generally optimistic about the oil find and the resultant windfall income, 
Ghanaians are presently paying taxes at levels never seen before in the history of the 
country. There are other reasons accounting for the resource curse than what Auty 
(1994) argues for, and the search for these reasons has yielded a variety of them. In 
what follows, I discuss some of the drivers or triggers of the curse in resource-endowed 
countries.  
 
2.2.3 Jeffery Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995 and 2001) 
In pursuit of more answers, Sachs and Warner (1995) follow the approaches of 
Gelb (1988) and Auty (1994) to compare the economic performances of oil-exporting 
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countries with the performances of non-oil-exporting countries. Gelb's (1988) study, 
though foundational, was only limited to six countries. Auty (1994) went a step further by 
comparing resource-endowed economies to resource-poor countries. However, in 
studying ninety-seven developing countries, Sachs and Warner (1995) not only increase 
the number of countries, but also agree with Gelb (1988) on a pattern in which 
economic growth in resource-poor countries outperforms economic growth in resource-
endowed countries. One significance of the study by Sachs and Warner (1995) is that it 
is the first study to investigate “the adverse effect of resource abundance on growth on 
the basis of a worldwide, comparative study” (Sachs and Warner 1995, 3). In addition to 
being the first global study, Sachs and Warner (1995) add new ideas and shed light on 
the resource curse: they argue that their study documents “a statistically significant, 
inverse, and robust association between natural resource intensity and [economic] 
growth”(Sachs and Warner 1995, 21).  Sachs and Warner (1995) represent another 
empirical study looking for and using quantitatively measurable attributes to show 
evidence of the resource curse.  
Following Sachs and Warner (1995), Sachs and Warner (2001) reaffirm the 
existence of the resource curse and provide further empirical explanations. However, 
they note the evidence for the curse is “not bulletproof” but only “strong” (Sachs and 
Warner 2001, 828). Adducing reasons in support of the resource curse, Sachs and 
Warner (2001) point out that from a casual observation, the category of countries 
endowed with natural resources does not overlap with the category of countries 
recording higher GDP. From casual observations, they find countries considered 
extremely rich in natural resources, such as Nigeria, the Gulf States, Mexico, and 
44 
 
Venezuela fail to sustain economic growth. Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that these 
casual observations are in agreement with evidence from their empirical analysis, too.  
However, Sachs and Warner (2001) caution that the results of their empirical 
study may be misleading. The negative correlation between resource abundance and 
growth of GDP is potentially attributable to “a by-product of subtle bias” (Sachs and 
Warner 2001, 829). That is to say, it is possible another constant variable affects growth 
of resource-endowed countries, which is not observable, yet produces a negative 
correlation between resource-endowment and growth. To eliminate this doubt, Sachs 
and Warner (2001) show (using an empirical approach) how there can never be such an 
effect, and that the resource curse exists, and it is due to resource endowment and not 
because of some other variable not detected. Their conclusion on this matter, however, 
is revealing, as they claim: “There is no clear evidence from the regressions […] that 
there was an omitted variable in our previous growth regressions that can account for 
the curse of natural resources” (Sachs and Warner 2001, 830–31). This conclusion is 
revealing, because Sachs and Warner (2001) fail to find evidence for any hidden 
variables that could account for declining growth of GDP in resource-endowed 
countries. In effect, their claim to finding a negative correlation between resource-
endowment and GDP decline is what they have. In establishing that there exists an 
investment relationship between resource-endowment and economic development and 
naming it the “curse of resources” (Sachs and Warner 1995; Sachs and Warner 2001), 
focus was now placed on the mechanisms through which the curse emanates. The 




2.2.4 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Thor H. Tryggvi, and Zoega Gylfi (1999)  
Gylfason, Tryggvi, and Gylfi (1999) argue that economic growth is not as 
simplistic as empirical studies seek to portray it through identifications of “a couple of 
robust determinants” of economic growth in the literature (Gylfason, Tryggvi, and Gylfi 
1999, 204). Although this may sound like a critique of the predominant use of empirical 
techniques and analysis in the resource curse discourse, it is not, because they too 
conduct empirical analyses to support their argument. From their perspective, 
abundance of natural resources in a country leads to increased primary production, 
which in turn negatively affects economic growth by lowering expenditure on “human 
capital,” that is, “educated workers” (Gylfason, Tryggvi, and Gylfi 1999, 206). Typically, 
economic activities fall into primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. The primary sector 
generally involves extractive activities; the secondary sector involves manufacturing 
activities; and the tertiary sector involves services.. 
According to the explanation by Gylfason et al. (1999), primary sectors of natural 
resource-endowed countries need less human capital in comparison to the secondary 
and tertiary sectors. Hence, since resource-endowed countries generate less human 
capital required for the secondary and tertiary sectors, the economy experiences 
stunted growth (Gylfason et al. 1999). They attribute the non-existent human capital to 
effects of the Dutch Disease. The expression “Dutch Disease” was coined in 1977 to 
describe a decline in manufacturing in the Netherlands following discovery of a large 
natural gas field (Corden 1984). For Gylfason et al. (1999), the Dutch Disease effect 
reduces the profitability of other export sectors of resource-endowed economies, except 
the primary sector. The effect of this is a slump in growth of the other export sectors of 
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the economy since these sectors are not profitable ventures that entrepreneurs would 
like to pursue.  
However, in spite of recognizing the effects of the Dutch Disease as responsible 
for low human capital, the principal explanation Gylfason et al. (1999) identify as the 
driver of the resource curse is education. They provide two arguments for the role of 
education in the resource curse. First, they argue that countries with relatively large 
primary sectors have less need for formal education because their secondary sectors 
are non-existent. Second, they argue, the absence of good educational systems inhibits 
growth of the secondary sectors of resource-endowed countries. The absence of a good 
educational system makes it expensive to train the human capital required for the 
secondary sector to take off and thrive. In the end, the dominance of the primary sector 
allows the system of education to churn out skills that suit a primary sector, thus stifling 
emergence and growth of a secondary sector. Thus, the secondary sector remains 
small or absent and incapable of pushing the country to economic development.  
The explanation by Gylfason et al. (1999) in respect to the role of education in 
promoting and perpetuating a primary sector and inhibiting the secondary and tertiary 
sectors appears to be a form of a feedback loop. In this loop activities of the one 
(primary sector) feeds and affects the other (secondary sector) and vice-versa, and until 
the link is broken somewhere, the status quo remains. One question needs answer: 
how can this link be broken? I would argue that by identifying and addressing 
environmental justice issues to include making investments addressing environmental 
justice concerns in the two sectors, some headway could be made in breaking the 
cycle. In spite of the explanations of Gylfason et al. (1999) on the source and driver of 
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the resource curse, many others who agree on the existence of the curse do not agree 
with their explanations.  
 
2.2.5 Michael Ross (1999) 
Ross (1999) takes a different perspective on the explanations of the resource 
curse by discussing four economic arguments, three political and two on the role of 
nations. While noting and reiterating disagreements among resource-curse scholars on 
a single explanation for the curse of natural resources, Ross (1999) undertakes a 
review of various explanations of the resource curse provided by other scholars. He 
categorizes these explanations into two major groups—economic and political. He 
identifies the explanations that fall under the economic to include declining terms of 
trade for primary commodities, international commodity market instability, weak linkages 
between resource and non-resource sectors of the national economy, and effects of the 
Dutch Disease. Ross (1999) then identifies the explanations under the political group to 
include cognitive explanations, societal explanations, and state centered explanations. 
To these explanations, he adds two more explanations—state ownership of enterprises 
and states inability to enforce property rights in resource-endowed countries (Ross, 
1999). Thus in all, Ross (1999) discusses nine explanations for the curse of resources. 
Accounting for the historical basis of the first economic explanation, Ross (1999) 
falls on Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) who argue against development strategies 
that rely on exports of natural resources: primary commodities have a tendency to suffer 
declining terms of trade. Ross (1999) argues that following the theories of Prebisch and 
Singer, studies exist that show an overall general decline in the terms of trade for 
primary commodities since the twentieth century. Furthermore, Ross (1999) points to 
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studies that show a linkage between terms of trade and economic growth, and comes to 
a conclusion that declining terms of trade accounts for “much of the resource curse,” in 
general. However, Ross (1999) waters down the effect of declining terms of trade by 
conceding that there is weakness on the robustness of the linkage at the individual 
country level. 
From economic and empirical bases, the link may be weak; however, insofar as 
there is a linkage, I would argue that it should not matter whether the link is weak or 
strong since the determination of strength or weakness is a quantitative matter, not a 
normative one. From my perspective, what should matter with respect to this linkage is 
that it affects the livelihoods and well-being of local communities (people and the 
environment). Therefore, we should not rely on empirical analyses alone to give us the 
whole picture and find answers to questions of development challenges and the 
resource curse.  
Regardless, Ross (1999) argues that declining terms of trade largely links to 
another economic explanation—the instability of the international commodity market. 
Though economists do not yet agree on the extent to which an unstable international 
commodity market is detrimental to poor countries, they agree that export earnings of 
resource-endowed countries “are exceptionally unstable” (Ross 1999, 304). Thus, Ross 
agrees with Nurske (1958) who argues that high fluctuations in primary commodity 
prices on the international market can be transferred to domestic economies of poor 
countries that rely on export earnings from primary commodities. This transfer then 
leads to unpredictable government revenue, unreliable foreign exchange supplies, and 
increased risk of private investment, all of which culminate in the curse of natural 
resources. Thus, this complements the argument by Gylfason et al. (1999) that the 
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economic cause of the resource curse is lack of linkages between the booming primary 
(natural resource) sector on one hand and other sectors (secondary and tertiary) of 
resource-endowed economies on the other. 
For the third economic explanation of the resource curse, Ross (1999) argues 
that natural resource-dependent industries are unlikely to promote economic growth in 
resource-endowed countries with multinational companies dominating the primary 
sector. Where they are allowed (which is often the case), multinational companies 
repatriate their profits from natural resources extraction instead of investing it in the 
local economy. Doing so leaves natural resource-exporting countries with booming 
natural resources enclaves that have no linkages to the rest of the national economy 
(Ross 1999; Hirschman 1958). Arguing further, Ross (1999) adds that the persistence 
of the linkages problem is a sign of policy failure, where governments of resource-
endowed countries fail to use policy instruments to direct and foster linkages between 
the natural resources sector and the rest of their economies.  
I concur with Ross (1999) to the extent that policy is important for directing and 
facilitating establishment of linkages to industry enclaves. From my perspective, 
however, several avenues exist in a resource-endowed country for linkages with that 
natural resources sector. The economic sphere is not the only sector in which linkages 
are available. For instance, opportunities and needs exist for linkages between natural 
resources and the environment, health, education, and the social spheres of a country. 
These linkages can be fostered through environmental justice related interventions. 
Moreover, with the acknowledgment by Ross (1999) that policies can play important 
roles in averting a resource curse, I believe that policies with environmental justice as 
overarching policy principle or objective could be pursued.  
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The final economic explanation of the resource curse that Ross (1999) discusses 
is the Dutch Disease effect. However, Ross (1999) argues that  unlike what others 
believe, the Dutch Disease refers to a combination of two effects that precede resource 
booms. The first effect is a rise in real value of a country’s currency, which is the result 
of a steep rise in exports from the country. The second effect is the preponderance of a 
booming resource sector to attract capital and labor, denying these factors to the 
country's manufacturing and agricultural sectors. This latter effect, therefore, leads to 
rising costs of production in the non-export sectors of the country. The ultimate effect is 
a rise in the cost of goods and services that the resource-endowed country cannot 
import, and a decline in local agriculture and manufactured goods meant for export 
(Ross, 1999). This in effect is a form of crowding out, where the natural resource sector 
suppresses all other sectors of a resource-endowed economy. 
From the perspective of Ross (1999), the economic factors accounting for the 
resource curse outlined above should be manageable for governments of resource-
endowed countries to ensure their economies do not suffer. However, most 
governments in resource-endowed countries fail to put in place measures to correct 
these economic factors. The role of governments in the resource sectors, therefore, is 
very important. After all, governments of resource-endowed countries play major roles 
in the natural resources sector through various policies they pass. Indeed, Ross (1999) 
concurs with Neary and Wijnbergen (1986) on the importance of government policy. 
This recognition of government's role has compelled a number of studies to understand 
why governments often fail with their policies to avert the curse of resources (Neary and 
Wijnbergen, 1986; Ross, 1999). 
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Three main groups of theories account for government policy failures, according 
to Ross (1999). These theories also correspond to the political explanations of the 
resource curse. They include cognitive theories, societal theories, and statist theories. 
According to the cognitive theories’ account of the resource curse, windfall income from 
export of natural resources produce short-sightedness effect among policymakers, 
which leads to “myopic sloth” or “myopic exuberance in policymakers.” On the other 
hand, the social theories’ account of the resource curse suggests windfall income from 
resource exports empower social groups inclined to “growth-impeding or trade policies.” 
The third group of policy failure theories, statist theories, suggest that availability of 
windfall income from natural resources exports weaken state institutions that have 
mandates of ensuring long-term economic development (Ross 1999, 308–9).  
In addition to these explanations of the resource curse, Ross (1999) introduces 
two more factors. One is that the resource curse is a result of government ownership of 
resource industries in resource-endowed countries, and therefore he proposes an 
antidote—privatize natural resources-based industries. The other factor, he argues, is 
failure by governments of resource-endowed countries to enforce property rights as 
responsible for the resource curse (Ross 1999).  
Having catalogued these factors, Ross concludes with an affirmation that the 
difference in economic growth between resource-endowed and resource-poor countries 
is “most certainly” the effect of “international economic factors, including a decline in the 
terms of trade for primary commodities and the instability of commodity markets”(Ross 
1999, 231). Although this effect is avoidable, resource-endowed countries have not 
avoided it because of policy failure. In spite of alluding to the role of policy failure in the 
resource curse, Ross (1999) does not attribute the emergence of the curse to policy 
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failure, which would have been apt. Rather, Ross (1999) seeks the cause of policy 
failure and attributes its emergence to the politics of the resource curse, while also 
claiming scholars know little about the politics of the resource curse. 
 
2.2.6 Jeffery Sachs and Andrew Warner (2001) and Richard Auty (2001) 
In spite of noting the absence of a universally accepted theory of the resource 
curse, Sachs and Warner (2001), provide some explanations to what they consider the 
driver of the curse. Most explanations, they claim, have a “crowding-out logic” (Sachs 
and Warner 2001, 833). That is, natural resources production tends to crowd-out a 
productive sector of economies in resource-endowed countries, and since the 
productive sector is eliminated or becomes weak, growth of these economies tend to 
suffer. However, Sachs and Warner (2001) believe the productive sector driving growth 
is the “traded manufacturing activities” of resource-endowed economies (Sachs and 
Warner 2001, 833). Thus, resource-endowment tends to create an unfavorable 
atmosphere for the export sector of resource-endowed countries to be competitive. The 
result is the inability of these countries to achieve economic growth through the export 
of locally manufactured goods. 
What Sachs and Warner (2001) have done in their identification of the 
“productive sector” is to oversimplify and reduce drivers of (economic) development to 
exports. I agree that the export sectors of many countries are important for economic 
growth. However, I find it too narrow to limit drivers of economic development to one 
cause—export—as Sachs and Warner (2001) argue. I believe other drivers exist (such 
as political stability, exchange rate, education, physical infrastructure, and foreign direct 
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investments) that affect the socioeconomic development of resources-endowed 
countries. Ross (1999) for instance discusses multiple economic factors. 
Since other factors must also drive economic development, and in view of the 
observation by Sachs and Warner (2001) that it is difficult to identify the productive 
sector driving the resource curse, it is appropriate to discuss some scholars who identify 
different variables. Moreover, in line with the conclusion by Ross (1999) that little is 
known about the politics of the resource curse, I turn to Auty (2001) who discusses the 
capture of the political processes in resource-endowed countries as an impact on the 
curse. He argues that resource-endowment leads to “predatory” political states with 
governments whose rent-seeking behaviors disrupt activities of the economy deployed 
to spearhead industrialization. This then leads to the collapse of economic growth in 
resource-endowed countries. I would disagree with Auty (2001) that industrialization is 
the same as development. Unsurprisingly, several others disagree with Auty (2001) in 
terms of the identity of the driver of economic growth and thus, of the resource curse. 
 
2.2.7 James Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier (2006) 
Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) recognize the knowledge gaps Ross (1999) 
identifies in the politics of the resource curse, which Auty (2001) provides some insight. 
It is important to note Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006)do not have any doubt about 
the reality of the resource curse; their concern is with answering the question: “what are 
the mechanisms linking natural resource endowments and their prices to development?” 
Furthermore, they believe although policy failures account for the resource curse, no 
“political model of resource extraction” exists (Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006, 448). 
Therefore, they develop a model to analyze ways in which resource booms initiate 
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“political incentives,” and how these negatively affect development through “policy 
‘mistakes’” (Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006, 448). In terms of what constitutes 
“development,” I infer that Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) are referring to 
economic development, a reference that is normal in the resource curse discourse, 
although a measure of economic development does not necessarily represent a 
measure of national human development. Human development encompasses the well-
being of the people (Stanton 2007; UNDP 2015)They present four key findings from the 
application of their model.  
First, Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) claim that in order to maximize rents, 
holders of political offices in resource-endowed countries have a tendency to over-
extract natural resources “relative to the socially efficient extraction path” (450). This is 
because, holders of political offices are not sure they will remain in power for long. On 
the other hand, Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) argue, these politicians would 
care about the future stock of the resources if they believed they would remain in power 
for long. Hence, the intention of holders of political power in the case where they are not 
guaranteed political office for a long time will be to maximize their interests in the 
monetary returns from the extraction of natural resources. The problem with this 
assertion by Robinson et al. (2006) is the proper definition and determination of what is 
an acceptable “socially efficient [natural resource] extraction path.” From my 
perspective, what should count in an assessment of “socially efficient resources 
extraction” must include assessments of decision-making processes in the management 
of resources and the distribution of returns from extraction of the resources. However, I 
am not sure these are matters Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) consider. 
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Second, Robinson et al. (2006) claim that persistent resource booms lead to 
improvements in efficiency of the resource extraction. Resource booms increase the 
value of holding political power, making incumbent political leaders allocate more 
resources to retain political power. Seeing the importance of the resource in maintaining 
political power, incumbent political leaders value future reserves of the resource, hence 
motivating them to pursue a socially efficient extraction path of the resource (Robinson 
et al. 2006). Thus, resource booms lead to improvements in the efficiency of the 
extraction path of the resource, which appears to be good, in respect to the efficiency 
introduced into the extraction process (Robinson et al. 2006). However, in terms of the 
overall benefit of resource extraction to the country, it is not the best; the rent from the 
resource extraction and sale accrues to the political elite and does not inure to the 
development needs of the country, or the local people from whose land the resources 
are extracted. Thus, I would argue that unless the efficient resource extraction leads to 
broader national impact, it would not be desirable to achieve efficient resource 
extraction only for the benefit of the political elite alone. 
I am doubtful whether Robinson et al. (2006) are right in claiming that resources 
boom leads to efficient resources extraction prompted by political incumbents’ interests. 
I acknowledge that their claim may be right theoretically; however, for incumbent 
political leaders (especially in sub-Sahara Africa) political incumbents often seek to 
maximize the economic rents from resources extraction within the shortest possible time 
knowing pressure would soon be brought to bear on them if they unlawfully extended 
their stay in political office. Thus, there is a tendency to pillage the resource in the 
process of maximizing the economic rent and send their wealth overseas to other 
countries (mostly developed countries in Europe). 
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In their third finding, Robinson et al. (2006) reaffirm findings by Gelb (1988) and 
others (cf. Auty [1999]; Gavin [1993]; Gelb [1988]; and Lane and Tornell [1999)] of a 
tendency among politicians in resource-endowed countries to increasingly misallocate 
state resources in the face of a boom. In their attempt to hold on to political power, 
politicians misallocate state resources through political patronage; they pursue policies 
that increase public sector employment; and maintain an inefficient public sector 
employment. Consequently, there is expansion in public sector employment when 
employment in other sectors are contracting; increase in the wage bill of public sector 
workers after resource booms; and the overall increase in the expenditure of 
government in periods of resource booms. This finding prevailed in Ghana. Increase in 
public sector expenditure occurred in Ghana after the oil discovery: in 2010, three years 
after discovering oil, Government of Ghana initiated a public sector pay reform called 
the Single Spine Salary Structure (SSSS) and the reform led to an increase in the wage 
bill of Ghana’s public sector, and contributed to the negative growth of Ghana’s 
economy which started in 2009.  The reform was aimed at “motivating public service 
workers to improve service delivery and productivity” (Fair Wages and Salaries 
Commission 2013, n.p.). 
Finally, Robinson et al. (2006) find that a critical determinant of whether a 
resource boom can lead to a curse or not depends on the quality of institutions. 
Because institutions have the capacity (and in many instances the mandate) to 
determine the extent to which political incentives can be transferred into policy 
outcomes. In their view, political institutions of interest in this context are institutions that 
ensure accountability of public officers and politicians, and generally formulate and 
promote rational bases for resource allocation.  
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While I agree that institutions are critical here, I wonder about the emphasis by 
Robinson et al. (2006) that such institutions hold only politicians and public office 
holders accountable. They do not see the need to hold resource extracting companies 
(mostly transnational corporations), private individuals, chiefs, local “technocrats,” and 
all stakeholders with interests in the natural resource accountable. In my view, every 
stakeholder in the natural resources sector must be held to account for their decisions 
and actions insofar as they affect resource extraction and allocation of proceeds.  
Robinson et al. (2006) argue further, that institutions of “low quality” tend to 
attract and promote bad policies by enabling incumbent political leadership to pursue 
inefficient redistribution of public resources in order to maintain hold of political power; 
however, “high quality” institutions on the other hand do not allow such inefficient 
approaches to operate (465). In conclusion, Robinson et al. (2006) claim that the extent 
to which resource booms promote inefficient redistribution of public resources 
(particularly windfalls) depends on the quality of institutions: 
In countries with institutions that limit the ability of politicians to use clientelism to 
bias elections, resource booms tend to raise national income. When such 
institutions are absent, the perverse political incentives may dominate and 
income can fall—here is a resource curse. (Italics in original). (Robinson, Torvik, 
and Verdier 2006, 466) 
 
This conclusion is laudable; however, Robinson et al. (2006) fail to define or provide a 
set of criteria for determining “low” and “high” quality institutions. What constitutes “low” 
or “high”?  Are institutions low or high quality because of their capacities and 
achievements, or they are low or high quality because they perform certain functions, or 
are institutions low or high quality because they possess staff of a certain qualification? 
Furthermore, does the strength or weakness of an institution depend on policy? 
Robinson et al. (2006) seem to suggest that institutional strength depends on 
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personnel. To this, I would add that a determination of institutional strength should 
include policy principles on which bases qualified personnel could function well. Policies 
anchored on strong principles, environmental justice for example, would provide clear 
mandates and backing not only to personnel of institutions, but also to the general 
population to make demands for action. Robinson et al.'s (2006) emphasis on politicians 
alone in their conclusion is inadequate. It is myopic. Apart from politicians, several 
actors exist in the natural resource extraction and management sectors who must 
account for their decisions and actions. These actors, arguably, may even wield more 
influence in natural resources extraction and income allocation processes than 
politicians would.  
The position that natural resources are advantageous for economic development 
gained renewed attention in the 21st Century among scholars following Ginsburg’s 
position in the 1950s. These scholars express different degrees of skepticism about the 
existence and inevitability of the resource curse. In the following sections of 2.2.8 to 
2.2.16, I discuss arguments from scholars that are skeptical that the curse of natural 
resources is inevitable, and scholars more optimistic about the role of natural resources 
in resource-endowed economies. 
 
2.2.8 Elissaios Papyrakis and Reyer Gerlagh (2004) 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) express concern about the inevitability of the 
natural resource curse. They acknowledge observations by natural resources 
economists that economies of resource-endowed countries tend to perform poorly in 
comparison to economies of resource-poor countries; however, to Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2004), when taken alone without considering other factors, natural resources 
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have a positive effect on economic development. This is a claim that is counter to 
positions taken by resource curse proponents, like Sachs and Warner (2001) who argue 
that resource abundance is a curse to natural resource-endowed countries.  
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) argue further that resource-endowed countries 
may not reap positive effects of natural resources “due to adverse indirect effects,” 
which emanate from the prevalence of some factors, namely, “corruption, low 
investment, protectionist measures, a deteriorating terms of trade, and low educational 
standards” (190). Since other scholars had previously identified these factors as 
responsible for the resource curse one may be tempted to believe that Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2004) support the argument that the resource curse is real. What they are 
saying is that the curse could be possible if these indirect factors were to play out in 
natural resources-endowed countries, and so they conclude: “natural resource wealth 
increases growth, if negative indirect effects are excluded” (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
2004, 190). Hence, natural resources per se cannot cause economies to perform badly 
unless we take into consideration the indirect effects of corruption, low investment, 
protectionist measures, deteriorating terms of trade, and low educational standards.  
Although Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) do not say that these factors are 
exclusive to natural resources-endowed countries, they also do not say if natural 
resources-poor countries could encounter these factors as well. As a result, there is the 
danger of interpreting them as ascribing these factors to only natural resources-
endowed countries. However, I would argue that these factors are not exclusive to 
natural resources-endowed countries. So, natural resources-poor countries could have 
what is called the curse even if they were not natural resources-endowed, but were to 
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face the factors listed by Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004). Thus, whatever effect are 
called the “resource curse” are not the results of natural resources abundance per se. 
 
2.2.9 Graham Davis and John Tilton (2005) 
Davis and Tilton (2005) share in the conclusions of Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004) that the resource curse is not inevitable. However, for the former pair, it is highly 
impossible for scholars to claim they know the pathway to economic development since 
economic development is an extremely complex issue. For Davis and Tilton (2005), 
every country has a different set of nuances regarding economic development, and 
therefore, a model of development should consider several variables. Nonetheless, in 
the resource curse discourse, only a few variables are of interest to its proponents. 
These variables of interest comprise those that suit empirical analyses and are easy to 
measure quantitatively. Moreover, measuring development can include variables that 
require qualitative and normative variables for assessments, which empirical 
approaches in the resource curse studies overlook, or indeed are incapable of 
measuring.  
The criticism by Davis and Tilton (2005) to the extent that scholars overlook the 
fact that different countries have different nuances regarding economic development 
may apply to my own attempt to seek to generalize that sub-Sahara African countries 
can learn from the practices (and failures) of Ghana. Though such a criticism is 
welcome, I believe it would be misplaced. My argument in seeking to extend Ghana’s 
experiences to other countries is this: whatever policies other countries in sub-Sahara 
Africa may wish to formulate for natural resources, they should consider environmental 
justice as a policy objective. The details and nuances as to how they capture it in their 
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policies would depend on the individual contexts of the countries. After all, 
environmental justice is contextual in space and time (Walker 2012). 
I agree with criticism that proponents of the natural resource curse fail to capture 
all variables that affect economic development in their models, for in their arguments, 
champions of the resource curse usually focus on two variables out of a myriad of 
variables (Davis and Tilton 2005). Notwithstanding this criticism, Davis and Tilton (2005) 
fail to point out that economic development in itself does not necessarily imply human 
development. They too seem to proceed on the assumption that economic development 
is synonymous to human development. I disagree, because scholars have argued that 
traditional economic metrics do not measure the lived experience of poverty. In 
particular, feminist scholars have shown that women’s experience of poverty does not 
correlate with traditional economic metrics (cf. Shiva 1993; Waring 1988; Waring 1999). 
The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) or Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare 
(ISEW) are alternative sets of economic metrics to assess development for the 
perspective of daily-lived experience of populations. However, the resource curse 
debate’s economic analysis are very much in terms of national wealth that rarely reflect 
wealth distribution or standards of living in the global South. Moreover, the argument 
that economic development is desirable and should be pursued since it would lead to 
human development has waned in development theory (cf. Ranis, Stewart, and Ramirez 
2000). Thus, fundamentally, the argument by proponents of the resource curse that the 
phenomenon is real is missing a very important target—human development. Therefore, 
the argument should be disregarded since its focus is on economic development, 
whereas it should have been on human development. Even if considered in respect to 
economic development, the resource curse argument remains dubious. 
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Since the target of the resource curse argument is economic development, Davis 
and Tilton (2005) argue that mining, as an example of natural resources extraction, “can 
promote economic development” (240); a contrast to proponents of the resource curse. 
From their perspective, however, the gateway to making sure natural resources 
contribute positively to economic growth is through public policy. And in order for public 
policy to be relevant in channeling natural resources for economic development, Davis 
and Tilton (2005) raise “useful questions for policy,” that beg for answers:  
How can public policy maximize the net benefits a country receives from its 
mining sector [natural resources]? How can policy ensure that these benefits are 
effectively used for economic development and the reduction of poverty? How 
should policy and international development institutions respond when the good 
governance and other conditions necessary to ensure that mining will on balance 
promote development are not in place? (Davis and Tilton 2005, 241) 
 
Indeed, these are useful questions; however, I would argue here that when used 
as a policy objective, environmental justice could galvanize and consolidate all these 
questions making it easier to find answers. Nevertheless, environmental justice is not a 
feature in the natural resource curse discourse at all, although scholars consider public 
policy a very important determinant of the resource curse. 
 
2.2.10 Erwin Bulte and Richard Damania (2008) 
Public policy is political decision-making and it significantly affects natural 
resources management. Bulte and Damania (2008) provide a model that examines the 
political economy of natural resources. In particular, they look at effects of resources 
endowment on decision making by governments, corruption, and political incentives. In 
this light, Bulte and Damania (2008) argue that a pathway to the emergence of the 
resource curs could be due to re-allocation of entrepreneurial talents in the economy of 
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resources-endowed countries in an “inefficient way,” and because governments have 
been influenced by bribes, they have abandoned policies that could maximize economic 
growth (19). Although Bulte and Damania (2008) are not what I would call “strong” 
skeptics of the resource curse, a significant contribution from their perspective is 
bringing to the fore the argument that policy is an important element that governments 
of resources-endowed countries can use to avoid the curse. Alternatively, if not properly 
used, public policy could facilitate the emergence of the resource curse.  
 
2.2.11 Christa Brunnschweiler and Erwin Bulte (2008) 
A stronger expression of doubt about the reality of the resource curse comes 
from Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) who describe the argument of resource curse 
proponents as a “red herring” (248). Their claim is that natural resources may lead to a 
curse depending on the way the resources are accounted for; otherwise, the so-called 
curse is a perspective. In making this argument Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) 
present a different perspective on the measure of natural resources endowment (or 
abundance) and argue that the measure prominently used in the literature measures 
dependence or intensity, not abundance (or endowment). Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2008) thus propose a method for measuring natural resources endowment that entails 
taking stock of the resources. They argue that a “better measure of resource abundance 
would reflect resource stocks, as opposed to current economic flows derived from them” 
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, 249). They illustrate this “stock-based” measure of 
natural resources endowment in their study by taking “valuations of the net present 
value of benefits [from the resources] over a time horizon of 20–25 years” 
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, 252–53). Brunnschweiler and Bulte's (2008) 
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examination of the measure of resource endowment is very significant since not many 
studies look at this critically, although it is an important aspect of the resource curse 
discourse. 
Another significance of the study by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) lies in their 
examination of institutional quality in relation to resources endowment. In this respect, 
they identify two perspectives on “institutional quality”: one perspective refers to “‘deep 
and durable’ characteristics of societies,” while the other perspective is institutional 
quality as “the reflection of policy outcomes that are in the state of flux” (Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte, 2008, 249). Also see Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2004); and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004). In the end, they emphasize the 
former interpretation of institutional quality since that interpretation “is consistent with 
the idea of institutions as constitutional variables” (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, 
249). Indeed, the persistent constitutional framework grants power and mandate to 
policymakers. Doing so empowers policymakers to make specific policies that establish 
new institutions, modify existing institutions, and to govern. Such institutions would 
include anti-corruption bodies, law enforcement bodies, and investment promotion 
bodies. Thus “constitutional design determines a range of policy outcomes” 
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, 249). 
Institutional quality, in the perspective adopted by Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2008) implies that institutions do not exists only as physical edifices (as in 
organizations/offices), but as norms, conventions, rules, laws, and the people who 
execute the laws. In this regard, institutions are important for society in general, not only 
for natural resources governance. The overall well-being of society—including, for 
instance, maintaining law and order, fostering political governance, ensuring justice, and 
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determining property rights among others—depend on good institutions. Therefore, it is 
easy for one to think of institutional quality in a general sense and to miss out how 
institutional quality is pertinent to the avoidance of the resource curse. My criticism is 
that Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) do not provide deeper insight into the role of 
institutions in natural resources management in particular. Furthermore, they too do not 
envisage the nexus between institutions and environmental justice in natural resources 
management. 
 
2.2.12 Daniel Lederman and William Maloney (2008) 
Taking the institutional quality argument further, Lederman and Maloney (2008) 
argue that there is no curse associated with natural resource abundance. They criticize 
proponents of the resource curse for their methods of measuring natural resource 
abundance. In particular, Lederman and Maloney (2008) criticize the use of share of 
natural resources export in GDP as proxy for natural resources endowment. They argue 
that using the right proxy for natural resources endowment in empirical studies and the 
understanding of its properties is important in establishing the veracity of any empirical 
study. However, they have yet to satisfy themselves that proponents of the resource 
curse use the right proxies. Furthermore, Lederman and Maloney (2008) argue that 
econometric evidence for the curse "remains weak" with "results [of the empirical 
analyses] changing depending on the empirical proxies used" for representing natural 
resources endowment (10).  
With respect to the institutional factor, they argue that the way to go in order to 
address poor economic performances of natural resource-endowed countries lies in 
"macroeconomic policy rather than trade or industrial policy" (Lederman and Maloney 
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2008, 8). In other words, they interpret the institutional quality factor in terms of policy - 
macroeconomic policy. This is significant, although they discount micro policies. Also, 
Lederman and Maloney (2008) interpret the institutional factor to mean organization. In 
this respect they argue that natural resource endowment may not lead to poor 
institutions (organizations); however, natural resources may stunt development when 
they interact with some types of political institutions. What types? They do not mention 
them. 
Although Lederman and Maloney (2008) also see the role of institutional factors 
in addressing the curse of natural resources, they too like other scholars of the curse, 
do not see the role of such factors in the realm of environmental justice. They restrict 
their analyses and arguments, and ultimately, their recommendations to economic 
terms and economic policy. This is a major weakness or loophole overall in the resource 
curse discourse.  
 
2.2.13 Phillip Crowson (2009) 
If Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and Lederman and Maloney (2008) express 
strong skepticism about the curse, then they are not alone. Another strong skeptic of the 
natural resource curse is Crowson (2009), who is also  critical of the manner in which 
proponents of the resource curse conduct their analyses. In particular, Crowson (2009) 
believes the time frame often used in analyses by proponents of the resource curse is 
short. He believes that when a long-term perspective is taken, natural resources have 
positive impacts on countries. Crowson (2009) is of the conviction that if the resource 
curse were to occur in a country, the cardinal reason would be that such a country has 
“far more deep-seated, and often insoluble issues" to resolve: issues that have nothing 
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to do with the resource, but have everything to do with socio-political stresses in the 
country (4). This may sound as tough Crowson (2009) understands that the socio-
political stresses may relate to environmental justice issues, but Crowson (2009) does 
not make this connection. Also, in spite of his criticism that the period of analyses often 
taken by the resource curse proponents is short, Crowson (2009) does not offer a 
specific time frame suitable for analyzing the resource curse.  
Another of the criticisms by Crowson (2009) is that proponents of the resource 
curse base their analyses of the relationship between resource extraction and economic 
development on export data. Data that is of "narrow coverage" and which is biased 
against the positive contributions of natural resource extraction (5). Thus, Crowson 
(2009) joins the multitude of skeptics who argue that the empirical analyses purporting 
to prove  the resource curse are flawed, flawed because resource curse proponents rely 
on small datasets and small conception of metrics (i.e., traditional economic rather than 
the lived experience of the population expressed in the broadest economic analyses 
such as GPI and ISEW, and evident in environmental justice analyses) for their 
analyses. 
Crowson (2009) agrees with other skeptics that institutional quality is very 
important in determining if the natural resource curse would manifest itself or not. To 
this end, Crowson (2009) argues that the effectiveness of government policies in 
offsetting the resource curse "presupposes the existence of effective institutions and 
competent governments," yet many developing countries lack them (whether these 
countries are resource-endowed or not) (22). This argument buttresses my argument 
that institutional quality, although it affects natural resources management, is too 
general a factor to address in order to avert the curse of natural resources. To avert the 
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curse of natural resources, one needs to focus on the specific triggers and then apply 
specific policy instruments that one wishes to deploy. Furthermore, an implicit outcome 
of the argument that institutional quality is important is that this argument supports the 
bigger argument that the curse of natural resource is not due to natural resources per 
se. 
 
2.2.14 Michael Alexeev and Robert Conrad (2009) 
Whereas other skeptics of the resource curse criticize proponents of the curse by 
arguing that the proponents’ measures of resource-endowment are flawed and the 
proxies they use for measuring endowment are wrong, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) 
reject the notion of natural resource curse by arguing that its proponents base their 
conclusions on misinterpreted data. In their empirical approach, Alexeev and Conrad 
(2009) recognize the problem Lederman and Maloney (2008) point out to the effect that 
the period usually used in assessing the growth of a country is short. In this regard, 
Alexeev and Conrad (2009) measure growth over long term. When done this way, 
Alexeev and Conrad (2009) argue natural resources tend to have a positive impact on 
economies of natural resource-endowed countries and no curse exists.  
In terms of the impact of natural resources on institutional quality, Alexeev and 
Conrad (2009) believe natural resources do not have any negative impact on 
institutions. Their reason for this argument is that supporters of the curse often fail to 
associate any positive relationship between resource endowment and economic growth 
and only tend to conclude that natural resources negatively affects institutions. To the 
contrary, according to Alexeev and Conrad (2009), their analysis shows that there is no 
negative relationship between institutions and economic growth. The outcome of their 
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study rather supports the effect of institutions on economic growth, not the other way 
round as champions of the natural resource curse argue. Notwithstanding this lack of 
consensus on the relationship between institutional quality and economic growth, the 
discussion on the role of institutions (however conceived) underscores the importance 
of institutions to natural resources management (cf. Hodgson [2006] and Jütting [2003] 
for discussions of the various ways “institution” is defined).  
 
2.2.15 Ragnar Torvik (2011) 
In the view of Torvik (2011), natural resources can benefit countries and so he 
seeks to answer the question: “why has oil induced prosperity in some countries but 
stagnation in others?” (Torvik, 2011, 237). In some respects, Torvik (2011) could be 
seen as a skeptic of the resource curse. The main response by Torvik (2011) to the 
question above is that “different political incentives map into different political 
outcomes,” and, the drivers of economic and political development following discovery 
of natural resources (and/or booms) are economic institutions and economic reform 
(237). He explains that after discovering natural resources, countries implement reforms 
in different ways. The reforms can lead to managing the resource wealth to benefit a 
larger portion of the country’s population, or, if incumbent political leadership is 
unchecked so that it introduces policies not in the interest of the broader population, 
reform can be implemented to preserve “old privileges.” Thus, the type of reform a 
country undertakes determines the ways new economic “opportunities increase or 
decrease welfare”(Torvik 2011, 238). Although Torvik (2011) attempts to address the 
myopia of Robinson et al. (2006) I pointed out earlier, he ends up going narrow as well, 
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albeit in a different way, by confining linkages under “economic” and neglecting for 
instance social and ecological linkages.  
Torvik (2011) agrees with findings by Ross (2001) in the Philippines, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia to the extent that politicians deliberately destroy state institutions in order 
to take advantage of abundant timber resources, and that countries with abundant oil 
deposits tend to be averse to democracy. Collier and Hoeffler (2009) who argue that 
rules—“checks and balances”—can promote economic growth further buttress this 
argument. “Checks and balances” are “institutional rules that limit the political abuse of 
power and balance political power” (Torvik 2011, 239; Collier and Hoeffler 2009). 
However, there is no guarantee of the absence of influences because of checks and 
balances, because Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik (2011) argue that checks and 
balances act like a double-edged sword. Though they can check abuse of power, they 
make it easier for the influential and affluent in society to influence politicians by bribing 
and lobbying their ways through. 
In the end, Torvik (2011) agrees with a number of scholars that “some 
dimensions are decisive” in determining whether natural resource endowment can inure 
to the benefit of resource-endowed countries or not (244). He agrees with Bulte and 
Damania (2008) that democratic countries are less likely to generate negative outcomes 
from the resources rents. Even among democratic countries, Torvik (2011) agrees with 
Andersen and Aslaksen (2006) that a parliamentary system of governance is better 
suited for growth in resource-endowed countries than the presidential system of 
government.  
Torvik (2011) points out that resource endowment can stimulate economic 
growth if economic and political institutions impose checks and balances on politicians 
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while the system guarantees property rights. Thus, the quality of economic and political 
institutions are important, together with enforcement of property rights. To conclude, 
Torvik (2011) claims: 
Political institutions shape political incentives. This in turn helps explain why 
there is such a huge variation in the experiences of resource-abundant countries. 
Dependent on initial institutions as well as the incentives these create for further 
policy reform, resource abundance may lower welfare or may strongly increase 
welfare. However, even when initial institutions are strong, there may be a short- 
term bias in political decisions, and investments may be made for political rather 
than economic reasons. [….] Transparency and strong macro institutions are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for resource abundance to stimulate 
prosperity. (Torvik, 2011, 254) 
 
In other words, Torvik’s (2011) claim is that the resource curse is not inevitable, 
as other scholars have claimed. Rather, institutions play a significant role in determining 
whether natural resources can lead to overall national development or not. Moreover, in 
so doing, institutions can determine the direction of politically motivated policy that may 
not inure to overall national human development 
 
2.2.16 Shanon Pendergast, Judith Clarke, and Cornelis van Kooten (2011) 
Before I conclude my discussion of natural resource curse skeptics, it is 
appropriate that I discuss the ideas of Pendergast, Clarke, and van Kooten (2011) who 
argue that natural resources “are not a necessary or sufficient condition for economic 
development” (411). In other words, no necessary causal relationship exists between 
either natural resource-endowment and positive economic growth on one hand, or 
resource-endowment and negative economic growth on the other. Beyond denying the 
existence of the resource curse, Pendergast et al. (2011) make three important 
contributions to the resource curse debate.  
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First, they point out that the methods used for measuring natural resource 
endowment and its impact on development is inadequate, and so, they propose a better 
method. This observation is in line with other scholars who argue that the 
preponderance of resource curse scholars to use GDP as a measure of national 
development is incorrect. Indeed, there is consensus that economic development is not 
that same as well-being, which is what is often implied in the resource curse discourse. 
Moreover, Pendergast et al. (2011) note that development (well-being) is “a multi-
facetted goal,” which requires proponents of the resource curse to address it as such 
instead of using GDP (418). As part of their methodology, Pendergast et al. (2011) use 
the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) and GDP per capita to measure 
well-being for their analyses. The HDI is not without criticism; however, cf. Mcgillivray 
(1991); Sagar and Najam (1998); and Neumayer (2001).  
Second, in applying their method, Pendergast et al. (2011) find that corruption 
negatively affects development and natural resources may contribute to corruption. 
Since it is the view of Pendergast et al. (2011) that natural resources are not a curse, 
they argue that “government failure is the problem” accounting for poor economic 
development in resource-endowed countries (419). They enumerate government 
failures to include failure to define and enforce property rights, and failure by 
governments to prevent theft by government agents of public goods. In this regard, they 
argue that the presence of “social institutions such as civil law and property rights” may 
prevent or reduce the incidence of corruption, which in turn affects institutional quality 
(419).  
Thus, Pendergast et al. (2011) align themselves with the scholars who argue that 
institutional quality is an important component in avoiding the resource curse. For, 
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Pendergast et al. (2011) linkage between institutional quality and corruption is a two-
way street: well-developed institutions may reduce corruption, while corruption may 
reduce the quality of well-developed institutions. However, an important question is how 
would natural resource-endowed countries establish and protect their social institutions 
in order to avoid the curse? I would argue that an answer to this question lies in the 
domain of environmental justice. Institutions (whether conceived in terms of 
policies/regulations/programs or conceived as organizations) could be strengthened if 
environmental justice objectives were mainstreamed in institutions. 
Finally, Pendergast et al. (2011) argue that the United Nations’ Human 
Development Index (HDI) is a better measure of well-being than GDP alone, which 
resource curse scholars use profusely in the analyses that support their arguments. 
Pendergast et al. (2011) prefer the HDI because it encapsulates the income levels, 
health status, and educational levels of people. But, just as Pendergast et al. (2011) 
criticize the use of GDP because it does not capture a lot about people, the HDI can 
also be criticized for the same reason; albeit the HDI captures more than what GDP 
captures. A major criticism of the HDI, from my perspective, is that it does not capture 
ecological concerns. The well-being of the environment is one dimension of this 
criticism (which may be overlooked easily). The other dimension is that human well-
being critically depends on the state of the environment’s quality, which the HDI does 
not capture. Yet, this concern about the use of HDI to measure well-being could be 
addressed using environmental justice 
 
2.3 The Curse of Natural Resources: A Verdict  
Natural resource curse or not? To answer this question, I would have to agree 
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with Pendergast et al. (2011) to the extent that there is yet to be established, given the 
literature I have surveyed so far, a necessary causal link between natural resources and 
human well-being. If anything at all, I would most likely lean towards the position that 
natural resource-endowment could have positive effects on human development. I am 
leaning towards a positive impact of resource-endowment on well-being because none 
of the sides in the resource curse debate knows with certainty whether the curse is 
unavoidable or avoidable. Proponents of the curse believe it is possible to find a way 
that ensures negative impacts of their explanatory factors are avoided by resource-
endowed countries so they do not encounter the curse. Opponents of the curse, on the 
other hand, believe it is possible for resource-endowed countries to encounter the 
positive explanatory factors in order to improve human well-being and thus avoid the 
curse. 
My concurrence with Pendergast et al. (2011) is based on my survey of the 
literature of both proponents and opponents of the natural resources cure. All the 
scholars I have encountered offer explanatory factors for why the curse could manifest 
itself or not in the context of resource abundance. All the factors (whether for the curse 
or against the curse) can be put under political, economic, and social categories. What 
is clear to me is that natural resource extraction and development have impacts on 
people, economies, and the environment. It is also clear to me that developmental 
misfortune can befall all countries (whether natural resource-endowed or not), and for 
natural resource-endowed countries, such misfortune is not unavoidable because they 
possess natural resources.  
Before I proceed further, I would like to make four observations concerning the 
resource curse literature. First, given several criticisms of the empirical approaches 
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resource curse scholars use in their analyses, I am inclined to believe that analyzing 
and managing natural resource impact on countries cannot rely only on empirical and 
positivist approaches. Analyzing and managing the impacts of natural resource 
extraction also require normative approaches to complement, if not replace, these 
empirical approaches. In this regard, philosophical approaches and discourse are 
important and relevant in the area of natural resources management, not only because 
of the weaknesses of empirical approaches, but also to help provide clarity on important 
concepts and ideas that engulf the field. It is for these reasons that this dissertation is 
partly situated—to bring philosophical and normative analyses to bear on natural 
resources management. 
Second, since analyses in the resource curse literature rely on key concepts 
such as “development,” “economic growth,” and “industrialization” as proxies for human 
well-being, the literature is littered with various uses of these concepts by different 
authors in different contexts. Yet, an erroneous impression remains in the resource 
curse literature that industrialization is the same as economic development, which is 
same as development, and the same as human well-being. The lack of a common 
understanding in the resource curse literature on what should constitute well-being, or 
what development means, is a major contributory factor to the controversy of the 
resource curse. For the avoidance of doubt, I adopt the United Nations Human 
Development Index, as a proxy measure of well-being, as Pendergast et al. (2011) do.  
Third, another key concept often used in the resource curse literature is 
“institution”; in the literature I have surveyed, there is a gravitation towards addressing 
institutional issues in order to ensure that natural resources contribute positively to well-
being. Yet, no consensus exists regarding the particular connotation “institution” 
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represents. A consensus is important because it has implications for what institutional 
quality means since resource curse scholars believe that institutional quality is a key 
component of ensuring that natural resources contribute positively to well-being. In 
some respects, “institution” in the resource curse literature connotes physical 
organizations as in personnel and offices (I call these hard institutions), whereas others 
use “institution” to connote laws, policies, regulations, and guidelines (I call these soft 
institutions). For the avoidance of doubt, I use the concept “institution” to refer 
principally to the soft institutions. I adopt this understanding following John Rawls’ 
definition of institution, which appeals to the thesis of this dissertation. Rawls (1971) 
defines institution in his book, A Theory of Justice, as “a public system of rules which 
defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and 
the like.” He gives two ways in which institution may be understood: “first as an abstract 
object…as a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules; and second, as 
the realization in the thought and conduct of certain persons at a certain time and place 
of the actions specified by these rules” (Rawls 1971, 55). In other words, the two ideas 
about “institution” could be summarized as institution in abstract or definition and 
institution in practical terms. 
Finally, in reviewing the resource curse literature, I observe that none of the 
scholars introduce justice issues even when they see more deeply than just the 
economic issues, as did Michael Ross as early as 1999. There is a concentration 
around economic and governance issues as though injustices emanating from natural 
resource extraction could be resolved with economic and governance strategies alone. 
Indeed, I would argue that injustices could be exacerbated if deliberate action is not 
77 
 
taken to resolve them rather than relying on governance and economic measures to 
automatically resolve.  
 
2.4 Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, I have presented arguments from scholars who posit that natural 
resource abundance is a curse to countries that are endowed—that the curse of natural 
resources is real. I have also presented analyses from scholars who argue that there is 
no curse of natural resources. It is instructive to note that these two groups of scholars, 
in their arguments, provide explanatory reasons for their positions. This state of affairs 
leads me to agree with Pendergast et al. (2011) who argue that no necessary causality 
exists between natural resource abundance and development. Thus, whether natural 
resources would contribute positively or negatively to human development is contingent 
on several factors. Overwhelmingly, the dominant factor in this case is the political or 
governance factor, particularly with policy choice. My perspective is that such policy 
choice should have environmental justice as a core policy objective.  
Furthermore, in analyzing the resource curse discourse, as above, what stands 
out clear to me is that oil wealth exacerbates poor governance and bad governance 
practices of corruption and conflict. Poor governance fritters away oil revenues, 
undermines other areas of a national economy, and can allow for environmental 
degradation. Bad governance impacts of resource wealth include increased corruption 
and the financing of military conflict and/or oppression of the people either on the basis 
of racism and cultural prejudice (as has happened in the Sudan), or to quell protest of 
environmental degradation affecting living conditions (as in the Niger Delta of Nigeria). I 
use this distinction between poor and bad governance to assess ways Ghana’s oil puts 
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the country, its economy, and its people at risk through subsequent analysis of Ghana’s 
oil governance. My contribution to this debate, however, is that good governance of 
resource wealth must include environmental justice issues proactively so the population 
are not harmed with respect to livelihood and health. It is against this background that I 
employ environmental justice as the framework for my analyses. 
The importance of this chapter to my dissertation is to provide clarity for what the 
resource curse is about and to analyze various perspectives of the curse’s existence or 
otherwise. In reviewing the perspectives, I have highlighted specific factors that I use to 
complement my theoretical framework when mapping Ghana’s policy process in 
Chapter 3, and when analyzing the institutional framework for managing Ghana’s oil 





MAPPING THE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS IN GHANA 
3.1 Introduction 
Understanding the public policymaking process in Ghana is the focus of this 
chapter. An understanding of the overall process is imperative in making judgments or 
assessments about whether the process is adequate or not in delivering specific desired 
outcomes, such as environmental justice in natural resources extraction. Furthermore, 
an understanding of the overall policymaking process enables analyses of specific 
policies in a proper context. In this regard, an understanding of policymaking in Ghana 
would enable me to situate and analyze the Guidelines on Environmental Assessment 
and Management of Ghana’s Offshore Oil and Gas (GEAM) in an appropriate context. 
Thus, to find out whether the GEAM went through a process that could be judged as 
appropriate, and whether the product—content of the GEAM—would be adequate to 
address its objectives and meet environmental justice requirements, a mapping is 
required of Ghana’s policymaking process. Moreover, in mapping, I would seek to 
identify challenges associated with the policy process. 
Before I proceed with the mapping, however, I would like to draw attention to the 
existence of a dilemma surrounding the definition of “public policy,” and the existence of 
several definitions (Ohemeng, Carroll, and Carroll 2012). Scholars, practitioners, and 
communities define “policy” differently leading to confusion when discussing it, and 
often, there is no explicit statement of what one means by “policy.” The problem is that 
what “policy” means is often assumed and taken for granted leaving a conceptual 
vacuum in place (Ball 1993; Stewart 2014). In order to avoid such confusion, I would 
adopt a definition by Briggle and Mitcham (2012) of “policy” as “a settled guideline for 
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action that occupies a conceptual space in between general principle and statutory law” 
(214).  
A “settled guideline” because policies are often contested by different 
stakeholders and constituencies who have different interests. Contestations may arise 
with respect to, for example, policy goals, funding mechanisms, or policy 
implementation strategies. These are often settled with debate and negotiations that 
entail compromises to reflect a certain common interest. Furthermore, policy is meant to 
provide a general direction of action and therefore is different from law, which provides 
specific directions and possesses legal enforceability. Given the definition I have 
adopted for “policy,” individuals and corporations could have policies; but the present 
project’s focus is on public policy. Therefore, I would define “public policy” for the 
present project as settled guidelines for action relating to problems of common public 
interest. Typically, such policies are sponsored or generated by publicly funded 
institutions. 
In what follows, I provide a discussion of Ghana’s emerging oil industry as a way 
of establishing some context for further analyses in this chapter. I follow this with an 
overview of a framework for public policymaking in Ghana. In this framework, I describe 
the space within which policy is conceived and produced in Ghana. Next, since I 
undertake some analyses of my fieldwork data in this chapter, I describe the fieldwork 
and method of data analysis before illustrating the workings of the general framework 
for policymaking in Ghana with the case of the policy process of the GEAM. Although 
my interest is in examining the process leading to the GEAM, I am also interested in 
finding out the extent to which the document is capable of “sustainable development” of 
Ghana’s offshore oil resources and to “mainstream environment, health, safety, and 
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community issues” in oil activities in Ghana (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, v, 
6). To complete this chapter, I discuss some challenges in Ghana’s policy process that 
can also serve as lessons to other African countries seeking to avert the curse of 
natural resources. 
  
3.2 Ghana’s Oil Industry and Impacts  
Ghana joined the league of oil-producing nations in 2010 when oil production 
started from a single oil field discovered in 2007 and named Jubilee Oil Field. The 
Jubilee field is located about sixty kilometers offshore the western coast of Ghana. Until 
2010 when production started in Jubilee, Ghana had been active in the upstream oil 
industry through several exploration activities and some insignificant production from 
the Saltpond fields. Thus, Ghana’s upstream oil industry, as of 2015, comprised mainly 
of production from the Jubilee oil field, planned production from a second oil field (TEN 
field), and several exploration activities offshore. The Teneboa, Enyenra, and Ntomme 
(TEN) oil field is the second oil field after the Jubilee field since the oil discovery in 
2007. TEN lies about twenty km west of Jubilee; however, Ghana and Ivory Coast are 
currently litigating over ownership of the territory where the TEN field sits. To 
complement these activities, a number of contractors and sub-contractors provide 
various auxiliary services to the major contractors and oil companies. 
At the time of discovery, the Jubilee field was a joint venture comprising Tullow 
Ghana Limited, Kosmos Ghana HC, Anadarko WCTP Company, Sabre Oil and Gas, 
EO Group, and Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). Tullow was elected by 
the other members of the joint venture to operate the unit while Kosmos, as Technical 
Operator, led the project design and execution (Tullow Ghana Limited, 2009). Kosmos 
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later sold its share of ownership to ExxonMobil in 2009 (Kapela, 2009). Participation in 
the new field (TEN field) includes almost the same companies as were in the joint 
venture that discovered the Jubilee field. The TEN field partners include Tullow, 
Kosmos Energy, Anadarko Petroleum, Petro SA, and GNPC (CWC Group 2015). So 
far, the major oil companies in Ghana’s upstream oil sector, with respect to production, 
are Tullow, Kosmos, Anadarko, and GNPC. 
Production of oil from the TEN field was set to commence in 2016 with a 
projected peak production of 80,000 barrels per day (Reuters 2015), but the territorial 
dispute between Ghana and Ivory Coast has delayed that. In the meantime, only the 
Jubilee field has produced oil so far since 2010. In view of the location of the Jubilee 
field offshore, the oil, associated gas and water are recovered from underground 
through wells that are connected by a network of subsea valves and pipelines. The 
valves and pipes carry the oil into a floating, production, storage, and offload (FPSO) 
vessel that is permanently anchored in the Jubilee field. The FPSO then separates the 
crude oil from the water and gas, and stores the crude oil until it is ready to be offloaded 
to oil tankers for sale on the international market (Tullow Ghana Limited 2009). 
In 2011, the first barge of crude oil left Ghana’s Jubilee field for sale and the 
economic effect was immense. Oil overtook cocoa as Ghana’s second largest export 
earner (Adam 2013). Between 2011 and 2014, about 124 million barrels of oil were 
produced valued over $13 billion USD. In spite of a Minimum Government Take of 
twenty-one percent (i.e., total economic returns to Government of Ghana from total 
production revenue), experts in the sector claim Ghana did not receive the minimum 
international standard take, which is set at 42% (Kwawukume 2015). The remainder 
seventy-nine percent went to the Jubilee joint venture partnership. It is important to 
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point out that Ghana’s state-owned oil company—GNPC— is a partner in the joint 
venture with a share of 10%. However, although oil production provided Ghana with 
some windfall income and impacted Ghana’s economy (GDP grew significantly in 2011 
by fifteen percent (Institute for Fiscal Studies 2014)), the oil-endowed country did not 
benefit from the oil sale as much as the country should have.  
This is consistent with Ross (1999), as discussed in Chapter 2, that resource 
endowed nations often exhibit a sense of myopia in the face of windfall income. In the 
case of Ghana, the myopia manifested in the fact that the country was satisfied with 
receiving twenty-one percent of the Minimum Government Take, when they could have 
obtained forty-two percent. Furthermore, I would argue that this is an example of poor 
governance on the part of Ghana, where appropriate expertise on oil was not available 
or engaged to negotiate for a better deal for Ghanaians.  
At the same time, a crucial economic impact of Ghana’s offshore upstream oil 
activities is the impact on local fishermen and their livelihoods. Fishermen have been 
forced out of their regular fishing areas to allow for oil exploration and development. The 
effect has seen reduction in the incomes of fishermen and the market folks whose 
trading activities depend on fisheries (Anderson and McTernan 2014). A study 
conducted by Boohene and Peprah (2011) revealed a perception by women in Cape 
Three Points and surrounding communities that offshore oil activities negatively impact 
their livelihoods through reduced availability of fish. Indeed, fishermen in Sekondi 
Takoradi have reported declining fish catch since oil exploration started offshore 
(Anderson and McTernan 2014).  
Ghana is not only feeling the impact of oil production economically, but is also 
feeling ecological impacts. Evidence is available of ecological impacts attributable to the 
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emerging oil sector. For instance, there was a recorded spill of oil from the Jubilee field 
in 2011: Fishermen discovered the spill and reported the incident to local authorities; 
however, authorities either did not know what to do or appeared not to take the incident 
seriously. Either way, there was no official clean up; the local communities were left to 
clean up the mess with no clear information about the incident. In addition, during the 
Jubilee field exploration stage, Kosmos Energy reportedly spilled toxic drilling mud on 
three occasions and the company refused to pay a fine of US$35 million imposed by the 
Government of Ghana because there was no law to back the fine (Badgley 2012; Smith 
2010). Environmental Protection Agency of Ghana’s establishment Act, Act 490, 
mandates the Agency to issue fines for breaches of environmental quality regulations in 
Ghana; however in the case of the fines that were imposed on Kosmos, “a six-member 
ministerial committee” investigated the spill and imposed the fine (Enquirer 2010, n.p.). 
It is not clear why the EPA did not impose the fine on Kosmos, nonetheless, this is an 
example of poor governance, where a state agency has not been allowed to perform its 
statutory function, which was usurped by the executive branch of governance through a 
ministerial committee. On the other hand, this could be interpreted as a lack of 
confidence in the EPA of Ghana to appropriately handle the case.  
The impact of offshore oil activities on livelihoods of fishermen and market 
women, and the handling of the Kosmos toxic mud spillage are incidents that give 
cause for great concern. These serious environmental justice issues require deliberate 
policy articulation for remedy. Moreover, these environmental justice issues are 
reflections of poor governance early on in Ghana’s oil development. In reviewing the 
resource curse literature in Chapter 2, I noted the absence of consideration for 
environmental justice, in terms of its role in avoiding the resource curse. It seems to me 
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that Ghana is reproducing this failure to include environmental justice issues. A poor 
governance practice that can translate the oil wealth into a curse to the people of Ghana 
rather than bringing benefits and improvements in their lives. In section 3.7, I examine a 
major oil management document for Ghana to assess whether the country learned from 
this early experience with oil and to institute better governance with respect to 
environmental justice impacts. Before I examine the policy document, I sketch a general 
framework for policymaking in Ghana in what follows. In this framework, I discuss the 
roles of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution and the various branches of governance, Ghana’s 
Civil Service, and non-state actors in policymaking. 
 
3.3 A General Framework of Ghana’s Public Policy Process 
The basic and fundamental law of many countries is the constitution. A nation’s 
constitution empowers institutions and provides the bases for several other laws and 
institutions to be established. In 1993, Ghana reverted to democratic and constitutional 
rule after several years of military rule under the Provisional National Defense Council 
(PNDC) (Ayee 1996; Mohammed 2015). Ohemeng and Ayee (2012) provide some 
discussion of policymaking in Ghana from post-independence (1957) to 1992. The 
present discussion’s focus is post 1992 policymaking, although I recognize that 
policymaking in this era has been influenced by events, laws, and institutions before 
1992. Since 1993 to date, Ghana’s 1992 Constitution has been the country’s 
fundamental law recognizing and/or replacing pre-existing laws and institutions prior to 
1992. In searching for a framework for public policymaking in Ghana, I find that the 
fundamental framework and mandate for public policymaking emanates from Ghana’s 
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1992 Constitution. Thus, I discuss some pertinent provisions in Ghana’s 1992 
Constitution with direct bearings on public policymaking. 
 
3.3.1 Ghana’s 1992 Constitution and Policymaking  
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution dictates a presidential-parliamentary governance 
structure, which comprises the Executive headed by the President, the Legislature 
represented by Parliament, and the Judiciary (Ayee 2012). The Executive administers 
Ghana’s Public Service, determines what is made into law by the Legislature, and 
ensures that laws enacted by the Legislature are implemented. The Legislature’s main 
function is to make laws, which the President ratifies and enforces. The Judiciary’s 
principal responsibility is to interpret the law (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2011).  
Among the three branches of governance, Ghana’s 1992 Constitution grants 
policymaking powers to the Executive in several ways. First, Article 34(2) of the 
Constitution obliges Ghana’s President to inform the people of Ghana about steps being 
taken to achieve policy objectives in the “Directive Principles of State Policy” (Republic 
of Ghana 1992, 31). Second, Article 67 of the Constitution requires the President of 
Ghana to report on the state of the nation to Ghana’s Parliament (Republic of Ghana, 
1992). This state of the nation report does not only capture the “state” in which the 
nation is (including problems of public interest); but the report also captures actions the 
Executive is taking to resolve problems identified by the President in the report to 
Parliament. Thus, Article 67 obliges the President of Ghana to make policy 
pronouncements regarding the direction of the country vis-à-vis the state of the country. 
Third, Article 76(2) of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution explicitly mandates the President of 
Ghana to determine the general policy of the government with assistance from the 
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Cabinet. The Cabinet comprises the President, vice-President, and some Ministers of 
State (Republic of Ghana 1992). It is clear, given the fact that the President pursuant to 
Article 78(1) of Ghana’s Constitution appoints Ministers of State and that the Vice-
President is elected with the President as the President’s running mate, Ghana’s 
constitution totally places policy formulation within the domain of the Executive branch 
of governance.  
In managing Ghana’s oil resource and the resulting windfall income, the 
Executive has full control over the sector. The Legislature has some supervisory role in 
some specific cases (some are discussed below in Chapter 4), while the Judiciary 
seems to have no role unless when there is need for interpretation of the law for 
purposes of enforcement. Even when the Judiciary adjudicates, the Executive enforces. 
The concentration of policymaking in Ghana’s Executive is a form of enclave in which 
the Executive has full control over policy formulation and implementation. This enclave 
feature of policymaking has the implication of limiting transparency and accountability, 
and could breed corruption in Ghana’s oil sector that would result in the resource curse 
for Ghanaians. This is possible because there is association between oil development 
and corruption (Glazebrook and Kola-olusanya 2011; Glazebrook and Story 2012), and 
corruption and the resource curse (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004; Shaxson 2007; 
McFerson 2009; Pendergast, Clarke, and van Kooten 2011). 
There has been discussion to the effect that Ghana’s Legislature has a direct role 
in policymaking in Ghana. However, Ayee (2012) concludes that the Legislature’s role in 
policymaking is constrained by a number of constitutional provisions, including the fact 
that the constitution mandates the President to appoint the majority of Ministers of State 
from among members of the Legislature. This constitutional requirement serves to 
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undermine the independence and effective operations of the Legislature. Furthermore, 
Article 108 of Ghana’s Constitution places a major constraint on the Legislature’s 
policymaking abilities, because, by this article, Ghana’s Parliament cannot initiate and 
formulate any public policy that places financial burden on the state (Republic of Ghana 
1992). 
There are ways in which policy relates to law within the Ghanaian context. For 
instance, when the Executive makes policy, it may proceed to prepare a Bill (draft law), 
based on the policy, for Ghana’s Legislature to pass into an Act (law) for enforcement. 
In this case, the Executive prepares the Bill, sends it to the Legislature to deliberate and 
pass into an Act, and send the Act back to the Executive (President) to sign the law to 
take effect. The Executive then enforces the accented Act. In such a case, the 
Legislature has an opportunity to influence the intended outcome of the policy through 
deliberations on the Bill. However, more often than not, the Executive does not translate 
policies into Acts, because the process for doing so takes a long time, and the 
Executive does not have the patience to go through the process before the next voting 
cycle that is approaching. Since the Executive branch is usually in a hurry to show to 
the electorate that it is working, it often would not take a policy through Parliament to 
pass into law. This situation reflects Gelb’s discussion in Chapter 2, that in the presence 
of windfall incomes, resource endowed governments lack patience to prepare 
adequately before expending the income (Gelb 1988). The Implication of not 
transforming policies into Acts are that the policies lack legal enforcement making such 
policies weak for implementation. Furthermore, when policies are not transformed into 
law by the Legislature, succeeding governments usually easily dispose of such policies.  
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3.3.2 Ghana’s Civil Service and Policymaking 
There is no doubt the Executive branch has responsibility for policymaking in 
Ghana. Assisting the Executive deliver on this responsibility is the Ghana Civil Service, 
which is answerable to the Executive. The Service has career professional civil servants 
(bureaucrats), not politicians (as is the composition of the higher Executive—President 
and Ministers of State). The Civil Service Act 1993 (PNDCL 327) describes one main 
objective for Ghana’s Civil Service: “to assist the Government in the formulation and 
implementation of government policies for the development of the country” (Republic of 
Ghana 1993, n.p.). In meeting that objective, Ghanaian civil servants perform seven 
functions. Of these functions, five relate directly to government policy. These include 
initiating and formulating policies for government to consider; providing advice on 
government plans; conducting research to implement government policies; 
implementing government policies; reviewing government policies; and monitoring and 
evaluating government policies (Republic of Ghana 1993).  
Under PNDCL 327, the Civil Service of Ghana comprises, among others, the 
Office of the President, Ministries, Departments, and Agencies. PNDCL 327 enjoins the 
President to create as many ministries as are deemed fit by the President to cater for 
specific sectors of Ghana’s socioeconomic, political, and environmental spheres. 
Consequently, a Ministry in Ghana is the highest establishment for its respective sector 
and consists of Departments and Agencies (Republic of Ghana, 1993). Since Ministries 
are the highest institutions for their respective sectors and Ghana’s constitution confers 
on the President the power to appoint Ministers of State, politicians head Ministries. The 
highest position for a civil servant in the Ministries is the post of Chief Director.  
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Ministries relevant for Ghana’s oil sector include the Ministry of Energy, the 
Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation (MESTI) and (to some 
degree) the Ministry of Finance. My assessment of the Ministries’ relevance relates to 
the extent to which they promulgate and implement policies, regulations, and laws on oil 
and the environment. The MESTI, through Ghana’s Environmental Protection Agency, 
has responsibilities for making and enforcing environmental policies and regulations. In 
Chapter 4, I discuss the roles of relevant Ministries and Agencies in Ghana’s oil sector. 
Apart from the Civil Service, there are other “social actors” in the policymaking process 
in Ghana (Ohemeng and Ayee 2012, 24). These are non-state participants. 
The nature of policymaking in Ghana prior to constitutional democracy under the 
1992 Constitution was “elitist and exclusionary,” limited to only politicians, bureaucrats, 
and expatriates from donor countries and organizations (Mohammed 2015, 45). But, 
although the political domain for public policymaking expanded after 1992 (Ohemeng & 
Ayee, 2012), it has not immediately translated into broader participation. Broadening 
participation in public policymaking in Ghana has been gradual, and it continues to 
expand to accommodate more stakeholders and participants. Participants, including 
identifiable non-state institutions and stakeholders such as chiefs and traditional 
leaders, civil society organizations (CSOs), think tanks, and the private sector, are now 
participating in public policymaking in Ghana. It is important to underscore the point that 
not all non-state actors get the opportunity to participate in every policymaking process; 
however, in principle, the potential is there for their participation.  
The influence of non-state actors such as CSOs and think tanks on public 
policymaking in Ghana is well recognized, not only for the purposes of broadening the 
policymaking process, but also there is recognition of their capacities, expertise, and 
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worldviews. These characteristics contribute to enhancing the capacities of state 
institutions for policymaking, because CSOs share their expertise and resources with 
state actors. CSOs also function as watchdog institutions to voice concern over impacts 
of policies on public interest. Recognizing these, the Government of Ghana has directed 
all state Agencies to involve stakeholders in policymaking (Ohemeng and Ayee 2012). 
The convention of inviting stakeholders to participate in public policymaking continues, 
and the practice has progressed to the extent that some of the non-state actors (CSOs 
in particular) commence conversations on public policy prior to their invitations. Where 
they are not invited and there seems to be lack of transparency in a policy process, 
CSOs critique and connect government activities and policy to population impacts. 
Thus, Ghana’s public policymaking arena inside Ghana includes state actors and 
non-state actors. The state actors comprise of the executive branch of governance and 
bureaucrats of Ghana’s Civil Service, while the non-state actors are often identified and 
invited to participate in the process by agents of the state actors depending on the 
policy at stake, and at the discretion of the policy originator (the Executive). The non-
state actors often include CSOs, think tanks, traditional/opinion leaders of communities, 
and academic experts.  
In many instances, there is a third set of actors (also non-state) in Ghana’s 
policymaking space—international organizations. Ghana relies tremendously on 
development aid from the global North, international aid organizations, and institutions 
affiliated with the United Nations. There are instances where international organizations 
have participated in Ghana’s policy processes, typically through the provision of funds 
either for the policymaking process or for implementation, and through provision of 
technical assistance through the assignment or procurement of consultants to facilitate 
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the policymaking process. Participation of international organizations may be indirect, 
but it is nonetheless a strong force in influencing policy directions and outcomes, 
especially when international organizations provide policymaking facilitation through 
funding and consultants. Also included in this group of actors are regional bodies (e.g., 
the Africa Union and the European Union), and sub-regional bodies (e.g., the Economic 
Community of West African States). Where Ghana is a signatory to conventions and 
treaties as an affiliate to these organizations, Ghana has to transform the treaties into 
national policies, and there is often a template available for all countries signing the 
treaties to adopt. Ghana is a signatory to several international treaties and conventions.  
The World Bank and IMF also fall into the category of international organizations 
that affect policymaking in Ghana; they are not just funding institutions. They are the 
two most influential international organizations on nation-states in the global South, with 
the World Bank aiming at development, while the IMF at economic stability. The World 
Bank often has many strings attached when providing funding, and can impose 
sanctions. For instance, the World Bank fined Ghana $40 million in 2001 for not 
providing accurate statistics. The IMF equally plays a substantial role in Ghana’s 
policymaking process. For instance, the IMF supported Ghana’s development policies 
and strategies on poverty reduction between 2003 and 2009, and continues to provide 
support for development strategies and frameworks. 
Fig. 2 summarizes the kind of interactions taking place in Ghana’s public 
policymaking space. It is within this framework that I will situate and examine the 
Guidelines on Environmental Assessment and Management (GEAM) of Ghana’s 
Offshore Oil and Gas. Before I do so, however, I describe my field method of data 
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collection and analysis in the following section. This is important at this stage because I 
will draw on my fieldwork interviews as part of my examination of the GEAM. 




3.4 Fieldwork, Interviews, and Analysis 
I interviewed eleven participants on-site in Ghana. The participants were targeted 
informants employed at institutions I purposely selected. They were purposely selected 
based on literature I reviewed that showed that the institutions participated in Ghana’s 
policymaking on oil, and therefore possessed knowledge and information relevant for 
this study. During interviews, I complemented this recruitment method of targeting 
identified informants with snowball sampling: at the end of each interview, I would ask 
the interviewee whether s/he knew of any other person/institution I could contact for an 
interview. I sent official letters to the heads of the institutions, and requested 
appointments to meet with them or an appointed representative for the purpose of an 
interview. In several instances, I had to make personal follow-up visits to ask if my 
letters have been received and if there was any response to my requests. I was 
successful in obtaining eleven interviews representing ten institutions. The institutions 
spread across various sectors, although not evenly so.  
The category on institutions with the highest number of participants (four) was 
the policymaking and central government category. In this category, I interviewed 
persons at the Ministry of Petroleum (MoP); the Ministry of Environment, Science, 
Technology, and Innovation (MESTI); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and 
the Petroleum Commission of Ghana (PCG). The next category (with three institutions, 
although with four interviewees) was the academic and knowledge institutions. I 
interviewed subjects at the Science and Technology Policy Research Institute of the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR-STEPRI); the Economics 
Department of University of Ghana (UG-ED); and the Institute of Environmental and 
Sanitation Studies of University of Ghana (UG-IESS). The third category of institutions 
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was the oil and gas companies. In this category, I was successful with two interviews in 
two quasi-state owned companies, namely the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
(GNPC) and the Ghana Gas Company (GGC). The last category was the civil society 
organizations, where I was able to interview one person from one institution—the 
Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC). 
 I personally interviewed all participants, with interviews lasting between forty-five 
and ninety minutes. There were three instances where more than one interviewee 
participated in the interview session. In these cases, although I addressed one person 
with my questions, I welcomed contributions from the other persons present even 
though I did not oblige them to participate. To facilitate and direct the interviews, I 
prepared and used interview guides. The interview guides ensured interviews were 
focused on themes of the subject matter. The interview guides were tailor-made for 
each of the four categories of institutions. Copies of the interview guides can be found in 
Appendix B. In addition to having the interview guides, I arrived for every interview with 
my notebook, audio recorder, and an informed consent form for participants to read, ask 
questions if they wished, and then sign. Every interviewee signed the informed consent 
form; an unsigned copy is available in Appendix C. 
 In terms of analyzing the interview data, the recorded interviews were transcribed 
into text. This text, my observations, and notes I took during the interviews were 
subjected to the hermeneutic method for thematic content and narrative analyses. The 
hermeneutic approach follows Kvale (1983). In applying the hermeneutic method to 
qualitative research interviews, Kvale (1983) suggests seven principles on the bases of 
the canons of hermeneutics stipulated by Radnitzky (1970). According to Kvale (1983) 
the first principle is to develop an iterative “back- and forth process between parts and 
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the whole” of the material being interpreted (italics in original) (186). With the second 
principle, the researcher must obtain full understanding of the internal coherence of the 
text devoid of logical contradictions. Third, the researcher has to test his understanding 
of the parts/themes of the interview with the general understanding of the interview. 
Fourth, for understanding, the researcher should rely strictly on the interview—the 
understanding should be reached sole on the basis of what the interviewee says during 
the interview. Fifth, the researcher must possess extensive knowledge of the themes of 
the interview on the bases of which he should be able to discern meanings and 
nuances. Sixth, the researcher ought to be aware that interpretation is “not 
presuppositionless,” (italics in original), and so the researcher ought to be mindful of his 
presuppositions (187). The seventh principle is that the researcher must be creative, 
creative in terms of the ability to obtain deeper understating of the interview and apply 
the understanding obtained from the analyses of specific parts/themes of the interview.  
These principles are relevant and useful for my study, for which I adopted them 
to aid in the analyses. In addition to the hermeneutic approach, I coded the data by 
organizing the transcribed texts on the bases of the categories of institutions the 
interviewees represent. I then searched for trends in specific themes and keywords from 
among the transcribed texts. In what follows, I now examine the GEAM’s policy process. 
 
3.5 Policy Process of the GEAM 
Part of the following analyses draws on interviews I had with the personnel of 
Ghana’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) while the other part is based on my 
own assessment of the Guidelines on Environmental Assessment and Management 
(GEAM). I start this section by presenting a description of the processes leading to the 
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production of the GEAM. Next, I provide a critique of the policy process of the GEAM, 
followed by an assessment of its environmental justice content, an examination of 
capacity to support good governance of oil development, with particular attention to 
environmental justice impacts.  
Ghana’s EPA is the state agency under the Ministry of Environment, Science, 
Technology, and Innovation (MESTI) with the mandate to protect and improve on the 
environment in Ghana. Established in 1974 by the National Redemption Council Decree 
(NRCD) 239 as the Environmental Protection Council, Ghana’s EPA was given its 
present powers and status by Act 490 of Parliament in 1994. The EPA’s mission is to 
“co-manage, protect and enhance the country's environment” (Environmental Protection 
Agency 2017, n.p.). Per Act 490, the EPA has policymaking, policy implementation, and 
regulation-making and enforcement functions. For its policymaking function, for 
instance, Act 490 directs the EPA to “advise the Minister on the formulation of policies 
on the environment…” and to “prescribe standards and guidelines relating to the 
pollution of air, water, land and any other forms of environmental pollution…” (Republic 
of Ghana 1994a, IV-3-IV-4). In the function of advising the Minister, the EPA is at the 
behest of the Executive branch of governance (represented by the Minister of State). In 
the function of prescribing guidelines and standards, however, the EPA is empowered 
by Act 490 to “prescribe” directions for actions at the EPA’s own behest, though even 
with this, the EPA is accountable to the Executive branch. The GEAM is thus a product 
of the latter function—an in-house product of Ghana’s EPA. 
During my interactions with personnel of Ghana’s EPA, the Petroleum 
Commission of Ghana (PCG), and the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), 
there was deliberate attempt to clarify to me that the GEAM is not “policy,” but a set of 
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guidelines. For instance, at the EPA, I was told, “this is not policy, it is just a guideline” 
in reference to the GEAM. Yet, they did not provide me with a definition of “policy.” Two 
ramifications emanate from this point of view. First, it sends the perception that “policy” 
is a document produced by Ministries of state and handed down to departments for 
enforcement—Departments do not make policy. Indeed, a Senior Program Officer at the 
EPA where the GEAM was produced told me “it is the ministry that deals with policy 
issues.” But policies may be “hard” or “soft” depending on their levels of enforceability. 
For instance, there is hard policy through military coercion, payment, and enforceable 
regulatory systems on the one hand. On the other hand, there is soft policy that appeals 
to and shapes preferences through advice and guidelines. While soft policies may 
appear unenforceable, there is some level of enforcement, typically through 
administrative actions—for example, appeals and guidelines (as with the GEAM in 
some respects). Hence, I would argue that when my respondents say the GEAM is not 
policy, they mean the GEAM is unenforceable and does not have the effect and impact 
of a policy. However, I would argue that the GEAM has enforceability to a greater extent 
because of the underlying and background documents from which it was prepared.  
Second, I would agree there are aspects of the GEAM that are unenforceable as 
hard policy would be, which means that there is no full accountability in Ghana’s oil 
sector under the GEAM. This is illustrated by the manner in which the 2011 oil spill was 
handled. There was a state of confusion and neglect when oil from the Jubilee Field 
spilled in 2011 and local communities were left on their own to deal with the spill 
although the GEAM contains provisions for dealing with such instances of oil spill. State 
authorities left local communities on their own in spite of the GEAM’s provisions 
because such provisions are of a soft nature and lack stringent enforceability as hard 
99 
 
policy would be. I would argue that this is an issue for environmental justice since there 
is no enforceability for some key provisions of the GEAM as in the case of the 2011 oil 
spill. Hence, I would propose that the GEAM be formalized through the legislative 
process into law or separate legislation be enacted that extracts the unenforceable 
provisions of the GEAM to address environmental justice in the oil sector.  
Oil production began in 2010, but the GEAM was not produced until 2011, a year 
later. That is not to say that there were no environmental regulations directing oil 
production in Ghana. Ghana has had an environmental assessment regulation in place 
since 1999 that would apply to oil production in the Jubilee Field, although the 
regulation did not anticipate and provide detailed provisions for oil production. In 
addition, it is important to note that Ghana is a signatory to several international 
conventions on the environment and the sea that could have been invoked to manage 
activities of oil companies (see discussion in Chapter 4 below). There was an 
environmental policy context for oil development in Ghana, but, among other 
challenges, it was fragmented over multiple documents and offices. The GEAM collects 
the core of these fragments together in one place, supported, as I will show in the next 
chapter, by enforceable policy and regulatory documents.  
Part of the legal grounding of the GEAM is accordingly Ghana’s Environmental 
Assessment Regulations of1999, Legislative Instrument (LI) 1652. LI 1652 prescribes 
Ghana’s environmental impact assessment scheme that requires environmental impact 
assessment for development activities likely to impact the environment negatively 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2011; Environmental Protection Agency 1999). 
Moreover, oil development in Ghana belongs to the list of development activities in 
“Schedule 2” of LI 1652 that specifically require environmental impact assessment. It is 
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within this framework that the GEAM was produced with a goal to “mainstream 
environment, health, safety and community issues into the offshore oil and gas 
operations” (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 6).  
The policy process leading to the production of the GEAM began with the 
constitution of a team of two people in-house at the EPA. The team did the initial 
research and put together a framework for a zero draft document, i.e., a first attempt to 
assemble relevant thoughts and issues, and then two more people joined the team to 
edit and review the document. The reviewed document then became the first draft. The 
four people who prepared the first draft were staff in the Petroleum Department of the 
EPA that was created when oil production started in Ghana. Having prepared the first 
draft within the confines of the Petroleum Department, the document was presented to 
“internal stakeholders” within the EPA for deliberation.  
The internal stakeholders comprised a team of twenty experts in various fields 
and backgrounds, and specialist staff of Ghana’s EPA. These experts were invited to an 
internal consultative forum to bring their expertise to bear on the first draft. According to 
the Head of Petroleum Department of the EPA, the purpose of the exercise was to 
“ensure that the document is consistent with what the EPA is doing,” “What the EPA is 
doing,” i.e., the EPA’s existing regulations, laws, policies, and functions. In addition, 
these experts and specialists were expected to bring on board their specialist 
knowledge to enrich the draft policy; to remove any deficiency the policy document 
might have; and to preempt the “surprise” identification of loopholes in the policy 
document during a wider stakeholder consultation to be organized later. After the 
internal stakeholder consultation exercise, relevant inputs taken from the experts and 
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specialist were incorporated into the first draft document. The document was then 
prepared for a wider external stakeholder consultation exercise.  
The external stakeholder consultation exercise had one main purpose—to look at 
the subject matter of the policy document. In this regard, part of the policy process 
entailed identifying institutions and organizations whose mandates and functions were 
relevant to the subject matter and objectives of the policy under consideration. Among 
the relevant stakeholders identified included supervisory ministries (the Ministry of 
Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation, and the Ministry of Energy), allied 
agencies like the Petroleum Commission of Ghana, Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation, Civil Society Organizations, and industry players in the private sector (i.e., 
corporations).  
During the external stakeholders’ consultation and review, suggestions were 
made to improve the document. The suggestions were screened and those found to be 
relevant to the objectives of the guidelines were incorporated and the document 
updated. Input collected for use in reviewing the draft after the external stakeholders’ 
consultation also came from Norway’s Environment Agency, which worked closely and 
supported Ghana’s EPA to manage Ghana’s environment in the offshore oil sector. 
Assistance from Norway’s Environment Agency to Ghana’s EPA was under the 
Norwegian government’s Oil for Development (OfD) program, an instrument of 
development cooperation between the governments of Ghana and Norway. The 
cooperation program started in 2010 when Ghana started oil production and ended in 
2014, but in 2015 was extended for five years (Norad 2016) 
Once the draft document was updated with inputs from identified stakeholders, 
and the EPA of Ghana was satisfied with the level of review, the document was 
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published in 2011. According to a Senior Program Officer at the Petroleum Department 
of the EPA, the document did not go through Parliament for deliberation, and was not 
passed into law before its launching: “it is a guideline,”  not a law. There are questions to 
be raised about the policy process of the GEAM, in particular, the nature of stakeholder 
participation in the process. I discuss these in the next section.  
 
3.6 A Critique of the GEAM’s Policy Process  
Generally, public policymaking is a complex and dynamic exercise for which no 
single approach exists. Besides, no outcome of a particular policymaking process is 
ever completely satisfactory to all constituencies or stakeholders of the policy, because 
there are always diverse interests and perspectives of various interest groups. 
However, in judging a policy process, one thing that should be looked at is public 
participation in the policy process. After all, it is through participation that various 
stakeholders have the potential to seek values they perceive would inure to their benefit 
(Clark 2002) and affect their situations. Hence, I examine the extent of public 
participation in the policy process of the GEAM, and in doing so, encounter what Clark 
(2002) calls a “social process,” i.e., “interaction of every individual and organized 
interest in society” (Clark 2002, 32). In the social process, one sees several interactions 
among various stakeholder groups and individuals who can be impacted by the policy 
proposal. 
Critiquing the GEAM by looking at participation of interest groups in the policy 
process evokes seven elements: participants, perspectives, situations, base values, 
strategies, outcomes, and effects (Clark 2002). By participants, Clark (2002) is referring 
to the individuals, groups, and organizations participating in the policymaking. These 
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participants have perspectives in the form of demands, expectations of the policy, and 
identities that they bring to bear on the policymaking process and ultimately, the policy 
document. Furthermore, participants emanate from situations—their spatial, temporal, 
and institutional settings—that influence their perspectives and participation in the 
policymaking process. Participants make use of assets or resources in order to engage 
in the process, and achieve their goals.  Clark calls these assets base values. Base 
values are different from, but work well with, strategies. Participants have and use 
different strategies to affect their participation in policymaking and to achieve their 
goals. According to Clark (2002), whereas outcomes are the immediate consequences 
of interactions among various participants of the policymaking process, effects 
represent the overall—long-term—consequences of the interactions. I discuss the policy 
process of the GEAM using Clark’s seven elements in the following. 
Concerning participants, the GEAM process did not exhaust the array of diverse 
participants that should have participated. The process did not include local 
communities; participants were formal institutions that were easy to identify and reach, 
including state departments and agencies, and oil companies. The process did not 
include informal institutions or representatives of marginalized rural communities 
onshore near the offshore oil activities in Ghana’s Western Region, i.e., the 
communities most likely to be impacted by the oil development. Hence, it is most likely 
that the perspectives of the local communities were not adequately captured in the 
GEAM document. Even if other participants (experts, for instance) raised concerns on 
behalf of local communities, these experts would not likely have been effective in 
articulating the perspectives of the local communities with respect to their identity, 
expectations, worries and demands. For Clark (2002), identity “lies at the heart of a 
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participant’s perspective” (36) because it determines a participant’s values and affects 
their expectations and demands. Thus, the absence of local communities in the policy 
process of the GEAM has manifested in a low level of local communities’ role in the 
GEAM. 
It is possible to discern the situations (“‘zones’ in which social interactions take 
place) of local communities in Ghana’s offshore oil activities through studies and 
sociological analyses (Clark 2002, 39). However, obtaining deep understanding of 
communities’ complex situations (e.g., of how their values affect their demands and use 
of marine resources), requires intimate knowledge of communities’ socio-economic 
dynamics. Indeed, it requires one to live the “situations” of local communities. Moreover, 
since there is no homogeneous situation depicting a community, and communities’ 
situations change with their values over a period of time (Clark 2002), it would be 
difficult to extract local communities’ situations from empirical studies and sociological 
analyses alone. Therefore, the non-participation of local communities in the GEAM 
process resulted in a superficial analysis and conclusion about the situations of local 
communities close to the oil activities. 
Local communities already have values that are useful for the sustainable 
development of their communities, and for managing Ghana’s marine resources off their 
coasts. Clark (2002, 40) calls these values “base values.” Base values include power, 
which can be used to acquire more power or to influence allocations of benefits and 
burdens. Power can serve to emancipate local communities because power has effect 
on access to information, which gives local communities advantage and allows 
communities assert themselves, demand their rights, and carry out their obligations 
devoid of unwarranted external influences. When power is well directed, it could yield 
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benefits that affect communities as a whole. The non-participation of local communities 
in the GEAM process places local communities at a disadvantage in terms of bringing 
their values to bear on the environmental management of Ghana’s offshore oil 
operations and marine resources. 
Apart from base values, communities also have “scope values”—values 
“demanded or sought as ends or outcomes” in themselves (Clark 2002, 40). Scope 
values may be the ultimate goal or interest of a policy-stakeholder or community, and 
communities adopt different strategies in pursuit of their scope values (Clark 2002). 
Four of such strategies have been identified by Clark (2002): diplomatic, ideological, 
economic, and military strategies. Diplomatic strategies include negotiations among 
representatives of policy-stakeholders (interest groups) to settle differences in their 
scope values. Unlike diplomatic strategies where communication is among 
representatives of policy-stakeholders, in ideological strategies communication is to the 
general public and entails mass communication of ideas to sway the worldviews or 
perspectives of the general public (akin to propaganda). For Clark (2002), diplomatic 
and ideological strategies are “communicative,” that is, they make us of symbols in 
sending across ideas (41). In the GEAM process, initiating and encouraging open 
communications between local communities during the policy process would have seen 
local communities deploying their diplomatic and ideological strategies (communicative 
approach) in putting across their scope values and needs. However, that was not the 
case and if that continues, local communities may resort to other strategies when their 
“economic strategies”—“practices that rely on the production and distribution of goods 
and services” (Clark, 2002, 41)—fail to affect their situations. Economic strategies of the 
communities are weak since they are rural communities with little to no formal 
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economies that can affect the regional and national economies in Ghana, or affect 
economies of oil companies and compel them to negotiate. With military strategies—
“resources as weapons” (Clark, 2002, 42)—local communities may be able to wield this 
to put across their demands in order to affect the value of an outcome in their favor. 
This strategy, however, is not desirable as it may lead to conflicts that would not 
optimize the outcomes desired by any policy-stakeholder in the end. The situation in the 
Niger Delta of Nigeria where militias are fighting the government of Nigeria and oil 
companies exemplifies the use of military strategies. Local communities should not be 
compelled to take that approach to seek better outcomes for themselves. 
Consequences resulting from the social process (including the immediate 
product of a policy document) are values: consequences valued as “outcomes” that 
“indulge or deprive participants of a given situation” (Clark, 2002, 42). Depending on the 
perspective of a participant, an outcome may be accepted or rejected. It is likely that 
some participants of a social process would reject an outcome, because their 
perspectives were not taken into consideration, as they did not participate in the social 
process. This is the scenario I find with communities along the coast of Ghana’s 
offshore oil operations. The outcome of the GEAM’s social process has engendered a 
new social process, including the discussions in this dissertation, to seek a better 
outcome from the situations and perspectives of communities along the coast of Ghana 
where oil activities are taking place. Unlike outcomes that are short-term consequences, 
“effects” are “long-term outcomes in terms of values, institutions, and society” (Clark, 
2002, 43). Effects reflect the overall impact of outcomes of a policy and could manifest 
as behavioral changes in individuals and communities; establishment or destruction of 
institutions; changes in social and economic statuses; and/or changes in values. In 
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terms of effects of the GEAM, some are discernible while for some, it would be too soon 
to manifest. For instance, while one effect of the GEAM—the establishment of health 
and safety committees by oil companies is obvious, Though it may be too soon to 
determine the effect of the GEAM on socioeconomic status of communities and their 
inhabitants, there are already studies indicating that the socio-economic effects of oil 
development on local communities in Ghana are not favorable (cf. Ackah-Baidoo, 2013; 
Boohene and Peprah, 2011). 
In reflecting on participation in the policy process of the GEAM, I invoked Clark’s 
seven elements of the social process of policymaking (participants, perspectives, 
situations, base values, strategies, outcomes, and effects for my analyses. Analyzing 
the policy process of the GEAM from the standpoint of participation aligns with the quest 
to democratize environmental governance and natural resources management. Viewing 
the GEAM process through the lens of participation and the social process, I would 
argue that adequate attention was not paid to broadening participation to include local 
communities, perhaps because these communities were not identified as relevant 
stakeholders in the management of the offshore environment and resources of Ghana. 
On the other hand, the local communities were not considered to possess knowledge 
and expertise in policymaking. However, the problem of limited participation in public 
policymaking in Ghana is not a problem peculiar to the GEAM process alone; it is a 
problem endemic, generally, in Ghana’s policymaking space. Bawole (2013) for 
instance concludes in a study that attempts to engage participation of local stakeholders 
in the environmental impact assessment process of oil activities are “cosmetic and 
rhetoric with the view to meeting legal requirements” (385). 
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True, since Ghana returned to constitutional rule, public policymaking space has 
enlarged to include many more participants, and there is recognition that room exists for 
more participants. However, in Ghana’s policymaking space, while increasing 
participation is important, other issues are equally important to ensure effective 
participation. Mohammed (2015) analyzed participation in public policymaking in Ghana 
in respect of issues such as “depth, quality, legitimacy, and impact” of participation (44). 
Thus, while it is important to call for improvements in the democratization of 
environmental governance through broader participation, it is also important to ensure 
that participation is effective by calling for depth and quality of participation. 
Having concluded that the GEAM’s policy process was not inclusive enough to 
cater to participation of local communities in the process, I now turn attention to analyze 
the content of the GEAM document itself. I intend to assess whether Ghana has learned 
from the early experience with oil so far and, through the GEAM, has moved to institute 
better governance structures that incorporate plans to identify and address 
environmental justice impacts. 
 
3.7 Examining the GEAM  
 GEAM’s purpose is to “mainstream environment, health, safety and community 
issues into the offshore oil and gas operations” in pursuit of sustainable development 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 6). Hence, the GEAM’s specific goals are to 
assist operators in Ghana’s oil sector with the environmental assessment process, and 
to identify and manage any environmental impacts emanating from the sector’s 
activities. Consequently, to examine the GEAM, I use an environmental justice 
framework to look at the extent to which its provisions and directions address this 
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purpose. For my analyses with respect to environmental justice, I rely on the trivalent 
conception of environmental justice as adopted in Chapter 1. This trivalent conception 
captures environmental justice as an objective that seeks to attain distributive, 
procedural (participatory), and recognition justice. 
 
3.7.1 About the GEAM 
 To facilitate my analyses, I present a summary of key provisions of the GEAM in 
the following for subsequent discussion in sub-sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3. I begin this 
summary with a presentation of the GEAM’s objectives, principles, and protocols, 
followed by a summary of the document’s three sections entitled “Industry specific 
impacts and management,” “Performance indicators and monitoring,” and “Industry 
specific requirements.” To mainstream environment, health, safety, and community 
concerns into oil operations, the GEAM seeks to meet three specific objectives that 
include: 
(i) Establish a system for identifying and managing environmental impacts 
associated with offshore operations 
(ii) Provide industry and government with clarity on the current regulatory 
requirements 
(iii) Provide for dialogue between industry and government to address 
opportunities and risks in the industry. (Environmental Protection Agency 
2011, 6-7) 
 
In addition to these specific objectives, the GEAM is premised on eight principles 
and two protocols. In the first principle, the GEAM directs oil companies to ensure their 
activities align with government policies and regulations on sustainable development. 
The second principle requires oil companies to carry out their activities in openness and 
transparency. The third instructs operators in the oil industry to adhere to “reasonable 
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and prudent” standards throughout their activities (Environmental Protection Agency 
2011, 9). The Precautionary Principle is the GEAM’s fourth principle, which among 
others, requires oil companies to prevent environmental degradation even in the 
absence of scientific knowledge, and to bear the burden of proof that an activity would 
not adversely affect the environment. The fifth principle calls for oil companies to adopt 
and apply best practices to reduce and prevent negative impacts of their activities on 
the environment. In respect to the sixth principle, oil companies must employ the best 
available technology to avert pollution at the source. Principle seven holds oil 
companies liable to pay for any cost incurred in cleaning up pollution resulting from 
activities of the companies; and the last, principle eight, stipulates that “international 
best practices present the most ideal set of standards on which to base decisions and 
be duly exploited” (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 10). That is, companies in 
Ghana’s oil industry must exploit international best standards to manage their activities. 
The two protocols in the GEAM are “consultation” and “data and information” 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 10-11). Consultation requires oil companies to 
be responsive and to share in communities’ concerns for the environment. The second 
enjoins “industry and government agencies” to contribute to the provision of existing 
relevant environmental information for the purposes of making environmental 
assessments.  
The GEAM is structured into three major sections that capture its specific and 
detail provisions. The first section prescribes procedures for managing “industry-specific 
impacts” of the country’s offshore oil sector. Areas covered under this section include 
impacts on the environment, occupational health and safety, community issues, and 
security (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 43). In respect to the environment, the 
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document’s provisions address air emissions, waste, noise, spills, decommissioning, 
and other waste streams. For occupational health and safety, the GEAM covers areas 
relating to air quality, hazardous materials, personnel transfer and vessels, well 
blowouts, ship collision, and emergency preparedness and response. Concerning 
community health and safety, the GEAM clearly acknowledges that offshore oil activities 
will affect local communities. A significant potential impact is on the community food 
source as oil spills can contaminate fish. The GEAM thus requires offshore operators to 
provide information regarding location of offshore facilities and timing of activities to 
maritime authorities and fishery groups. In addition, offshore operators must clearly 
mark locations of fixed facilities and safety exclusion zones, and must provide 
instructions regarding limitations to accessing the exclusion zones to other sea users. 
The GEAM requires operators to appoint a person as liaison between fishing 
communities and operators, in “areas where significant impacts to fishermen are 
anticipated” (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 93). What is “significant” in this 
context is arguable since no definition for it exists in the GEAM.  
Furthermore, on community issues, the GEAM requires operators to develop 
plans for community relations and communication channels “in order to improve 
relations and minimize conflicts between the parties” (Environmental Protection Agency 
2011, 96). I interpret “parties” to mean mainly local communities, offshore oil operators 
and their subcontractors, and government. The final area of the GEAM under the first 
major is security—security of offshore facilities, security of the personnel on board, and 
security of the oil. Securing the offshore facility is very important for the EPA and the 
operators. Thus, the GEAM directs operators to conduct “security assessments of their 
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facilities [….] and develop security plans” to protect their facilities and prevent 
unauthorized access to facilities (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 96).  
In the second major section, the GEAM deals with “performance indicators and 
monitoring.” The section provides directions on ways operators’ activities would be 
monitored (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 99). The directives outlined in this 
section cover environmental emissions and effluent guidelines, environmental 
monitoring, and occupational health and safety. Furthermore, the section provides that 
community health and safety be monitored by operators against a list of indicators that 
must have been determined during the impact assessment stages of oil projects. Oil 
companies are required to conduct environmental impact assessments prior to 
commencing oil development projects (cf. Chapter 4 below). 
The third and final major section of the GEAM, “industry specific requirements,” 
describes mandatory actions operators must take to ensure “oil and gas development 
activities are conducted in safe and responsible manner” (Environmental Protection 
Agency 2011, 105). Specific directives in this section require operators to cooperate 
among themselves to plan and monitor the external environment in their areas of 
operation, although, there is no mention of cooperation with communities onshore—
communities that depend on the marine resources offshore and whose environment 
could be impacted by oil development. Other specific directives include remote 
measurement of acute pollution, baseline surveys, environmental monitoring, follow-up 
surveys, and characterization of oil and chemicals. With respect to emissions and 
discharges into the external environment, the GEAM provides for discharge of oil-
contained water, emission to air, ecotoxicological testing of chemicals, categorization of 
chemicals, environmental assessments, choice of chemicals, use and discharge of 
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chemicals, chemicals for emergency preparedness, discharge of cuttings and particles, 
and several other specific directives. Another assignment would be required to assess 
the extent to which these duties are met.  
 
3.7.2 The GEAM and Environmental Justice  
 From the summary of the GEAM above, it is clear the document contains plans 
and provisions bordering on environmental justice issues. Of the eight principles, the 
second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh seek to address environmental justice issues. 
The second principle is about openness and potentially provides for the inclusion of 
diverse groups of stakeholders in the environmental management of Ghana’s offshore 
oil activities. Hence, procedural justice is achievable in theory. The principle also 
implicitly evokes recognition justice and distributive justice in Ghana’s offshore oil 
industry. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh principles explicitly seek to address 
distributive justice, as they relate to the prevention and reparation of negative 
environmental consequences of oil production. The principle of sustainable 
development, depending on its articulation in the GEAM (beyond it being stated as a 
principle), could have potential to recognize and address environmental justice 
concerns. However, as the principles appear in the GEAM, it is not clear which way one 
should read and interpret sustainable development throughout the GEAM. Moreover, I 
am not convinced that oil operators would be able to align “all” their activities with 
Ghana government policies on sustainable development as the principle requires. 
With respect to the protocols, since the first protocol requires oil companies to be 
responsive and share in communities’ concerns for the environment, it is my 
expectation that the companies would consult all relevant stakeholders in this regard, 
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and, thus, communities. This protocol is an attempt by the GEAM to address procedural 
and distributive aspects of environmental justice, particularly in terms of engaging local 
communities to participate in protecting their environment. The second protocol enjoins 
industry and government agencies to contribute to the provision of existing relevant 
environmental information for the purposes of making environmental assessments. 
Although the GEAM’s first protocol requires oil companies to consult stakeholders and 
communities, the GEAM does not provide details of what the consultations should be. 
Moreover, given the fact that the GEAM takes some of its provisions from LI 1652 (see 
3.5 above), it could have referred oil companies to sections of the LI addressing 
community engagement and expand that, because the LI’s own section on public 
hearing is narrow (cf. Chapter 4 for detailed discussion of the LI 1652).  
In the major sections of the GEAM, abundant provisions exist to address some 
distributive aspect of environmental justice in terms of protecting the environment from 
pollution and degradation, and the lives of people in local communities onshore and 
personnel offshore. I have captured some of these important provisions in the summary 
above (3.7.1). However, the major sections of the GEAM falls short when it comes to 
procedural and recognition justice. As such, and in view of my acceptance of the 
trivalent conception of environmental justice, I would argue that the GEAM requires 
review in order to address environmental justice comprehensively in Ghana’s oil sector.  
The GEAM is a good starting point for further deliberation on ensuring that the 
environment, human well-being, and livelihoods are protected in the face of oil 
development to avoid emergence of the resource curse in Ghana. In the light of 
contributing to deliberations on the GEAM, I would like to highlight specific shortfalls of 
the GEAM in respect of managing the environment and addressing environmental 
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justice. I discuss these shortfalls in three ways that align with the trivalent conception of 
environmental justice—distributive, recognition, and procedural justice. 
First, in terms of distributive justice for instance, Ghana has a policy of not flaring 
any gas associated with oil production. Gas flaring is “controlled burning of natural 
gases associated with oil production” (Nwaugo, Onyeagba, and Nwahcukwu 2006, 
1824). Yet, in managing impacts of offshore oil activities on the environment, the GEAM 
provides that flaring can be carried out by operators under certain conditions, such as 
for safety reasons, “emergency, power or equipment failure, or other plant upset 
condition and start up (sic) operations” (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 46). 
The problem with this provision is that though the GEAM prescribes measures to control 
and prevent pollution in the process of flaring, the GEAM does not require oil companies 
(operators) to seek approval from the EPA or some other regulatory authority prior to 
flaring. There is thus potential for operators to abuse those exceptions for gas flaring 
because flaring is a cheaper way of disposing off unwanted gas associated with oil 
during extraction. Meanwhile, deleterious effects of gas flaring have been found on 
people in Nigeria in cases of cancers, skin and respiratory disease, and effects on 
childhood development (Glazebrook and Kola-olusanya 2011); soil microbial activity 
(Nwaugo, Onyeagba, and Nwahcukwu 2006); crops production (Dung, Bombom, and 
Agusomu 2008); and contributions to greenhouse gas emissions (Anomohanran 2012). 
Therefore, to allow operators the opportunity to flare gas without prior approval could be 
detrimental to the environment and health of local communities. In instances where 
companies need to flare gas immediately for safety reasons, the GEAM must require 
companies to furnish the EPA or a regulatory organization with reports within a certain 
period to allow for follow-up investigations.  
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Second, in terms of recognition justice, although the GEAM acknowledges there 
could be some impacts of operators’ offshore activities onshore; there is no recognition 
of onshore communities’ role in relation to environmental management. This may be 
justified in some respects given that oil activities are offshore and require a certain level 
of technical knowledge and expertise. Nonetheless, this does not constitute sufficient 
grounds for the misrecognition and non-recognition of local communities, since the 
offshore oil activities have implications onshore. For instance, offshore oil spills can 
have devastating impacts onshore, and I recall the oil spill incident in 2011 when 
Kosmos spilled oil that washed ashore. Spills also affect fish with livelihood and health 
impacts on people who rely on fish for food security. Furthermore, as far as recognition 
of the values of local communities is concerned, the GEAM does not prescribe ways 
operators should treat the values of local communities as part of the management of the 
environment. 
Third, since proposals in the GEAM for managing impacts of offshore oil activities 
on the environment fall short with regards to recognition justice, it affects the 
achievement of procedural justice as well. Moreover, although the GEAM has a section 
called “community issues,” the document does not require offshore oil operators to 
ensure the participation of local communities in the environmental management 
activities. Yet, the GEAM clearly acknowledges the potential impacts of offshore oil 
activities on communities onshore. Thus, when it comes to the management of offshore 
oil activities on the environment, the GEAM proposes little for ways to involve local 
communities. I discuss the role of local communities later in this section, where I 
recommend roles local communities could play.  
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The GEAM is an important document and part of the overall system of 
governance mechanism established to protect Ghana from encountering the resource 
curse. In what follows, I examine ways in which the GEAM can serve to promote or 
hinder good governance in Ghana’s oil sector. In this discussion, I relate tenets of the 
GEAM to the resource curse literature I reviewed in Chapter 2 in order to establish 
linkages between the existing literature and Ghana’s planned actions in view of the 
GEAM. 
 
3.7.3 The GEAM and Governance of Ghana’s Oil Sector 
A starting point for considering the GEAM as a tool of governance in Ghana’s oil 
sector is to consider it as a means for checks and balances, because institutional 
design that assures checks and balances is an important requirement for good 
governance in the natural resource sector (Torvik 2011). In the resources curse 
literature, the expression “checks and balances” has been used to mean rules for 
ensuring compliance and accountability. In most instances of its use, “checks and 
balance” relates to financial management and political governance of the resource 
sector (cf. Gelb 1988; Lederman and Maloney 2008; Torvik 2011). Collier and Hoeffler 
(2009), for instance, make an argument for including checks and balances in political 
governance. They argue that resource-endowed developing countries need 
democracies with strong checks and balances to avert the misuse of income from 
resource development.  
My reference to the GEAM as a tool for checks and balances, however, relates to 
the documents ability to serve as a means of enforcing compliance and accountability in 
the environmental management of Ghana’s oil sector, not only for political governance 
118 
 
and for revenue management in the sector. As such, since most of the GEAM’s 
provisions and directives emanate from LI 1652 (which is a regulation), compliance with 
the GEAMs provisions and directives are enforceable through the LI. Furthermore, since 
the GEAM is a public document (albeit not available for free), its provisions are 
important for enforcing accountability in Ghana’s oil sector. For instance, local 
communities and all Ghanaians can apprise themselves of the document’s provisions 
and make demands on government of Ghana and oil companies to account for their 
actions or inactions in the oil development. The GEAM is not only a tool for 
implementing checks and balances in the (environmental) governance of Ghana’s oil 
sector. The GEAM has several other roles to play for good governance in Ghana’s oil 
sector as a means of averting the resource curse. The GEAM can be a tool to establish 
or extend linkages from Ghana’s oil sector to other sectors of Ghana’s socio-economic 
life. Furthermore, the GEAM has some capacity, in view of its provisions, to diminish 
factors that can contribute to the manifestation of the Dutch disease and thus the 
resource curse. Considering the usefulness of the GEAM, I would recommend that the 
GEAM be made available to the public for free. 
In Chapter 2, I highlighted arguments by Gylfason, Tryggvi, and Gylfi (1999) and 
Ross (1999) to the effect that resource-endowed countries are bound to encounter the 
curse due to a lack of linkages between the resource sector and other sectors of the 
countries’ economies. With the GEAM, Ghana has an opportunity to establish linkages 
between the oil sector and health, economic (livelihood), and education sectors in 
Ghana. The GEAM makes clear provisions for oil companies and Ghana government 
(national, regional and local) to collaborate to in order to address the health and safety 
needs of communities. This is important because the GEAM’s provisions serve as a 
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reminder and as an obligation to oil companies and government of Ghana (especially) 
to invest income from the oil development in the health sector. If done, this investment 
could ensure improvements in the health status of Ghanaians due to increased access 
to healthcare and improvements in overall health system in Ghana. Furthermore, such 
investment could lead to other spinoffs and increased investments in allied services. In 
addition, the GEAM could link Ghana’s oil sector and the livelihoods of local 
communities. 
Although I would argue that the GEAM’s provisions for generating livelihood 
options for local communities are inadequate, I do believe the provisions can play a role 
in improving the livelihood options of local communities. In view of oil development, the 
GEAM directs oil companies to create a point of liaison between local communities 
(whose fishing activities would be affected by oil production) and oil companies. I 
believe through such a liaison, local communities would be able to offer suggestions, 
and receive suggestions and assistance on ways to diversify or improve on their 
livelihood options. Furthermore, in view of the GEAM’s provisions that facilitate activities 
of oil companies, there would be expanded commerce and business activities in the 
local communities as more oil companies are encouraged to develop more oil fields. 
These would be important in addressing local economic issues and improving on the 
national economy in Ghana.  
The GEAM’s provisions give opportunity for Ghana to avert the resources curse 
and improve on governance through improvement in education. In Chapter 2, I pointed 
out an argument by Gylfason, Tryggvi, and Gylfi (1999) that resource-endowment tends 
to hinder investment in education which leads to the curse of resources. In Ghana, 
however, the GEAM has potential to address this problem and avert the resource curse. 
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If livelihood options must change because oil development has affected fishing, new 
skills and expertise would be required, which in turn would require education. Moreover, 
if Ghanaians should be able to participate in the oil sector as the Local Content Act 
provides (I discuss this Act in Chapter 4), investment in education is necessary. Some 
education may be for short-term purposes—to retrain and empower people with skills to 
transition into new livelihood opportunities. Some education would be long-term, as in 
reforming, improving, and expanding the education system and infrastructure from 
primary level to tertiary level. Investment in education with a long-term perspective looks 
at future generations. Thus, in requiring oil companies to liaise with local communities in 
respect of addressing livelihood issues for the latter, the GEAM provides the opportunity 
for Ghana government (national, regional, and local) and oil companies to invest in 
Ghana’s educational system with revenue from oil. With improved education, local 
communities can diversify their livelihood options and economies. Moreover, since 
improved education would improve the literacy rate in Ghana, and since improved 
education system is an indicator of good governance (Andrews 2008), Ghana could 
experience overall good governance that could impact the oil sector, too.  
Overall, I would argue that the GEAM has opportunities to diminish the 
effectiveness of some the factors that can contribute to the resource curse in Ghana. 
However, the GEAM can be a double-edge sword. It can be a tool for poor governance 
and inhibit good governance in Ghana’s oil sector chiefly due to the document’s role in 
ensuring checks and balances, because the GEAM can be one of the tools that 




As a means of checks and balances in (environmental) governance of Ghana’s 
oil sector, the GEAM could be subject to abuse and subversion. It is known that income 
from natural resources can weaken checks and balances (Gelb 1988; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2009; Torvik 2011; Lederman and Maloney 2008), allowing for “patronage 
politics” to prevail (Collier and Hoeffler 2009, 305) through bribery and lobbying of 
political elites (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Torvik 2011). Governance of Ghana’s oil 
sector is not immune from this. Hence, individuals and organizations with financial 
power can influence implementation of the GEAM in a selective way that inures to their 
benefit while being detrimental to Ghanaians and local communities.  
To avert a subversion of the GEAM would require strong institutions, in terms of 
existence of other policy documents, organizations, and qualified personnel to serve as 
checks and balances that complement the GEAM, and protect it from rent seekers (cf. 
Chapter 4 for discussion of some of these institutions). In addition, since the GEAM has 
potential to create desirable public outcomes in serving as checks and balances in the 
oil sector, it requires constant public engagement and scrutiny to be effective. After all, 
checks and balances are “processes” (Collier and Hoeffler 2009, 299) and should not 
be seen as events that are relevant in the short term.  
The GEAM is a product of Ghana’s public policymaking process and in view of its 
shortcomings, it would be appropriate to discuss some of the challenges of the 
policymaking process in an attempt to situate the challenges the GEAM’s process 
encountered. Furthermore, these challenges are important to serve as lessons for future 
policymaking in Ghana and other resource-endowed countries in sub-Sahara Africa. I 




3.8 Challenges and Lessons from Ghana’s Policy Process  
Ghana’s policymaking process is encumbered by a number of challenges that 
should serve as lessons to Ghana in moving forward, and lessons to other sub-Sahara 
African countries seeking to follow Ghana’s steps. One challenge of the policy process 
in Ghana’s oil sector is the lack of expertise on oil issues in the various public 
institutions mandated to make policies for the sector and to regulate activities of oil 
companies in Ghana. For instance, before the 2007 oil discovery, Ghana’s EPA did not 
have a department in charge of oil activities; yet, in the wake of the oil discovery and 
preparations to commence production in 2010, the EPA was expected to oversee the 
environmental aspects of oil production in Ghana. This did not only place enormous 
pressure on the organization’s human and technical resources; it also led to inadequate 
preparations to ensure oil companies were putting in place effective measures for the 
environmental management of their operations. Inadequate capacities and expertise 
were important concerns raised by representatives I interviewed. At ISODEC for 
instance, I was told that due to inadequate expertise and capacity at the EPA. 
According to the Programs Coordinator at ISODEC: 
…there were lots of gaps in the jubilee EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] 
and the over reliance on historical data as against trend data. There was lack of 
simulation, to see how far, for instance, potential spills could spread around the 
coast. There was also poor work done in terms of the protection of the marine 
area—the use of single hull tanker as against the double hull tanker 
recommended by the international maritime organization and a whole lot of other 
concerns that we had. (Program Coordinator at ISODEC, personal 
communication 2015) 
 
Inadequacies of Ghana’s EPA were reflected in, for instance, Tullow Ghana 
using outdated data to prepare the Environmental Impact Statement for Phase 1 stage 
of the Golden Jubilee oil field operations. Moreover, because the EPA was ill prepared, 
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they did not do simulations to determine potential environmental impacts due to 
accidents on offshore facilities, and the first floating production storage and offloading 
(FPSO) vessel was manufactured with a single hull instead of a double hull. The lack of 
expertise also manifested in an improper institutional structure for managing Ghana’s oil 
sector. According to experts, a proper structure would have entailed, after the discovery 
of oil in 2007, Ghana would have produced a policy on oil production based on which 
laws and regulations would be derived. However, that was not the case. 
In addition to the paucity of expertise in oil, Ghana’s oil policy process was 
characterized by a lack of transparency in the policymaking exercises. For instance, 
although there were attempts to make some policy processes transparent through 
national public consultation forums and workshops, draft documents of the policies were 
not available to the public prior to the consultation forums. Thus, public comments and 
contributions to these policies were not informed, and because such forums were 
organized with inadequate preparations, consultation exercises took long to complete, 
leading to waste of time (as the multinational corporations were not delaying their 
preparations to produce the oil). The delays also meant that the costs of the 
policymaking processes were rising. With the rising cost of the policy process coupled 
with the paucity of expertise, Ghana has relied on donor aid to manage the oil sector; 
but such aid is not all free from conditions and pressures.  
Associated with the lack of transparency in the policymaking process is the 
repeal or abandonment of policies formulated in the previous government. At the time of 
Ghana’s oil discovery in 2007, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) was in the government 
and commenced some of the policymaking in preparations for the production of oil. 
However, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) won elections and came to power 
124 
 
in 2009. Because the policymaking processes commenced by the NPP were not 
transparent and were not bi-partisan, the new government (NDC) had challenges 
continuing with, completing, and implementing the policies started by the previous 
government (NPP). Thus, there were further delays in the production of policies to guide 
Ghana’s burgeoning oil industry. 
Making effective policies that are legally enforceable through Acts of Parliament 
in Ghana is a lengthy and expensive process. According to the Chief Director of Energy 
Ministry:  
…you start a whole process and probably it takes one or two years…and the 
public do not understand especially when you have contentious things… so the 
public gets impatient. It becomes so expensive particularly when the Ministry is 
not resource endowed it, [policy process] continues to move slowly because 
consultation does not come cheap. Apart from this consultation, parliamentarians 
need an understanding because you have to send the parliamentary committees 
that are relevant to be taken through the policy or legislation [and its] 
implications. (Acting Chief Director of Energy Ministry, personal communication 
2015) 
 
The lengthy and expensive process of making legally enforceable policies are 
challenges that need addressing, not only for the oil sector in Ghana, but also for 
policymaking in Ghana generally. 
The work of lobbyists is another challenge facing oil policymaking in Ghana. 
Whether such policies would be made into laws by the legislature or not, there is a 
considerable level of lobbying activity going on in oil policymaking in Ghana. 
Multinational oil companies have the bigger advantage, because they have financial 
means to obtain and provide information that policymakers need to inform their policy 
choices. Such means of influence often takes place through workshops and field trips 
funded by the multinational companies, a practice that could involve conflict of interest 
issues. Moreover, the oil companies have advantage because Ghana needs the 
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investments and revenues that are going to accrue due to the activities of the oil 
operations. Thus, policymakers tend to yield to the interests of oil companies in order to 
obtain the investments and revenue from oil operations.  
Last but not the least, a challenge I would associate with Ghana’s policy process 
is the inability to avoid overlapping functions among state institutions. This challenge is 
a corollary of inability to ensure inter-sectoral understanding and cooperation in 
policymaking and implementation of policies and regulations in the nascent oil sector. 
This is particularly important when it comes to the mandates and functions of state 
institutions. For instance, with respect to developing human safety and environment 
(HSE) regulations for Ghana’s oil sector, the Petroleum Commission believes it is their 
mandate, whereas Ghana Maritime Authority believes it has responsibility and has 
already prepared an HSE regulation. As I was informed by a Program Officer at the 
Petroleum Commission of Ghana: 
…. the reason why they [Ghana Maritime Authority] are not part of the draft is 
that, they have also gone and developed their L.I. already. Virtually it is just like a 
repetition so not until we have finished with the draft before you can now send 
our copy to them to read through and see where it conflicts with whatever they 
have. (Program Officer of Petroleum Commission, personal communication 
2015) 
 
The oil sector appears to be a lucrative sector in Ghana; hence, several state 
institutions want to extend their mandates to the sector, and in doing so, they tend to 
seek little collaboration with other state agencies in the sector. This a major source of 
the overlapping of functions. My verdict is that the policy terrain is messy with policies, 
regulations, and organizations being created that further exacerbate the confusion in 
terms of agencies’ ownership and execution of mandates. There is a certain aspect of 
enclave behavior, even among national policymaking and regulatory organizations, that 
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is breeding duplication of efforts. The enclave that is beginning to emerge must be 
broken before it is entrenched in Ghana.  
 
3.9 Chapter Summary 
The goal of this chapter is to analyze Ghana’s Guidelines for the Environmental 
Assessments and Management of offshore oil activities (GEAM). This analysis takes 
place within the framework of Ghana’s public policymaking space. In mapping Ghana’s 
policymaking framework, I find that Ghana’s 1992 Constitution provides the bedrock for 
public policymaking in Ghana, and the Constitution places policymaking responsibility 
on the Executive branch of governance. For instance, Article 34(2) of Ghana’s 1992 
Constitution requires the President of Ghana to inform Ghana’s Parliament about ways 
the government intends to fulfill Ghana’s Direct Principles of State Policy. Additionally, 
Article 67 of the Constitution requires the President of Ghana to deliver the state of the 
nation’s message to Parliament. These are constitutional requirements for the President 
of Ghana to make public policy pronouncements.  
Furthermore, Article 76(2) of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution is an unequivocal dictate 
to the Executive to determine overall government policy. While the constitution requires 
the President to make policies, the Constitution places a constraint on Ghana’s 
Parliament for policymaking. Per Article 108 of the Constitution, the Parliament of 
Ghana cannot make any policy that places a financial burden on the state, and although 
Ghana’s Parliament, in some cases may debate government policy, e.g., budget 




The President of Ghana, the Cabinet, and the Ministers of state are assisted with 
their policymaking duties by the career civil servants of Ghana’s Civil Service. Ministries 
are composed of Departments and Agencies, such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency, tasked to perform specific functions in administration. The Presidency, 
Ministries, Departments, and Agencies constitute state actors in Ghana’s policymaking. 
It used to be the case that Ghana’s public policymaking space was elitist, composed of 
state actors and experts from donor countries and agencies. However, the public 
policymaking space in Ghana has broadened to include others, such as civil society 
organizations, think tanks, and the general public. Thus, the public policymaking space 
in Ghana is occupied by state actors (Ministries, Departments, and Agencies), civil 
society organizations, private sector (industry), academic (research institutions), think 
tanks, and “relevant” communities. 
As an arm of the Executive—an agency under the Ministry of Environment, 
Science, Technology, and Innovation—Ghana’s EPA was established by Act 490 with 
the mandate to advise the Minister of State on environmental policy and to formulate 
standards and guidelines to avert pollution. The GEAM is a product of the EPA, and the 
document has provisions to address distributive environmental justice in Ghana’s oil 
sector, although the document falls short with respect to recognition justice. With 
respect to procedural justice, the document would have been better with more 
provisions.  
I find that the GEAM’s social process (interactions of stakeholders during 
policymaking) was poor, because of limited participation of stakeholders (including local 
communities). But, inadequacy in the social process of policymaking is not limited only 
to the GEAM’s policy process. Inadequacy of the social process is endemic in public 
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policymaking in Ghana. Yes, the policymaking space is broadening in Ghana, but it is 
doing so at a slow pace and the impacts of state directives to broaden participation is 
yet to be realized.  
A number of challenges encumber Ghana’s policymaking process, challenges 
that include inadequate Ghanaian-based expertise in oil, lack of transparency of the 
policymaking process, weak attachment of succeeding governments to policies 
formulated by the preceding governments, and activities of lobbyist who project the 
interests of multinational corporations over local community interest in Ghana’s 
policymaking space. In addition, I noted that Ghana’s policymaking process was 
challenged by the jostling behavior of public institutions wanting to participate in the oil 
sector (because the sector is perceived as lucrative) even when such institutions’ 
mandates and functions were not related to the sector. 
In spite of the challenges of Ghana’s policymaking process, the GEAM was 
made with the view that it would be a tool to provide checks and balances in Ghana’s oil 
sector. As a tool for enforcing checks and balances (at least to ensure environmental 
justice) in Ghana’s oil sector, the GEAM itself requires an institutional design that 
assures checks and balances in order for good governance. In Chapter 4, I will examine 




INSTITUTIONS MANAGING GHANA’S OIL AND GAS SECTOR AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
Environmental impacts are “intrinsic” to oil activities (Sakyi, Efavi, and Asare 
2012, 62), and have been detrimental to the environment and human livelihoods 
(Glazebrook and Story 2012; Glazebrook and Kola-olusanya 2011). Some impacts may 
reach areas beyond the immediate surroundings of particular oil activities. During 
preparations for Phase 1 of the Jubilee Oil Field development, environmental and socio-
economic impacts were anticipated following the impact assessments carried out by the 
Jubilee Field operators (Tullow Ghana Limited 2009). Thus, concern about impacts of 
oil activities in Ghana are unanimously acknowledged. For this reason, Ghana ought to 
have a functioning institutional framework to manage the exploration and development 
of oil resources in Ghana.  
Since a strong institutional design is imperative for good governance of the 
natural resources sector (Torvik 2011), Ghana must have an institutional framework that 
ensures good governance for the oil sector in order to avert the resource curse. I 
argued in Chapter 3 that the Guidelines on Environmental Assessment and 
Management of Ghana’s Offshore Oil and Gas (GEAM) is an important tool that serves 
purposes of checks and balances in Ghana’s oil sector and recommended that either it 
is put through the legislative process to become fully enforceable or aspects of its 
provisions that are unenforceable be extracted and made into law. However, given its 
present form (which gives it a mix of hard and soft policy effect, cf. Chapter 3), there is 
need for a strong institutional framework to back the GEAM to be effective in performing 
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the roles of checks and balances. Moreover, I would argue that even if the GEAM were 
fully enforceable, it would nonetheless require a strong institutional framework to be 
effective. Hence, the goal of this chapter is to discuss a framework for managing oil 
activities in Ghana with emphasis on environmental justice ramifications, including 
socio-economic, of the oil sector. The discussion is on an existing framework that 
involves active and non-active institutions. The purpose of this discussion is to analyze 
the extent to which elements of the framework improve governance in Ghana’s oil 
sector. In addition, I analyze the extent to which the elements are capable of identifying 
and addressing environmental justice issues. Furthermore, seeking to understand the 
institutional framework is important in obtaining clarity and broader understanding of 
the, legal, policy, and administrative nuances at play in Ghana’s efforts to avert the 
curse of natural resource wealth.  
In what follows, I do not claim that the analysis would be exhaustive in terms of 
my ability to cover every element of the framework. Research limitations and the fact 
that the framework comprises a complex system of elements that require much time 
and space than this dissertation can accommodate necessitate selectivity of the 
elements for discussion. Hence, I cover key legislative and policy elements of the 
framework (documents), on the one hand, and organizational structures (administrative 
elements) of the framework (infrastructure), on the other hand. First, I discuss the 
documents.  
 
4.2 Legislative and Policy Documents  
Several legislative and policy elements comprise the framework for managing 
Ghana’s environment, environmental impact of oil activities, and oil resources in Ghana. 
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These include international conventions Ghana has ratified and national laws and 
policies Ghana has formulated. In addition, there are several legal and policy 
documents not specifically on oil or the environment per se; but on other sectors, for 
instance fisheries and national security, that indirectly affect oil exploration and 
development. In the following, I discuss some of the legal and policy documents with 
respect to their roles in the management of Ghana’s oil resources, and in ensuring the 
protection of Ghana’s environment. I begin this discussion with some international 
documents. 
 
4.2.1 International Documents 
Ghana is signatory to a number of international environmental conventions and 
policy frameworks that have direct bearing on oil activities and the environment. These 
conventions have affected not just oil activities, but also Ghana’s national laws and 
policies. They have served either as templates or as principles for policymaking. 
Moreover, where the international documents have not been adapted into Ghana’s 
policies, they are nonetheless significant because offshore oil activities are substantially 
guided by regional and international laws (Bonsu 2011).  
The importance of international documents in Ghana’s oil sector is illustrated by 
the number of them Tullow Ghana Limited relied on in producing the environmental 
impact statement (EIS) for the first phase of the Jubilee Oil Field development. Whereas 
Tullow adduced only one national document—the Environmental Regulation (LI 652)—
the company adduced several international documents. These include International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) Conventions—the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973, modified 1978 (MARPOL 73/78), 
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United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), and some “good 
practice standards and guidelines” (Tullow Ghana Limited 2009, x). In addition, Tullow 
relied on the World Bank’s social and environmental performance standards to prepare 
the EIS for Jubilee operations.  
Besides these international documents that formed the bases of the first 
environmental impact statement for managing Ghana’s offshore oil activities, there are 
other international Conventions to which Ghana is a signatory  These include the 
International Convention of Oil Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (1990); the 
Convention on Biological diversity(1994); the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (1995) and subsequent Kyoto Protocol (2003) and Paris Agreement 
(2015); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966, 
signed by Ghana in 2000); the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(2003); and the Revised Africa Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (2007). However, my discussion does not cover these because they do not 
have direct impact in the lived experience of Ghanaians with respect to environmental 
justice; that is, this dissertation is focused on how individuals and communities are and 
should be protected from direct environmental harms in consequence of Ghana’s oil 
development. In short, this study is about “where we live, work and play,” (Novotny 
2000, 3) so only international documents with direct impacts on Ghanaians are 
discussed. These include Conventions protecting waters that have consequences for 
fishing livelihoods directly impacted by offshore drilling, and World Bank social and 
environmental standards in countries they finance. 
As mentioned above, I would be selective about which document to discuss. My 
discussion will focus on international documents cited in the GEAM and Tullow’s EIS for 
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the Jubilee Field development. The documents in question include MARPOL 73/78, 
UNCLOS, and World Bank’s social and environmental performance standards. I focus 
on these because, in citing these international documents in the GEAM, Ghana 
demonstrated the immediate relevance of these documents for the oil sector. Moreover, 
when Tullow adduced these international documents in the environmental impact 
statement approved by the EPA, Tullow had set a precedence in Ghana, and since 
there was no precedence to guide Tullow and the oil industry in Ghana generally, the 
acceptance of Tullow’s approach had become a de facto norm in Ghana’s oil industry. 
Whether these documents are enough to complement the GEAM as checks and 
balances, it remains to be determined. I proceed in a chronological order to discuss the 
documents, from the oldest to the latest, as follows. 
 
4.2.1.1 International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution  
In 1973, the International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL) was adopted; however, before the convention could come into effect, 
a series of tanker accidents in 1976-1977 led to the adoption of the MARPOL Protocol 
in 1978. The 1978 Protocol then assimilated the 1973 convention and hence, the 
acronym MARPOL 73/78. In spite of this, MARPOL 73/78 did not kick in until in 1983. 
MARPOL serves to deter ships from polluting marine environments (International 
Maritime Organisation 2017). Tullow Ghana alluded to the MARPOL 73/78 because, 
first, the Jubilee Field is an offshore operation and MARPOL 73/78 seeks to prevent 
pollution of the ocean. Second, Tullow finds MARPOL 73/78 relevant for the purposes 
of preparing its environmental impact statement for the Jubilee Field operations 
because oil produced from the Jubilee Field is stored in a floating production storage 
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and offloading (FPSO) vessel. An FPSO is a sitting vessel that stores unprocessed 
crude oil, processes it, stores the processed crude oil and gas, and transfers the 
processed oil and gas to tanker vessels for onward transportation and sale Thus, since 
the FPSO is a vessel, it must to be covered by MARPOL 73/78, as the convention 
governs vessels.  
MARPOL 73/78 has six annexes that contain specific provisions for the 
deterrence of pollution from vessels. The first, Annex I, “Regulations for the Prevention 
of Pollution by Oil,” came into force in 1983 and was amended in 1992. This Annex 
governs prevention of oil pollution from accidents and normal operations. Annex II, titled 
“Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk,” 
establishes the criteria for discharging, and details for controlling pollution by noxious 
substances. Like Annex I, Annex II came into force in 1983. Annex III, “Prevention of 
Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form,” has general 
provisions for the formulation of detailed standards regarding packaging, marking, 
labelling, stowage, and notifications. This Annex came into force in 1992. Annex IV 
came into force in 2003 and is entitled “Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships.” 
Annex IV has provisions that serve to deter and control pollution of marine environment 
by sewage. Annex V came into force in 1988 and is called “Prevention of Pollution by 
Garbage from Ships.” Annex V contains provisions on the types of garbage, means of 
garbage disposal, and ban on disposal of plastic garbage into the ocean. Annex VI—the 
latest of all the annexes of MARPOL 73/78—came into force in 2005 and is titled 
“Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships.” This Annex establishes limits on Sulphur oxide 
and nitrogen oxide emissions from ships, and it outlaws the intentional release of ozone 
depleting substances. In 2011, a chapter was adopted in Annex VI that provides for 
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ships to mandatorily adopt energy efficient means to reduce greenhouse emissions 
(International Maritime Organisation 2017). 
My examination of MARPOL 73/78 and the six annexes reveals there is ample 
provisions for checks and balances that seek to avert and/or minimize marine pollution. 
This directly addresses distributive aspects of environmental justice. The purpose of 
MARPOL and the annexes is to protect and maintain the ecological integrity of marine 
environments from destruction by pollution from ocean vessels. It is a good governance 
tool for the environment and ocean transportation.  
Further, I would argue that MARPOL 73/78 and the six annexes readily lend 
themselves to an environmental ethics approach to maintaining and improving on the 
well-being of the world’s oceans directly, and well-being of humans indirectly. I believe 
this environmental ethics approach is a recognition, and an attempt, to extend justice to 
the various lifeforms that exists in the oceans. Hence, in the end, I perceive MARPOL 
73/78 and the annexes as capable of been used to achieve environmental justice 
purposes, although not strictly for anthropocentric purposes, as is often the case when 
environmental justice is advocated.  
 
4.2.1.2 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea  
For the purposes of this project, I consider the first international regulation 
targeting the world’s oceans to be the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the 
Sea (UNCLOS). Although UNCLOS was passed in 1982 and came into force in 1994, 
the law of the sea has existed for centuries. What is new in the modern law of the sea 
(UNCLOS) is the addition of the ecological aspect. UNCLOS follows from recognition 
that the world’s oceans were not bottomless pits for dumping garbage and refuse, and 
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that the world’s oceans and the oceans’ contents needed international regulations for 
their protection, management, and development. Furthermore, need for the UNCLOS 
arose because “political and economic concerns” led countries to extend their national 
claims to offshore resources (Kupecek 1995, 1). 
In 1958, a United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas codified already 
existing laws of the sea that were customary into four separate conventions leading to 
the production of UNCLOS I (Schiffman 2010). The conventions include Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Convention on the High Seas, Convention 
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and Convention 
on the Continental Shelf. The United Nations organized a second conference in 1960, 
where UNCLOS II was born; however, both UNCLOS I and II were failures. Parties 
attending the conferences failed to reach agreement on the dimensions of the territorial 
sea. Thus, in 1973, negotiations began for UNCLOS III, which took nine years to 
complete in 1982 and led to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) (Schiffman 2010). The 1982 document did not have the participation of 
some developed countries, notably the United States of America. Thus, it was 
subsequently modified and adopted to become a binding international convention, and 
came into force in 1994 as UNCLOS (Kupecek 1995).  
UNCLOS is organized into 16 major parts with nine annexes. The relevant parts 
for the present assignment include Section 2 of Part 7, Sections 4 to 6 of Part 12, and 
Annex 3. These portions of UNCLOS in one way or the other deal with offshore 
resource prospecting and extraction, control of environmental pollution, and monitoring 
and assessing the oceans’ environment. Specifically, Part 7, Section 2 of UNCLOS 
deals with the conservation and management of the living resources of the high seas. 
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Part 12, Section 4 has provisions for monitoring and environmental assessment; 
Section 5 deals with international rules and national legislation to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment; and Section 6 relates to enforcement of the 
above provisions. Annex III of UNCLOS sets in place basic conditions for prospecting, 
exploring, and exploiting offshore resources (United Nations 1994).  
For the purposes of this dissertation, UNCLOS is a step further than MARPOL in 
terms of fostering good governance of the oil sector in Ghana. The provisions of 
UNCLOS directly govern natural resources exploration and development in sea (which 
MARPOL does not), and the Convention has provisions explicitly expressed for the 
protection of the marine environment, as does MARPOL. Furthermore, UNCLOS makes 
general provisions for member countries to enact local legislation and, hence, serving 
as template for such local policy or legislation in member countries. MARPOL can be an 
effective tool as checks, balances for governing ocean transportation and pollution while 
UNCLOS can be the checks and balances tool for natural resources exploration and 
development in the oceans.  
These two documents would appear to have no effect on addressing 
environmental justice in Ghana since the environmental medium for their provisions is 
the ocean. However, there are key provisions of the GEAM (discussed in Chapter 3) 
that directly map onto provisions in MARPOL and UNCLOS and this suggests that the 
GEAM adopted aspects of both documents. For instance, provisions on pollution 
prevention at sea, air emissions, and management of waste streams. These are 
provisions that address distributive justice, and as already argued in Chapter 3 (section 
3.7.2), the GEAM can be important checks and balances document that ensures some 
distributive justice in Ghana’s oil sector. This is achievable because the GEAM aims to 
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“mainstream environment, health, safety, and community issues into the offshore oil and 
gas oil  operations” in Ghana (Environmental Protection Agency 2011, 6).  
  
4.2.1.3 World Bank’s Social and Environmental Performance Standards 
There is no reference to the World Bank’s Social and Environmental 
Performance Standards in the GEAM document. However, they were cited in Tullow’s 
EIS, and aspects of community relations in the GEAM mirror the Standards, so I 
conclude that the Standards had some influence. Moreover, the Standards are 
important for oil development in Ghana because oil companies are required to adhere to 
these Standards if they approach the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) for financing. Ghana already borrows extensively from the World Bank, and is 
therefore required to adhere to these Standards in funded projects.  
The Standards are useful checks and balances for managing social and 
environmental risks and impacts of oil development. There are eight Performance 
Standards that must be applied throughout the life cycle of such projects (International 
Finance Corporation 2006). Performance Standard 1 deals with social environmental 
assessment and management systems. The objectives of Performance Standard 1 
include identifying and assessing social and environmental impacts of projects; 
avoiding, minimizing, or mitigating adverse impacts of project activities on workers, 
communities, and the environment; “appropriately” engaging communities that are 
affected “on issues that could potentially affect them”; and making use of management 
systems that improve social and environment performance of companies (International 
Finance Corporation 2006, 1).  
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The objectives of Standard 1 indicate the Standard has provisions that can serve 
to meet the needs of distributive, procedural, and possibly recognition justice. I say 
possibly because it depends on how the Standard is eventually implemented. Standard 
1 requires companies to identify and assess social and environmental impacts of 
projects; avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse impacts of project activities on workers, 
communities, and the environment. It further requires companies to “appropriately” 
engage communities that are affected “on issues that could potentially affect them.” 
Thus, I would argue that in the process of talking to people to see how a project might 
affect them in order to minimize impacts, companies must ensure there is deliberate 
effort to inculcate the socio-cultural and ecological values of local communities in the 
final management plan. Meanwhile, I am concerned this would be an uphill challenge 
for companies or their consultants to overcome, because even where participation of 
local communities has been mandatory for development projects in Ghana, such 
participation has not always been broad and effective, especially for rural and 
vulnerable communities. Participation does not necessarily mean the values of local 
communities will be considered in final management plans. 
Performance Standards 2 and 3 deal with labor and working conditions of 
projects, and pollution prevention and abatement respectively. The objectives of 
Performance Standard 2 include ensuring there is worker-management relationship in 
IFC financed projects; promoting fair treatment and equal opportunity of workers; 
addressing child labor and forced labor for the purposes of protecting the workforce; 
and promoting and protecting the safe and healthy working conditions of workers. The 
objectives of Performance Standard 3 include: preventing adverse impacts of projects 
on human health and the environment; and to reduce emissions of “emissions that 
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contribute to climate change” (greenhouse gases) (International Finance Corporation 
2006, 7, 11). As with Performance Standard 1, the objectives of Standard 2 and, 
especially, Standard 3 have distributive and procedural elements. There is no indication 
of need to address recognition justice, given the objectives of Standards 2 and 3.  
Performance Standards 4, 5, and 6 respectively deal with community health, 
safety, and security; land acquisition and voluntary resettlement; and biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable natural resources management. For Performance 
Standard 4, the objectives are: addressing risks, impacts, and safety of local 
communities “during the project life cycle”; and safeguarding project personnel and 
property without jeopardizing the safety and security of local communities (International 
Finance Corporation 2006, 15). With respect to Performance Standard 5, the objectives 
include addressing involuntary resettlement; addressing adverse social impacts due to 
land acquisition or impacts of restrictions on access to land; addressing issues on 
livelihoods and living standards of displaced people; and improving conditions of 
displaced people by providing housing at places of resettlement. The objectives of 
Performance Standard 6 include protecting and conserving biodiversity; and integrating 
conservation needs with development needs to promote sustainable management and 
extraction of natural resources (International Finance Corporation, 2006). In terms of the 
extent to which Standards 4, 5, and 6 can serve environmental justice purposes, I 
believe they address distributive justice, with Standard 5 very relevant to address 
recognition justice issues. Furthermore, Standards 4, 5, and 6 can address procedural 
justice. 
The last two Standards—7 and 8—address indigenous peoples and cultural 
heritage respectively. Performance Standard 7 aims to achieve five objectives. The first 
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objective is ensuring that project developments respect the dignity, rights, aspirations, 
cultures, natural resources, and livelihood sources of indigenous peoples. The other 
objectives include addressing negative impacts of projects on indigenous peoples “in a 
culturally appropriate manner”; building relationships between projects and indigenous 
peoples throughout the life cycle of the project; fostering “good faith negotiation” and 
quality participation of indigenous peoples, especially when projects are sited on 
traditional lands of indigenous people; and recognizing and protecting the cultures, 
knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples (International Finance Corporation 
2006, 28). In addition to Standard 5, which specifically makes provisions for recognition 
justice, the objectives of Standards 7 and 8 explicitly address recognition justice issues 
and some distributive justice issues as well.  
From the foregoing, concerning the Performance Standards, it is clear the IFC of 
the World Bank has concerns about addressing environmental justice in development 
projects in general. All eight Standards together combine to provide opportunities for 
addressing all the three aspects of environmental justice—distributive, procedural, and 
recognition justice. Since there is evidence some aspects of the GEAM mirrors the 
Standards in some way and Tullow cited the Standards in its EIS, I have belief tenets of 
the Standards would filter into the overall framework for managing Ghana’s oil sector. 
However, that should not be left to chance; it requires deliberate policy articulation and 
action.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Standards address the trivalent environmental 
justice, there is need for some review. For instance, the IFC wants the Standards to be 
applicable within the life cycle of projects. Whereas there may be some form of 
justification for that, I believe the Standards ought to require project developers to 
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establish plans for local communities after projects life cycles elapse in the form of post 
decommissioning plans. This is because when development projects end, local 
communities (whether resettled or not) continue to remain, and continue to feel impacts 
of activities from the finished projects. Thus, it is important for projects to plan with local 
communities for strategies that ensure the sustainability and resilience of such 
communities.  
In addition, the IFC, in the Standards, especially in 7 and 8, specifically refers to 
“Indigenous Peoples,” instead of local communities. The IFC defines “Indigenous 
Peoples” as “social groups with identities that are distinct from dominant groups in 
national societies” (International Finance Corporation 2007, 143). I find this worrying, 
because reference to indigenous peoples can serve as a basis for discriminating 
against non-indigenous people of a community who may have been settlers and 
therefore living in the communities. It is true that indigenous peoples can be among the 
vulnerable in society, and the IFC’s intends is to protect such people. However, I would 
argue that the provisions should rather focus on for identifying and addressing peculiar 
challenges of vulnerable groups in local communities. If this were the case, indigenous 
peoples that are vulnerable would be covered and plans made to address their needs.  
In short, my examination of international documents cited by Tullow in its EIS and 
in the GEAM shows there are enough provisions to serve as checks and balances to 
ensure good governance of Ghana’s oil sector. MARPOL 73/78, UNCLOS, and the 
World Bank’s Social and Environmental Performance Standards are documents I 
consider important international documents of an overarching institutional framework for 
managing Ghana’s oil sector and the environment. The documents have enough 
provisions to serve as checks and balances with respect to ocean transportation, 
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environmental pollution of the oceans and marine ecosystem health, marine resources 
exploration. Most importantly, I believe the documents contain provisions that Ghana 
should use to address environmental justice in the oil sector. 
Moreover, the checks and balances of the international documents buttresses 
the GEAM so that it can be effective in ensuring good governance of Ghana’s oil sector. 
However, in order for that to be complete, the key tenets of the international documents 
that are relevant for Ghana have to be adapted and made into national laws and 
regulations in Ghana. This is important, in that it allows for strict enforcement of the 
provisions. In what follows, I discuss some the national legislative and policy 
documents.  
 
4.2.2 National Documents 
This discussion builds on my analysis of GEAM in Chapter 3. Here I discuss the 
regulatory context with focus on Ghana’s Environmental Assessment Regulation of 
1999 (Legislative Instrument 1652); the Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011 
(Act 815); the Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations of 2013 
(Legislative Instrument 2204); the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act of 2016 
(Act 919); and the National Environment and Energy Policies. 
 
4.2.2.1 Environmental Assessment Regulations 
Of all the local documents governing oil activities in Ghana, the GEAM and the 
Environmental Assessment Regulations of 1999 (Legislative Instrument 1652) directly 
relate to environmental management. LI 1652 is Ghana’s national regulation that 
requires development projects to register with the Environmental Protection Agency 
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(EPA). Based on LI 1652, proponents of oil projects in Ghana are required to register 
with the EPA following from which the EPA issues environmental permits before the 
projects’ activities can commence (Republic of Ghana 1999).  
LI 1652 mandates that before the EPA issues an environmental permit for any oil 
project, the company responsible for operating the project must prepare and submit an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) to the EPA to enable the EPA assess the extent 
of likely adverse environmental impact (Republic of Ghana 1999). On this score, LI 
1652 provides a template to establish terms of reference for preparing the EIS. Among 
others, the EIS must seek to address issues that include the nature of potential impacts 
of proposed activities in terms of environmental, social, economic, and cultural aspects; 
potential effects on human health; proposals to mitigate any adverse impacts; 
consultations with communities likely to be impacted by proposed project; and a 
tentative plan for environmental management.  
Furthermore, LI 1652 requires a project’s EIS to provide means of addressing 
direct and indirect effects of the project’s activities at pre-construction, construction, 
operation of venture, decommissioning, and after decommissioning stages of projects 
(Republic of Ghana 1999). This requirement by the LI 1652 is important, because it 
address a shortfall of the World Bank’s Standards that require companies to apply 
provisions of the Standards in the life-cycle of projects, but LI 1652 goes beyond project 
life-cycles with provisions for post decommissioning stages. 
In preparing an EIS, responsible companies or projects’ proponents are required 
to give notice to relevant public institutions and local government bodies in Ghana. The 
companies must advertise their proposed projects and locations in national and local 
print media, and exhibit the scoping report of the EIS to the public for inspection. The 
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scoping report is a report that precedes the EIS report. In the scoping report, companies 
responsible for submitting an EIS to the EPA establish the “scope or extent of the 
environmental impact assessment to be carried out by the applicant” (Republic of 
Ghana 1999, 4). Thus, the scoping report is the terms of reference for preparing the EIS 
of a particular project. These requirements by LI 1652 are attempts to engender public 
participation in the EIS process, and complementing these is a public hearing exercise 
that the EPA carries out. If this process were open to community participation, it would 
have been an opportunity for people to identify themselves as affected or potentially 
affected by a proposed project; the LI does not require public engagement at this stage. 
By LI 1652 requirements, upon receipt of a company’s application (which 
includes the EIS) for an environmental permit, Ghana’s EPA must hold public hearings 
under certain conditions. Conditions that include: “adverse public reaction” to the 
proposed project to be carried out; if the project would restrict and or prevent people’s 
access to their land (spaces); and when the EPA has determined that a proposed 
project would have “extensive and far reaching” environmental consequences (Republic 
of Ghana 1999, 7). When a public hearing becomes necessary, the EPA must constitute 
a panel to hear and consider submissions made by individuals and organizations in 
respect of their misgivings about a proposed project. 
In considering the LI 1652, I would conclude that the regulations contain checks 
and balances provisions for the environmental governance of Ghana’s oil sector, and 
most significantly, these checks and balances are strictly enforceable in Ghana If a 
permit is denied for a proposed project, proponents may resubmit a new application with 
remedies to the denied application or abandon the project altogether, because the LI is 
law and enforceable. Thus, the LI gives some legal backing to the GEAM and makes 
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the GEAM an enforceable document in respect of those provisions that have their 
foundation in the LI. I would argue that in the overall institutional framework for 
managing Ghana’s oil sector, the LI 1652 is the most important element of the 
framework, because it makes the GEAM an effective checks and balances tool that is 
key to good governance of Ghana’s oil industry. It would, therefore, be appropriate to 
amend the LI to rectify some of the concerns I have raised about its shortcomings.  
On the LI 1652, I would also conclude the regulation provides for addressing 
environmental justice issues in respect of distributive justice principally, and it carries an 
environmental ethics perspective. In respect of the distributive justice issues, LI 1652 
specifically requires companies proposing to embark on projects to, for instance, ensure 
that the health, settlements, and livelihoods of people in the local communities are not 
adversely impacted. Where there is anticipation of any adverse impact, companies must 
propose plans to avoid or mitigate such adverse impacts, per LI 1652 requirements. LI 
1652 contains provisions that seek to protect the environment (not necessarily the 
human habited environment) from proposed projects development, an indication of the 
LI’s intents on an environmental ethic approach to development.  
From my analyses of the LI 1652, I find that the Regulations have some 
provisions that could address procedural justice. However, I find these provisions 
inadequate and restrictive. For instance, by requiring companies to advertise proposed 
projects and scoping reports for public scrutiny in the print media, the LI has not 
achieved public access to information, and therefore not public participation in the 
determination of the sort of project activities that can be sited in communities. Ghana 
has a high illiteracy rate that cannot access the medium in which the LI requires 
companies to publicize their proposed activities. Exacerbating this barrier is the fact that 
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newspaper circulation in Ghana is very poor. Thus, by requiring companies to advertise 
in the print media, LI 1652 has restricted the extent to which the public can be aware 
and thus mobilize to participate in a process that would be determining, among others, 
the quality of their spaces, access to their spaces, disruptions in their social and cultural 
values, and impacts on their livelihoods. I would suggest that since there is greater radio 
and televisions broadcasting in Ghana (Walsh 2017), coupled with the fact that many of 
the broadcasts are in local languages, the announcements should include broadcasts. 
To facilitate this, broadcast networks should consider such announcements as their 
public duty and carry the announcements at no fee or at a significantly reduced fee.  
Additionally, the LI 1652’s provisions for procedural justice are inadequate 
because of the conditions set for undertaking public hearings. The LI does not provide a 
definition for and a measure of “adverse public reaction,” which is a trigger for 
organizing public hearings. Furthermore, in respect to the public hearing, the LI’s 
requirement for public participation in the assessment process is a late call since the 
hearing is about the EIS that has been prepared and submitted to the EPA. I would 
argue that LI 1652 should oblige companies to engage local communities and the public 
prior to the preparation of the EIS, during the preparation of the EIS, and after 
submission to the EPA so to broaden opportunities for achieving procedural justice.  
As far as recognition justice is concerned, LI 1652 makes some provisions that at 
face value would appear to be addressing recognition justice. However, upon further 
reflection, it becomes clear that these provisions are in effect addressing distributive 
justice. For instance, the LI 1652 requires companies to propose means for addressing 
changes in social and cultural patterns arising from proposed project activities (Republic 
of Ghana 1999, 6). This provision does not necessarily represent a recognition of the 
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values on the local communities as being capable of contributing to the environmental 
and socio-economic management of proposed project activities. This provision of the LI 
1652 rather objectifies the values (social and culture behavior) of local communities for 
the purpose of their alienation from project activities. This alienation begins when local 
people are perceived as rural and not possessing any Western-styled knowledge and 
expertise that can contribute to the management of their environment. 
 
4.2.2.2 Petroleum Revenue Management Act 
Apart from the LI 1652, there is a number of other national legislative documents 
governing oil development that have provisions with potential to address environmental 
justice. Moreover, these legislations were formulated to aid Ghana avoid the resources 
curse through good governance of Ghana’s oil sector. The Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) is one of such legislative documents. Act 815 
establishes the general directives for collecting, disbursing, and managing income from 
oil production in a “responsible, transparent, accountable, and sustainable manner” for 
the benefit of all Ghanaians (Republic of Ghana 2011b, 4). 
In pursuit of its objectives, Act 815 provides for government of Ghana to establish 
a Petroleum Holding Fund, a public fund in which all petroleum revenue accruing to 
Ghana is kept and disbursed from. Disbursement from the Holding Fund can be made 
for three reasons: one reason is for disbursement into two other Funds, namely, Ghana 
Stabilization Fund and Ghana Heritage Fund (which together are called Ghana 
Petroleum Funds). The Stabilization Fund’s main purpose is to cushion Ghana’s 
economy against shocks in periods of unpredicted lows in petroleum revenue. The 
Heritage Fund is an endowment fund to cater to the needs of future generations. The 
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second reason for which disbursement can be made from the Holding Fund is for the 
purposes of supporting Ghana’s national budget; and the third reason, for “exceptional 
deductions” (Republic of Ghana 2011b, 10). I would suggest that such exceptional 
deductions should be made also for cleanups and ecological restoration in events of 
accidents. 
With respect to management and accountability issues, the Bank of Ghana has 
responsibility for daily management of the Funds. Such management is within a 
management framework provided by a Minister of state who has overall responsibility 
for the Funds, and the Minister is assisted by an Investment Advisory Committee to 
monitor the performance and management of the Funds. Act 815 requires the Bank of 
Ghana to submit semi-annual reports covering the Funds to Ghana’s Parliament and 
publish same in national newspapers and on the internet. Furthermore, and in pursuit of 
transparency, Act 815 establishes a Public Interest and Accountability Committee 
(PIAC) to hold consultations for best practices on the management and disbursement of 
petroleum revenue in Ghana. The PIAC has a membership of seven persons, who, 
although they represent a cross-section of the Ghanaian public, are appointed by the 
Minister. Hence, transparency of oil revenue distribution and oversight is possible, albeit 
with too much power in the hands of the Executive.  
Act 815 is another important element of the institutional framework for managing 
Ghana’s oil sector given its checks and balances provisions. The Act is particularly 
relevant for good governance in respect of managing oil revenue accruing to Ghana, 
unlike LI 1652 that is relevant for environmental governance. The Act’s provisions are 
checks and balances that direct the allocations of revenue Ghana receives from oil, and 
although the Act does not explicitly serve to buttress the GEAM, its significance in the 
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overall institutional framework for managing Ghana’s oil industry is great. The Act is an 
important piece of the framework that not only complements the GEAM in covering 
revenue management, but also can be extended in some cases to cater for provisions 
in the GEAM that seek to address environmental justice that would require government 
funding for specific development projects to execute in local communities. 
However, although the main purpose of Act 815 is to ensure (fair) distribution of 
income from Ghana’s oil resources—distributive justice—as a means to avoid the 
resource curse, the Act does not address the distribution of adverse externalities from 
oil activities. Perhaps, this responsibility is deemed not relevant in the Act, and is thus 
seen as something to be left for environmental regulations (e.g., LI 1652) to address. I 
would argue that since Act 815 established the Heritage Fund to address needs of 
future generations, there is some admission of need to address environmental justice 
issues, therefore, Act 815 ought to establish a fund to deal with the adverse 
environmental externalities of oil in local communities along the lines of the US 
Environmental Defense Fund. Alternatively, the Heritage Fund could be re-designated 
to cover such concerns in local communities around oil development in Ghana. 
Another shortcoming of Act 815 is that the Act places too much power in the 
hands of the executive branch of governance in Ghana to determine the management 
and accountability of the Petroleum Funds established by the Act. For instance, 
although the Bank of Ghana manages the various Funds, the Minister of State 
determines the framework under which the Bank manages the funds. The Minister of 
State is also responsible for appointing members of the Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee, a conflict of interest situation because the Minister oversees 
management as well. Moreover, there is cause for concern because too much power is 
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concentrated in the office of the Minister of State who is appointed by the President of 
Ghana. This represents a narrow and structure for managing Ghana’s petroleum 
revenue, and this structure is susceptible to rent seeking behavior, that is, behavior that 
seeks economic returns from oil by unduly manipulating the structure, through bribery 
for instance. Furthermore, to achieve transparency, Act 815 requires the Bank of Ghana 
to publish reports in the print media and on the internet. This requirement further 
reinforces the elitist structure put in place, because, with a high illiteracy rate and poor 
access to the internet, not many Ghanaians would have access to the semi-annual 
reports being published for scrutiny.  
 
4.2.2.3 Local Content and Local Participation Regulations 
Another national legislation formulated to govern Ghana’s oil sector with the 
intent to foster distributive justice in Ghana is the Petroleum (Local Content and Local 
Participation) Regulations, 2013 (LI 2204) The main purpose of LI 2204 is to facilitate 
the participation Ghanaians, and the use of local inputs, in the oil industry as a means to 
redistribute and retain the economic benefits accruing from oil and gas activities in 
Ghana. The key provision of LI 2204 is that local content must be a component of 
petroleum activities in Ghana. In this context, LI 2204 defines “local content” as “the 
quantum or percentage of locally produced materials, personnel, financing, goods and 
services rendered in the petroleum industry value chain and which can be measured in 
monetary terms”(Republic of Ghana 2013, 27).  
Like Act 815, LI 2204 aims to help Ghana avoid the curse of oil resources, albeit, 
by different means, means that include ensuring that commercial activities relating to oil 
involve Ghanaian personnel, Ghanaian produce, and Ghanaian financial investments. 
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For the objectives of this dissertation, provisions of LI 2204 of relevance address issues 
relating to “local content plan,” “employment and training sub-plan and succession 
plan,” and ‘program for research and research development sub-plan.” It is important to 
note that most of the provisions under these areas do portend to address distributive 
justice issues and they represent checks and balances that ensure proper governance 
of Ghana’s oil sector. 
Preceding the specific provisions of LI 2204 are a set of provisions labeled 
“general provisions” (Republic of Ghana 2013, 4). Key tenets of the general provisions 
relevant for this assignment includes giving indigenous Ghanaian companies preference 
in granting petroleum agreements; requirement for a minimum of five percent 
indigenous Ghanaian equity in petroleum agreements; and requirement for non-
indigenous companies intending to supply goods to the oil sector in Ghana to have at 
least ten percent indigenous Ghanaian ownership (Republic of Ghana 2013, 5). 
In respect to the specific provisions of LI 2204, under local content plan section, 
the LI requires all firms to submit local content plans to the Petroleum Commission of 
Ghana for approval prior to commencing project activities. The local content plan must 
provide detail descriptions of ways to ensure that first preference is given to goods 
manufactured, and services rendered in Ghana. In addition, the plan must describe 
ways that ensure qualified Ghanaians are given first preference in recruitment; and 
provide detail descriptions of ways firms intend to train Ghanaians on the job. 
Furthermore, the local content plan must provide details of ways firms are guaranteeing 
the use of goods and services in Ghana.  
To complement the local content plan, LI 2204 requires companies to submit 
sub-plans: employment, training, and succession sub-plan, and program for research 
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and research development sub-plan. Provisions for the former sub-plan seek to, among 
others, oblige companies in Ghana’s oil sector to submit forecasts of employment 
openings and training needs; periods in which companies would have job opportunities 
for Ghanaians; and steps companies would take to accelerate training of Ghanaians. 
Furthermore, LI 2204 requires companies to include in this sub-plan, means by which 
companies intend to replace non-Ghanaians with Ghanaians in order to meet the 
minimum requirements for local content. In the latter sub-plan (program for research 
and research development), LI 2204 requires oil and gas companies to submit to the 
Petroleum Commission, programs and budget for research and development that seeks 
to promote education, internships, and development in Ghana (Republic of Ghana 
2013, 14–15). 
From the foregoing, on the Local Content and Local Participation Regulations, it 
is clear that the intent of this governance document is to distribute the commercial 
benefits arising from Ghana’s oil industry by ensuring the participation of Ghanaian 
nationals in the oil industry. Thus, the LI is an important checks and balances tool to 
ensure that oil companies in Ghana provide job opportunities in the industry to 
Ghanaians. However, this distribution (or redistribution) effort fails to account for how 
local communities immediately close to the oil operations can share in the benefits 
accruing from the oil industry. Benefits not limited to only commercial opportunities, but 
also benefits in terms of maintenance of the quality of their environment, participation in 
making decisions that impact them, and the recognition of their values in the 
management of Ghana’s oil activities insofar as these activities have potential to impact 
their environment and livelihoods.  
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Thus, LI 2204 clearly does not target local communities in particular for 
distribution purposes, as the bases for enjoying its provisions are mostly unachievable 
by rural, poor, and illiterate communities. The LI 2204, in my view, as far as local 
communities are concerned is elitist, even by general Ghanaian standards. For 
instance, the oil industry is capital and technology intensive for which it would be difficult 
for members of the rural and poor communities immediately close to the oil activities to 
participate and share in the commercial benefits of the industry as LI 2204 intends.  
 
4.2.2.4 Petroleum Exploration and Production Act 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act of 2016 (Act 919) is to “provide 
for and ensure safe, secure, sustainable and efficient petroleum activities” for the 
production of oil to benefit the welfare of Ghanaians (Republic of Ghana 2016, 5). This 
Act replaces the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1984 (PNDCL 84) and is 
organized into thirteen sections of which two sections are of most relevant for the 
objectives of this dissertation. These sections are “health, safety, security, and 
environment,” and “environment and liability for pollution damage.” I consider these 
sections to be of utmost importance for this project, because Act 919 represents a 
consolidation of some other laws and regulations I have already discussed. 
In the first relevant section, Act 919 stipulates that oil operations must be carried 
out in ways that ensure high-level safety, and companies must submit to the Petroleum 
Commission of Ghana plans for implementing safely programs. The specific provisions 
of Act 919 in respect of safety precautions require oil companies to identify and evaluate 
hazards and risks corresponding to their activities that can threaten their employees and 
any persons present within the “vicinity of the facility” (Republic of Ghana 2016, 46). Act 
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919 requires oil companies to establish protocols for emergencies to address accidents 
that may injure people, damage property or the environment. These protocols must also 
include measures for ecological restorations after accidents.  
The second section of Act 919 that I consider relevant for this project deals with 
environment and liability for pollution damage. Key provisions of the section include 
requirements for oil companies to follow environmental principles enshrined in the 
Environmental Protection Act, 1994, (Act 490). In addition, companies are obliged by 
Act 919 to conduct environmental impact assessments prior to commencing project 
activities (a requirement by LI 1562, which I have already discussed). Furthermore, per 
Act 919, companies are liable for any pollution resulting from oil activities, and the Act 
provides for a formula that should be applied to determine responsibility for paying 
compensations due to pollution damage.  
Act 919 together with LI 1652 are the two key national documents that provide 
strict legal enforcement backing to the GEAM. With the two documents, the GEAM can 
function as a checks-and-balances tool for governing the environment in the face of oil 
exploration and development in Ghana. As already discussed, LI 1652 requires oil 
companies to obtain environmental permits prior to commencing operations. These 
requirements, however, are generic and not limited to activities of oil exploration and 
production. LI 1652 was formulated prior to commercial oil production in Ghana. The 
requirements of Act 919, on the other hand, are specific to activities of oil exploration 
and production. Hence, LI 1652 and Act 919 are complementary to each other in re-
enforcing the GEAM’s role in governing oil activities in Ghana.  
In terms of environmental justice, Act 919 seeks to distribute the benefits of oil 
production for improving the welfare of Ghanaians, and to manage the environment and 
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security of oil operations. However, Act 919 does not define the limits of what 
constitutes the “vicinity” of oil and gas facilities. Consequently, whether “vicinity” applies 
to the immediate surroundings of oil activities, to exclude local communities or to 
include local communities, is left to be determined by oil companies. Furthermore, as I 
have already observed about other governance frameworks, Act 919 does little to 
address recognition and procedural justice. 
 
4.2.2.5 National Environment and Energy Policies 
Apart from the legislative and regulatory documents discussed above, there are 
other national documents that affect the environmental management and governance of 
oil activities in Ghana. Such national policies include the national environment policy 
and energy policy. Unlike the documents already discussed, these policies are not 
legislative by nature; the provisions of these policies only have administrative 
enforceability. Moreover, unlike the previously discussed documents, the environment 
and energy policies are easily subject to political (government) control: a successive 
government may totally abandon a policy formulated by a preceding government with 
ease.  
The purposes of Ghana’s National Environment Policy of 2014 includes guiding 
environmental governance in Ghana; guiding Ghana’s development along the lines of 
sustainable development; and ensuring Ghana’s commitment to international 
conventions and agreements. The national environment policy is organized into eight 
sections captioned to reflect, among others, the environmental situation in Ghana; the 
policy principles; policy goal, objectives and strategies; sectoral environmental policies; 
cross-sectoral environmental policies; and policy implementation and arrangements 
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(MESTI 2014). National Environment Policy’s objectives are distributive by design. 
Distributive in terms of ensuring and protecting the quality of Ghana’s biophysical 
environment. The Environment Policy acknowledges the role of public and citizen 
participation in environmental management in Ghana 
The goal of Ghana’s Energy Policy, 2010 is to ensure the universal availability of 
energy services to Ghanaians in a sustainable manner. Among the ten objectives to 
achieve under this goal, the following are relevant for the purposes of this dissertation: 
improve the management, regulatory environment, and operation of Ghana’s energy 
sector; minimize impacts arising from energy production and consumption to the 
environment; and facilitate participation of the private sector in Ghana’s energy sector 
(Ministry of Energy 2010). The Energy Policy is divided into ten sections addressing key 
areas that include Ghana’s power sub-sector; petroleum sub-sector; renewable sub-
sector; waste-to-energy; energy efficiency and conservation; energy and environment; 
energy and gender; and management of the policy implementation process.  
Neither the objectives nor the various sections of Ghana’s Energy Policy identify 
and addresses environmental justice issues explicitly. However, there are several 
references to participation of the Ghanaian public and private sector in some cases. 
Participation, together with the fact that the policy goal and objectives serve to meet 
distributive purposes give reason to believe there is attention to environmental justice. 
But, addressing environmental justice issues of a particular project, for instance, is not 
only about ensuring participation, distributing the goods of the project, and recognizing 
people. It is all of that in a well-coordinated manner to effect a single goal—improving 
the well-being of people and the environment. Moreover, I would argue that in terms of 
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ensuring good governance of Ghana’s oil industry, the Environment and Energy Policies 
have little to do in providing enforceable backing to the GEAM.  
Each of the national documents discussed above have their individual inherent 
challenges, which I have discussed a few. However, even without the challenges 
mentioned above, a major factor in the success of these documents (LI 1652, Act 815, 
LI 2204, and Act 815) in the effective functioning of the overarching framework for 
governing Ghana’s oil sector is in their implementation. These documents require 
administrative structures that can interpret, execute, and review their provisions to the 
letter. In what follows, I discuss some administrative elements of the institutional 
framework.  
 
4.3 Organizational Structures 
All the legislative, regulatory, and policy documents discussed so far either 
depend on existing organizational structures or provide for the establishment of new 
organizational structures for their implementation. There are instances that the 
legislative documents provide for the establishment of new organizations to complement 
already existing ones. In this section, I discuss some of the key public organizations and 
their roles in governing Ghana’s nascent oil sector. Among the organizations of most 
relevance for the objectives of this dissertation are Ministry of Energy; Ministry of 
Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation; Petroleum Commission of Ghana; 
Environmental Protection Agency; National Development Planning Commission; district 




4.3.1 Ministry of Energy 
Ghana’s Ministry of Energy belongs to the executive branch of governance in 
Ghana and in some respects an extension of the Office of the President. Prior to 2016, 
when the National Democratic Congress (NDC) political party was in charge of 
government, the Ministry of Energy existed separately from a Ministry of Petroleum. 
However, when a new political party—the New Patriotic Party (NPP)—took charge of 
government in 2017, the Petroleum ministry was subsumed under the Ministry of 
Energy. It is common for the President of Ghana to close or establish Ministries, 
because Ghana’s 1992 Constitution gives the President the power to create and 
dissolve Ministries, as well as appoint and dismiss Ministers of State at any time. In 
what follows, I discuss the Ministry of Energy as of 2017 partly on the bases of 
information available on the ministry’s website.  
The Ministry of Energy’s mandate is to develop and ensure availability of the best 
energy services at the least cost to every sector in Ghana’s economy through policy 
formulation, policy implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Given this mandate, 
the Ministry’s functions include oil and gas policymaking; conversion of oil and gas 
policy into programs (and projects) for implementation; and enhancing capacities of 
agencies and departments under the Ministry of Energy to aid the Ministry execute its 
mandate (Ministry of Energy 2017b; Ministry of Energy 2017a). Thus, the Ministry of 
Energy has both policymaking and implementation powers, as well as powers to 
establish agencies that would implement the policies.  
Ghana’s Ministry of Energy is headed by a Minister of State, who is assisted by 
two deputies, and appointed by Ghana’s President. They are then assisted by career 
civil servants who are professional technocrats that work under various directorates of 
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the Ministry. Apart from the in-house directorates of the ministry, the current Ministry of 
Energy (as of August 2017) oversees the activities of 16 agencies under it. Among 
these, the Energy Commission and the Petroleum Commission are of relevance for the 
purposes of this dissertation. 
In 1997, Ghana established the Energy Commission by an Act of Parliament. 
The Energy Commission Act of 1997, Act 541, mandates it to “regulate and manage the 
utilisation (sic) of energy resources in Ghana and co-ordinate policies in relation to 
them” (Republic of Ghana 1997, 3). The Energy Commission’s functions assigned by 
Act 541 include to recommend policies for developing and using indigenous energy 
resources in Ghana and advise the Minister of Energy on policies for the supply of 
natural gas and petroleum products, among others. Act 541 provides that the Energy 
Commission could be directed by the Minister of Energy to perform specific functions if 
the Minister believes such functions are in the interest of the Ghanaian public.  
Ghana’s Energy Commission is governed by a Board that includes an Executive 
Secretary. The Board provides policy guidance to the Commission, whereas the 
Executive Secretary manages the daily operations of the Commission’s secretariat. The 
Board and the Executive Secretary are appointed by the President of Ghana in 
consultation with Ghana’s Council of State and Public Service Commission respectively. 
Act 541 empowers the Energy Commission to establish any committee the Commission 
deems fit for the purposes of performing its functions (Republic of Ghana 1997). 
As the latest of the two commissions, Ghana’s Petroleum Commission (PC) was 
established by an Act of Parliament in 2011, four years after the major oil discovery and 
a year after oil production commenced in 2010. Although late in being established 
before oil production commenced, establishing the PC remedied the previous conflict of 
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interest in which the GNPC was both a producer of oil and an oversight organization 
that regulated oil exploration and production. 
The Petroleum Commission Act of 2011, Act 821, establishes the Petroleum 
Commission to regulate and manage Ghana’s petroleum resources, as well as 
coordinate petroleum resources policies. Among its functions, the Petroleum 
Commission is expected to recommend petroleum-related policies to the Minister of 
energy; enforce national policies, laws, and regulations on petroleum activities that 
include health, safety, and environment standards; and promote local content 
participation in Ghana’s petroleum industry. The Petroleum Commission of Ghana is, 
furthermore, expected to advice the Minister of energy on matters related to petroleum 
activities (Republic of Ghana 2011a). The Petroleum Commission of Ghana is governed 
by a Board that includes a Chief Executive Officer who runs the Commission on a daily 
basis. The Chief Executive Officer and the Board of the Petroleum Commission are 
appointed by the President of Ghana. 
Ghana’s Energy and Petroleum Commissions have similar objective and some 
overlapping functions—a recipe for turf wars between the two organizations. Ghana’s 
nascent oil industry is considered a lucrative sector, even for public institutions, and so 
there can be unnecessary competition for control or jurisdiction over the sector. This 
unnecessary competition is especially exacerbated for the Energy and Petroleum 
Commissions, because each of them is empowered by Acts of Parliament to perform 
similar functions. Any signs of turf wars are indications for oil companies in the sector to 
exploit the countries oil resources with impunity knowing the two commissions could be 
pitched against each other instead of collaborating to manage the sector. Thus, turf 
wars between regulatory institutions leaves the nation vulnerable and susceptible as the 
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institutions would not be engaged in their core activities of governing the sector 
effectively. 
 
4.3.2 Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation 
Ministry of Energy is the sector ministry for Ghana’s oil exploration and 
production. Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation (MESTI) on 
the other hand, is the sector ministry in charge of managing Ghana’s environment. 
MESTI is headed by a Minister of State who is assisted by a deputy minister. The 
Minister and deputy are appointed by Ghana’s President. They are assisted by technical 
career civil servants in various fields to execute the functions of the Ministry. MESTI’s 
functions include, among others and for the purposes of this dissertation, to make and 
implement policies on environment, science, technology, and innovation; oversee the 
formulation of regulations and standards to manage Ghana’s environment; oversee the 
coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of activities related to the environment; consult 
with the National Development Planning Commission and district assemblies to 
establish parameters for programming environmental activities and human settlement; 
oversee research and review of policies and regulation relating to the environment; and 
oversee better environmental management and governance (MESTI 2017). 
MESTI has six directorates that perform specialized daily functions of the 
Ministry. Among these directorates is the Environment Directorate that provides 
“technical support” to initiate and implement policies, programs, and legislation for 
sound environmental governance and natural resources management (MESTI 2017, 
n.p.). The Environment Directorate performs this broad function principally through two 
agencies: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA of Ghana and the Town and 
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Country Planning Department. For the purposes of this dissertation, the EPA is the 
relevant institution of interest. 
 
4.3.2.1 Environmental Protection Agency of Ghana 
Ghana’s Parliament established the Environmental Protection Agency with an 
Act—the Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1994, Act 490. Act 490 thereafter 
empowers the EPA to: provide advice and recommend to the minister in charge of 
Ghana’s environment (MESTI) policies for consideration; and coordinate the activities of 
other organizations dealing with technical or practical sides of the environment. The 
EPA is further mandated by Act 490 to serve as the link between organizations dealing 
with technical or practical sides of the environment and MESTI (Republic of Ghana 
1994a). 
The EPA is headed by a Chief Executive Officer who is appointed by the 
President of Ghana. The Chief Executive Officer obtains broad policy guidance for 
running the daily affairs of the EPA from a Board whose membership is determined by 
the President of Ghana. As a national organization, the EPA has offices in all ten 
regions of Ghana with the head office divided into seven internal departments. The 
heads of departments and the Chief Executive Officer run the organization on a daily 
basis. Among the seven departments is the Petroleum Department in charge of the oil 
operations.  
It is important to underscore the fact that the Petroleum Department was 
established in the EPA only after oil production started in Ghana. As such, there is 
acknowledgment, even within the EPA and the Petroleum Department, that the 
organization lacks the requisite human resources capacity to handle the demands of the 
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oil and gas sector and to fulfill its obligations. From information available on its website, 
the EPA’s Petroleum Department expects to establish five units to effectively 
management the needs of the oil sector. The units to be established are expected to 
cater to upstream petroleum activities; downstream petroleum activities; emergency 
response needs; data management; and incident report receipt and record keeping 
(EPA 2017). There is no timeline as to when this would be done, although there should 
be one, and within a year from now, since oil production in Ghana is on the increase 
with more exploration and production. The units ought to be in place to complement 
existing institutions to enable the effective management of the oil sector.  
 
4.3.3 Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organizations 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) 
play important roles in the national development agenda of Ghana. Among their roles 
include policy advocacy, activism, social mobilization, watch-dogging, and whistle-
blowing. In the oil sector, NGOs and CSOs have come together to form a common 
platform on which they carry out their functions commonly. The Civil Society Platform on 
Oil and Gas (CSPOG), hosted by the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC), 
was established in 2009, two years after oil discovery and a year before oil production 
commenced. (A sign of proactivity on the part of the CSOs.)  
The Platform functions as a common avenue to share knowledge and harmonize 
activities of CSOs engaged in the oil sector in Ghana. CSPOG has a semi-formal 
(“loose”) structure with membership open to individuals and organizations (Civil Society 
Platform of Oil and Gas 2017). With respect to the Platform’s activities, it has been 
active in policy advocacy and has participated in influencing oil policymaking in Ghana. 
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CSPOG also serves as a watchdog and an agent for demanding transparency and 
accountability in Ghana’s oil sector. All these activities are driven by one agenda—
economic justice. I would argue that CSPOG acknowledges the existence of economic 
injustice in Ghana’s oil sector, and by implication, environmental justice in the sector, 
because one aspect of environmental justice is distributive justice, which deals with 
allocations of goods accruing from development activities. 
The presence of a common platform to advocate and raise concerns about 
Ghana’s oil sector is laudable, however, if such a platform becomes the only 
mouthpiece or means by which civil society organizations in Ghana can be heard, then 
that can become a problem. There would appear to be only one (credible) voice (to be 
heard) on concerns CSOs may want to raise. Furthermore, a single platform as the 
CSPOG may have dissenting views or approaches in contrast to the collective approach 
of the Platform; dealing with such dissenting positions could be challenging and if not 
handle appropriately could lead to internal conflicts among members of the coalition. As 
a single voice, the Platform could easily be targeted by lobbyist, persons, and 
organizations seeking to unduly influence their positions and activities. Thus, it is 
important to have opportunities for multiple NGOs and CSOs to participate in Ghana’s 
oil sector, and not to close the door to others, because the CSPOG is already 
participating. I am not aware if the door is closed, but it is important to keep that in mind.  
 
4.3.4 Structural Gaps 
So far, all the organizations I have discussed, from my perspective, are very 
important for managing Ghana’s natural resources and environment. Indeed, per my 
observations of the practical aspects of these organizations, they appear to be 
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exercising the legal bases of their being in practical terms as far as Ghana’s oil sector is 
concerned. These organizations are fully participating in Ghana’s oil sector. By “fully,” I 
mean to say the organizations have been recognized by other organizations as 
belonging to the oil sector. My use of “fully” does not imply that the organizations’ level 
of participation is at the effective level desired.  
There are some organizations that by virtue of their practical roles in Ghana, 
ought to be playing important roles in governing Ghana’s oil sector, and yet they are 
not. These are organizations, I believe, have been given little attention in the 
management of Ghana’s oil resources and the environment. They include the National 
Development Planning Commission, district assemblies, and traditional authorities. I 
discuss these in the following. In discussing these organizations, I am not implying that 
these are the only ones underrepresented in Ghana’s oil sector. I acknowledge that 
other organizations exist that have been underrepresented in managing Ghana’s oil and 
gas resources. My intent here is to highlight the fact that key organizations have been 
left out in the management of Ghana’s oil resources and the environment, such that the 
criticism that oil is an enclave industry holds true. 
 
4.3.4.1 National Development Planning Commission  
One of the important, yet underutilized organizations in Ghana is the National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC), one of a few organizations in Ghana that 
have their legal bases established explicitly by Ghana’s 1992 Constitution. Articles 86 
and 87 of the Constitution establishes the NDPC as part of the executive branch of 
governance, and in furtherance of the constitutional provisions, the NDPC is backed by 
two legislative frameworks, namely, the National Development Planning Commission 
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Act of 1994, Act 479, and the National Development Planning (System) Act of 1994, Act 
480 (National Development Planning Commission 2015).  
Act 479 places the Commission directly under the President of Ghana, and 
mandates the Commission to advice the President of Ghana on matters relating to 
development planning policies and strategies. Although the NDPC is responsible to 
Ghana’s President, Ghana’s Parliament may request the Commission to perform certain 
functions. Functions that include proposing multi-year national development plans; 
proposing plans for protecting Ghana’s environment with the view to aligning 
development programs with sound environmental principles; and monitoring, evaluating, 
and coordinating development policies and projects in Ghana (Republic of Ghana 
1994c). By these, the NDPC has powers to initiate policy proposals for national 
development, and to oversee the implementation of such policies.  
NDPC’s powers and functions are further entrenched by Act 480, the National 
Development Planning (System) Act of 1994. Act 480 designates NDPC as the national 
organization to coordinate Ghana’s decentralized planning system. Within Ghana’s 
decentralized planning system, the planning authorities of district/municipal/metropolitan 
assemblies are required to prepare development plans for their districts with guidance 
from NDPC and “full participation of the local community” (Republic of Ghana 1994b, 3). 
Yet, as noted, the Commission’s functions have often been overlooked as far as oil 
activities are concerned. The NDPC was one of the institutions I selected to participate 
in my research, however, after obtaining an appointment and meeting with a Director of 
the Commission for interview, I was informed that the Commission was not part of any 




4.3.4.2 District Assemblies 
Ghana’s political administrative structure is designed to ensure a decentralized 
system of governance (at least on paper). Hence, the country is divided into ten 
administrative regions that are further divided into district assemblies (for local 
governance). Thus, district assemblies are important part of the decentralized planning 
system of Ghana. Furthermore, since the district assembly structure represents local 
government, they are very important institutions for local communities to influence, if not 
determine, their development needs and aspirations, and to plan for accordingly. 
However, many districts in Ghana lack the requisite resources, expertise, and 
infrastructure to independently take development planning into their own hands. Further 
exacerbating this challenge is the fact that Ghana’s central government (headed by the 
Presidency and located in the capital city) determines district development plans by 
controlling the funding of district assemblies and appointing District Chief Executives.  
The district assemblies of relevance for consideration here are the six coastal 
districts in the Western Region of Ghana, namely Ahanta West, Ellembelle, Jomoro, 
Nzema East, Sekondi Takoradi, and Shama Districts. These are six coastal districts 
whose areas of jurisdiction have been and/or would be affected by oil exploration and 
production. Given that the oil resources are offshore, the coastline of these districts are 
already busy, while inland, several acres of land have been acquired to develop oil 
infrastructure and businesses (Buckle and Sam 2017). Consequently, the significance 
of these six districts for the objective of this dissertation is that they are the districts to 
be immediately impacted by Ghana’s oil activities whose involvement in any 
policymaking and planning should be paramount.  
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Participation of the six districts in oil policymaking is important in order for the 
policy to obtain and reflect the perspectives and aspirations of the local people. 
Participation of the district assemblies is important, also, because the districts can 
become shareowners of the final policy document, its outcome, effects, and share in the 
obligations and responsibilities provided by the policy. However, during my fieldwork in 
Ghana, I found out that none of the six districts participated in the preparation of the 
Guidelines on Environmental Assessment and Management (GEAM) of Ghana’s 
offshore oil activities. 
 
4.3.4.3 Traditional Authorities  
At the local community level, within the six districts immediately effected by oil 
activities, there are traditional leaders who wield substantial amount of power for 
decisions making and allocation of resources. These local authorities are generally 
respected as institutions by the people they represent, yet, their participation in oil 
policymaking has been limited. Indeed, for the preparation of the GEAM, for instance, 
there was no participation of traditional authorities from the six districts in the 
preparation of the document.  
Traditional authorities in Ghana are important institutions and serve to manage 
and direct the social, cultural, and economic life of communities in Ghana. Therefore, 
participation of traditional authorities from communities that are immediately affected by 
oil activities in the governance of the environment and natural resources is a non-
negotiable position. Of course, it is acknowledged that traditional authorities in Ghana 
have inherent problems that make their participation in national development difficult. 
For instance, by nature, many traditional authorities are oral and many do not have 
170 
 
established means of keeping records. Furthermore, most activities of traditional 
authorities are often shrouded in secrecy and mystery making it difficult to seek 
accountability. Hence, it would appear that traditional authorities are not fit for 
consideration in Ghana’s formal sector. That is wrong, because like any human 
institution, traditional authorities have their share of problems. What can be done is to 
work with the National House of Chiefs in Ghana to support their efforts in reforming 
traditional leadership in Ghana. This way, traditional authorities, whom local 
communities respect and uphold, can participate effectively in national development 
planning and management on behalf of their people.  
From my perspective, the major hurdle on the path of traditional authorities’ 
participation in national policymaking derives from the constitution of Ghana. Although 
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution gives respect and visibility to traditional authorities in several 
national affairs, it prohibits traditional authorities in Ghana from participating in partisan 
politics, among several other prohibitions. Okyenhene (2010) provides a review of some 
the constitutional obstructions imposed on traditional authorities in Ghana.)  
Consequently, since policymaking in Ghana is by and large a political activity and a 
formal process, there is the tendency to exclude traditional authorities in the 
policymaking process until the latter and advanced stages of the process where 
traditional authorities are invited to attend stakeholder consultation workshops. 
However, this practice is wrong. Policymaking may be political, but it ought not to be 
partisan. Therefore, traditional authorities should be involved in development planning 
and natural resources policymaking from the onset.  
In the foregoing, I have shown that Ghana has an institutional framework 
consisting of legislations and administrative structures for governing the soil sector. In 
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this framework, the constituent elements (various documents and organizations) 
including the GEAM serve as checks and balances to direct participants and regulators 
of the oil sector to deliver goods. For this framework to be effective as checks and 
balances, however, Ghana ought to overcome some challenges. For instance, in 
Chapter 2, I highlighted an argument by Auty (1994) that in the event of windfall income 
from natural resources, supervisory administrations and institutions become tolerant of 
unproductive policies and directives in their governance efforts. In a similar way, Ross 
(1999) argues that windfall income from natural resource extraction tends to weaken 
state institutions, and there is a tendency for institutions to exhibit rent-seeking behavior 
that do not inure to the benefit of the state (Auty 1994). Ghana’s institutions must not be 
found wanting in these ways so to ensure good governance of the oil sector and to avert 
the resource curse. 
Moreover, it is not adequate to have institutions governing Ghana’s oil sector. 
The quality of those institutions is important (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008). Robinson 
et al. (2006) argue that the extent to which benefits of resource wealth are distributed in 
a country depends on the quality of institutions, because high quality institutions can 
stem the concerns raised in the previous paragraph, and not allow inefficient 
approaches to prevail. Low quality institutions on the other hand can enable incumbent 
political administration to pursue and implement bad policies that only serve the 
administration’s purposes. Pendergast et al. (2011) argue that institutions have a two-
way effect on corruption: well-developed institutions can reduce corruption and 
corruption can diminish the quality of instructions. If Ghana’s institutional framework has 
to work to ensure environmental justice and to avert the resource curse, its quality 
needs to be high—e.g., human resource capacities need be excellent. As I have 
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acknowledged earlier, there is insufficient expertise on oil in Ghana; but expertise is one 
aspect of institutional quality. Another aspect is the nature of public engagement—
transparency and accountability—approaches adopted by the institution.  
In addition, if Ghana should succeed in averting the resource curse through good 
governance of the oil sector by considering the checks and balances in the institutional 
framework, then Ghana must overcome the bane of checks and balances. Acemoglu, 
Robinson, and Torvik (2011) argue that checks and balances act like a double-edged 
sword. On one side, they check abuse of power and corruption, while on other side they 
make it easier for the affluent and powerful in society to bribe and lobby to have their 
ways. Of course, the ability of the second side to manifest is a function of institutional 
quality. Ghana has to address this problem to prevent the abuse of the checks and 
balances. 
From the analysis so far, I can conclude that Ghana’s institutional framework has 
no specific legal or policy document addressing environmental justice even though I 
showed how some of the documents address environmental justice without the 
expression “environmental justice” stated. Besides, although there are organizational 
structures for managing Ghana’s oil sector and the environment, there is no specific 
organization designated to administer environmental justice in Ghana (as the EPA of 
the US does). In light of these, I gauged the level of understanding of environmental 
justice among policymakers and persons who influence policymaking in Ghana. I 
discuss the outcome of my interviews in this regard in the following. 
 
4.4 Perception of Environmental Justice in Ghana 
In assessing the level of understanding among representatives of public 
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institutions, civil society organizations, and academic and research institutions, I 
discovered a mixture of the presence and absence of adequate understanding of what 
environmental justice is. I use “adequate” to mean being able to offer an explanation of 
“environmental justice” that points to differentiated environmental impacts of 
development that may arise due to the nonparticipation of relevant stakeholders and no 
recognition of their values. To put into some perspective, I recapitulate and modify a 
definition of “environmental justice” operationalized by the United States of America’s 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). Thus, “environmental justice” is “the fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national 
origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies (USEPA 2017, n.p.) that affect “where we 
live, work and play” (Novotny 2000, 3). 
The salient portions of the USEPA’s definition include the intent to seek fairness 
in environmental management in policymaking, policy implementation, and 
enforcement; democratization of decision-making in environmental management; and 
nondiscrimination against people. All these attend to differentiated environmental 
impacts of development. Moreover, the definition by the USEPA is relevant here, 
because the USEPA embodies the environmental justice frame in the U.S.: the USEPA 
has a working definition for “environmental justice,” and an organizational structure to 
administer it and I would recommend that as part of the expansion of Ghana’s EPA with 
new units, an environmental justice unit be created. But the embodiment of 
environmental justice in the U.S. by the USEPA cannot be replicated elsewhere without 




Subjects interviewed demonstrated little familiarity with the phrase, 
“environmental justice,” though the policies and institutions discussed above show intent 
to meet its requirements despite weaknesses for which I identified and suggested 
remedies. The Chief Director at the Ministry of Energy (formerly the Ministry of 
Petroleum) provided explanation for “environmental justice” focused on provisions 
relating to the Local Content Act (LI 2204) and corporate social responsibility activities 
of oil companies. Presented with the USEPA’s definition, all subjects acknowledged that 
their institution works to address environmental justice through public participation 
based on provisions in Ghana’s Environmental Assessment Regulations (LI 1652). But 
environmental justice is not only about participation alone; it is dealing with the 
aspirations and needs of different groups of people in society.  
Among representatives of the academic and research institutions I interviewed, 
there was an appreciable level of understanding of what “environmental justice” means. 
The Programs Coordinator at ISODEC, representing civil society organizations, offered 
the best explanation for “environmental justice” to include “host communities should not 
suffer unduly” from natural resources extraction. In his explanations, he said: 
…we need to strengthen that process [environmental impact assessment] to 
ensure that host communities don't suffer unduly from the irresponsible actions of 
companies so to make sure the compliance mechanism which is a follow up to 
the conduct of the environmental impact assessment and the public hearings are 
actually strengthened so that we are able to mitigate truly the negative fallout of 
environmental activities. Let me stress the fact that one of the key points of our 
policy advocacy around the environment has been crucial for environmental 
accounting in our natural resource sector…when we are told that in a particular 
year Ghana derives so much dollars in revenues, we want to also be told how 
much it has cost us environmentally and socially to generate that revenue. 
(Program Coordinator at ISODEC, personal communication 2015) 
 
This participant showed a deeper understanding of environmental justice, which his 
organization has used in their advocacy activities.  
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However, since public institutions in Ghana, especially those under the executive 
branch of governance, are the chief drivers of policymaking and policy implementation, 
their lack of familiarity with the environmental justice framework coupled with the 
absence of a national consensus in Ghana on “environmental justice” could affect ways 
in which the implicit provisions for environmental justice in national documents are 
executed. Civil society organizations and academia may understand “environmental 
justice,” but that is not enough. There is need to reach some consensus on an 
understanding for “environmental justice” in Ghana. In particular, increased 
conversation between government Ministries and CSOs concerned with oil development 
is strongly recommended for avoiding the resource curse with respect to oil. Policy 
needs to include not just indigenous people and local communities, but also CSOs that 
have greater opportunity to understand environmental justice movements elsewhere, 
and thus are well-placed to enrich the Ghanaian discourse on good governance of oil. 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
Following the 2007 discovery of oil reserves in Ghana, the nation begun 
organizing to establish an institutional framework to govern the oil industry that was 
about to take off. These efforts were ongoing as were preparations by oil companies to 
commence oil production. However, the nation’s efforts were slow-paced compared to 
the pace at which the multinational corporations were proceeding with their own 
preparations to produce the oil. Nonetheless, Ghana has in place an institutional 
framework to govern the exploration and development of oil, and the environment. The 
framework comprises documents (international and national legislations) and national 
organizational structures. Although I am claiming that Ghana has an established 
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framework in place, I am not implying that such a framework is fixed and its 
establishment is complete. To the contrary, I believe that the process has not ended—it 
must not; it is a continuous and evolving process that should go on so long as the oil 
industry exists in Ghana. Indeed, it is because of the framework’s evolving nature that 
this dissertation is founded.  
The document-based elements of the framework comprise international 
Conventions, and national legislation and regulations. Together, these broadly seeks to 
function as checks and balances in Ghana’s oil sector to distribute benefits from the 
extraction of oil resources, and to manage the environmental ramifications of oil 
extraction. The administrative elements of the framework comprise Ministries, 
Departments, Agencies, and Commissions designated to ensure the implementation of 
the legislations and the GEAM.  
In this Chapter, I analyzed three international documents that have been 
assimilated into practices (and checks and balances) of Ghana’s oil sector. Also, I 
analyzed five national documents. In my analyses, I come to conclude that Ghana’s 
national documents have been influenced by international conventions and treaties 
Ghana is a signatory and party to. Specifically, Ghana’s legal and policy documents for 
the oil sector have been influenced by the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973, modified 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) and the United 
Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). Furthermore, Ghana’s oil sector 
has been managed with aspects of the World Bank’s Social and Environmental 
Performance Standards.  
Provisions of the international and national documents I analyzed significantly 
address distributive justice and are capable of serving as checks and balances in 
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Ghana’s oil sector. Moreover, provisions of the documents I analyzed, especially the 
Environmental Assessment Regulation (LI 1652) and the Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Act (Act 919), provide legal enforceable backing to the GEAM to perform the 
role of checks and balances. For the documents that do not directly serve as legal 
backing to the GEAM, they nonetheless, belong to the overarching institutional 
framework for managing Ghana’s oil sector and thus perform complementary functions 
to the GEAM. Hence, although the documents fall short in some aspects of addressing 
the trivalent nature of environmental justice (distributive, procedural, and recognition 
justice), they complement each other and end up addressing it. Thus to address the 
trivalent environmental justice in Ghana’s oil sector, managers of the sector have to look 
carefully at different documents and provisions for remedy. Alternatively, the Petroleum 
Commission or some regulatory authority could embark on an exercise to compile the 
environmental justice provisions into a single document (in the form of the GEAM) for 
easy referencing and to facilitate implementation. 
With respect to the administrative structure coupling the documents in the 
institutional framework, and implementing provisions of these documents, I would argue 
that Ghana is on the right path with respect to their establishment. For instance, the 
Petroleum Commission of Ghana regulates oil companies and the sector; the 
Environmental Protection Agency is manager of the environment, issues environmental 
permits, and imposes fines for environmental infractions; and the Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee ensures transparency in management of revenue from the oil. 
These and other organizations implement the checks and balances provisions 
contained in the various documents of the overarching institutional framework in order 
to ensure good governance and avert the curse of resources. I should also point out 
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that there are some organizations whose participation in the sector is not at the 
desirable level—e.g., district assemblies and the National Development Planning 
Commission—and efforts should be made for their engagement.  
However, some of the organizations have similar legislative mandates that clash 
with each other and that can lead to turf-wars. I also observed that all the state/public 
organizations are in the control of the Executive branch of governance in Ghana, with 
Ghana’s president wielding all the power to appoint and remove heads of the 
institutions. The executive branch also determines policy on ways the organizations 
ought to operate. With the executive holding so much power in Ghana’s oil sector, it 
becomes easier for poor practices like rent-seeking behavior and small bribe systems 
that grow and foster corruption to set in, and for external bodies and interests to easily 
exert influence through lobbying activities.  
In this chapter, I have shown that Ghana has a reasonably well-developed policy 
framework and institutional arrangement for good governance of its oil wealth, but that 
this framework is fragmented over multiple documents and organizations and uneven in 
its ability to meet requirements of the triad of distributive, procedural and recognition 
justices that comprise environmental justice. I have also shown that these documents 
and institutions give some teeth to the GEAM that is otherwise weak to induce 
accountability. The function of the GEAM is accordingly to provide a comprehensive 
document that collects together best practices from other policy documents that are 
enforceable and provide the accountability the GEAM cannot.  
High quality organizations are nonetheless needed for Ghana’s oil sector. 
Furthermore, Ghana must avoid the bane of checks and balances by ensuring 





The overarching goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the discourse on 
natural resources management using Ghana’s management of oil resources as a case 
study. Specifically, I set out to examine the policy context of Ghana oil industry, to see if 
governance of oil resources might contribute to a curse in Ghana, or positively impact 
development. Throughout that examination, I looked to see ways in which Ghana’s 
institutional framework—the policy and administrative contexts—for governing the oil 
sector seek to address environmental justice. In pursuing the overarching goal, and 
using Ghana as a case study, I set specific objectives: to map Ghana’s policymaking 
space; to analyze Ghana’s institutional arrangement for managing oil activities and the 
environment; and to assess the level of understanding or environmental justice among 
policymakers in Ghana.  
Although environmental justice has tremendous potential for addressing 
differentiated socioeconomic and environmental impacts of natural resources extraction, 
it has not been highlighted in mainstream natural resources policymaking, perhaps 
because the resource curse literature does not discuss it. I did not find, in the academic 
literature or in international frameworks, provisions explicitly direct the application of the 
trivalent environmental justice to address differentiated effects of natural resources 
extraction. By trivalent environmental justice, I mean efforts that seek to 
complementarily address distributive, procedural, and recognition justice. I did find in 
the governing documents I analyzed provisions that seek to address in general 
distributive justice, but procedural and recognition justices less so and more unevenly.  
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A key feature of natural resources management literature is the resource curse 
debate—whether natural resources are associated to poor economic growth and 
development or whether natural resources have positive impacts on economic 
development and growth. Resource-curse scholars argue that natural resources have 
the unavoidable effect of contributing negatively to the overall development of resource-
endowed nations. Yet, since the turn of the century more scholars have emerged who 
dispute this claim and argue against the existence of such a curse. In examining the 
resource curse debate, I conclude that the debate is misplaced, because each side of 
the debate contain ambiguities that require clarification. Moreover, every scholar, on 
either side of the debate, gives reasons why the curse would manifest or not.  
With respect to ambiguities left unaddressed in the resource curse debate, I 
would highlight what borders on the meaning of “development,” as used by proponents 
and opponents of the resources curse thesis. It appears that by “development,” they 
mean the well-being of nations (citizens and their environment); however, in actuality, 
what is measured in the analyses of these is gross domestic product (GDP) of various 
nations. The use of GDP as a proxy measure for well-being has been critically 
contested and weakened to the extent that the United Nations has adopted the Human 
Development Index as a measure of well-being. Alternatively, there is the Index for 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) that assesses development for the perspective 
of daily-lived experiences of people. 
The use of GDP to measure national development and well-being of nations is 
seductive due to its convenience for purposes of measurements in the positivist 
perspectives. However, human well-being is too complex to be reduced. Normative 
assessments and valuations are needed, for which scholars dominating the resources 
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curse debate (mostly economists) seem to have no patience and appetite for. Thus, 
natural resources policymaking needs the expertise of philosophers to not only bring the 
normative perspective to bear on analyses that impact natural resources policies, but to 
also help in avoiding ambiguities by providing the clarity of concepts.  
Moreover, in addition to the lack of clarity on key concepts in the resources curse 
debate, I would conclude that the debate is misplaced because both sides of the debate 
provide reasons why nations may experience the curse or not. On this score, I believe 
the focus should then be on examining these reasons or factors that can contribute to 
avoiding the curse in order to improve the environment and lives of people. Scholars 
should move away from showing that the curse exists or not and focus on how 
resource-endowed countries should avoid it. In this regard, I argue that adopting the 
trivalent environmental justice framework would be a key to avoiding the curse of 
natural resources. 
 I recognize the absence of discussion on the trivalent environmental justice in 
the resource curse discourse. Hence, I call for attention to be given in the resources 
management literature about ways to mainstream the trivalent environmental justice into 
natural resources policy. In addition to making the call, I project this call by examining 
the framework of the policymaking process in Ghana as a means to understand it and 
place oil policies in the framework for analysis. In the analyses, I focus on Ghana’s 
Guidelines for the Environmental Assessments and Management of offshore oil 
activities (GEAM), because it is one important policy document produced after oil 
discovery to serve as a checks-and-balances mechanism for stakeholders in Ghana’s 
oil sector. In examining the policymaking space in Ghana, I find that the Executive 
branch of governance has control, and the country’s constitution provides the backing. 
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Ghana’s President and Ministers of State, whom the President appoints, have control 
over policymaking and funding of the policy process and implementation. Though the 
Parliament of Ghana has roles in demanding accountability (and in some cases) 
approval, the institution has yet to assert itself. This is partly because Ghana’s 
constitution has placed hurdles on the Parliament’s path in respect of policymaking. 
Furthermore, Ghana’s Parliament has so far been a “rubberstamp” institution.  
Since Ghana’s policymaking space is controlled by the Executive branch directly 
and indirectly though the agencies and departments the Executive controls, there is 
recognition that more room exists to broaden and encourage participation of the public 
in Ghana. Indeed, there has been efforts to improve public participation in policymaking 
in Ghana. In spite of all the challenges, civil society organizations have been very 
aggressive in demanding more participation and they have been proactive in engaging 
policymaking institutions on national policies.  
Ghana’s policymaking framework comprises state actors (mainly under the 
auspices of the Executive branch of governance) who control the entire process and 
non-state actors that include civil society organizations (CSOs), think tanks, business 
organizations, and private citizens. As noted earlier, a significant drawback of Ghana’s 
policymaking framework is the poor level of participation by non-state actors in the 
process. For instance, participation of traditional authorities, local communities, and 
private citizens is inadequate, a situation I found with the policy process of the GEAM. 
Poor participation from non-state actors arise because of limited opportunities for them 




Problems of policymaking in Ghana are not limited to the GEAM policy process 
alone. In Ghana’s oil sector, challenges that beset policymaking include shortage of 
expertise (typical for a new and emerging industry, but nonetheless needing urgent 
addressing), lack of continuity due to non-commitment of succeeding governments to 
policies formulated by preceding governments, and the influential behaviors of lobbyists. 
In addition to these challenges, Ghana’s policy process has a reputation of poor policy 
implementation, partly because organizations are busy in conflict with each other over 
jurisdictions of the oil sector. Some of these conflicts arise because of overlapping 
functions and mandates assigned by statutory law. Ghana has problems with policy 
implementation because the policies lack buy-in. Since there is some form or elitism 
and enclave-behavior in the policy process in Ghana, not many would be ready (due to 
genuine ignorance or deliberate withdrawal of interest) implement.  
I began this project with a thought that policymaking institutions were the same 
as those managing Ghana’s oil sector and the environment. However, as my research 
progressed, it became clear that although there are overlaps, they are not the same, 
because policymaking institutions are mostly separate from policy implementing 
institutions, although some may embody the two (e.g., the EPA). Hence, apart from the 
policymaking framework, I analyzed Ghana’s institutional framework for governing the 
oil sector. The governing framework comprises international and national documents on 
one hand, and national administrative organizations on the other.  
In analyzing the international and national documents governing Ghana’s oil 
sector, I find that they have provisions to serve as checks and balances that ensure 
good governance in the oil sector. Moreover, though aspects of some of the documents 
were assimilated into the GEAM, all the documents complement the GEAM in different 
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ways to ensure good governance. Thus, with the legislations and regulations in place, 
Ghana has a chance of averting the curse of natural resources; however, Ghana needs 
high quality administrative organizations to translate tenets of the documents into 
practice.  
Organizations comprising the institutional framework for managing Ghana’s oil 
sector require capacity building in order to deliver on the provisions of the legislative, 
regulatory and policy documents. For instance, though the EPA has existed longer than 
the 2007 oil discovery, its Petroleum Department was created after oil production 
started. Hence, in order for the EPA to play the role of environmental regulator, the 
organization ought to have capacity for doing. Yet, the organization does not have all its 
divisions in place. The Petroleum Commission is a new creation altogether after oil 
discovery. There is so much responsibility on the organization, an organization that has 
new staff that are learning to navigate the complex terrain of the oil industry. Besides, I 
believe the organization has been given too much to deal with. I would have preferred it 
split into two organizations—one in charge of regulations and the other in charge of 
monitoring enforcement of the oil sector.  
In the face of challenges, Ghana has established an institutional framework to 
govern the oil sector in order to avert the curse of natural resources. This structure also 
has the ability to deliver some environmental justice to communities in oil producing 
areas in Ghana. Overall, the framework functions as a system of checks and balances 
in the oil industry to ensure that Ghanaians benefit from the oil resource. However, for 
this framework to be effective, Ghana would have to take proactive action to make 
policy that does not allow checks and balances to be abused. Moreover, the gap 
between what is positive in the material discussed above, and the experience at the 
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Ahanta West District where locals had to clean up a spill themselves, must be closed 
through unambiguous and consistent implementation of what is emerging as a 
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QUESTION GUIDES FOR INTERVIEWS
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Questions to Guide Interview of Key Informants at Public Institutions 
1. What is the mandate/role of your organization in relation to Ghana’s oil and gas 
development? 
2. What do you know about Ghana’s environmental policies relating to oil and gas 
development? Do you know about Ghana’s Guidelines on Environmental 
Assessment and Management of oil and gas? 
3.  What are your views about the objectives of policies/the Guidelines? 
a. Are the objectives sufficient to achieve the policy goal? 
b. What do you perceive are problematic about the objectives?  
c. What other objectives would you have preferred? 
4. What new thing would the guidelines do than currently pertains in the natural 
resource sector in Ghana or in the oil and gas sector of other countries? 
a. How different is it from the ordinary environmental impact assessment 
process? 
5. Do the environmental policies and or Guidelines on Environmental Assessment 
and Management of oil and gas address future on-shore oil development and 
expanded oil refining? 
6. If so how? If not what other policies are there to address these? 
7. Was your organization involved in formulating the policies/guidelines? What role 
did your organization play? 
8.  Does your organization have a department/unit/person responsible for oil and 
gas and or local content issues? If no, why? 
191 
 
9.  Do you think your organization is adequately represented at events and 
processes in the environmental management of Ghana’s oil and gas 
development? 
10. Do you think that the environmental policy-process involved the key 
stakeholders? If not, name the stakeholders that should have been part. Why 
should they have been part? 
11. Has your organization seen a re-organization in view of Ghana’s oil and gas 
development? How so? Was this reorganization due to any national policy on oil 
and gas? 
12.  Do the environmental policies and guidelines on oil and gas reflect your 
organization’s policy objectives? What would have being your organization’s 
policy objectives? 
13. Is avoiding environmental injustice in Ghana’s oil and gas sector important to 
your organization? 
14. Does your organization have any program, project or activities relating to 
environmental justice? What is your operational understanding of environmental 
justice?  
15. Do you think the environmental policies and guidelines on oil and gas address 
environmental justice issues in: 
a. Current offshore development and gas processing? 
b. Future onshore development? 
c. Future expansion in oil refining?  
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16. If your organization did participate in the environmental policy-processes, was 
the “forum” of participation adequate/appropriate? What “forum” would have been 
best for you and other participants? 
17.  Do you think your organization is entitled to participation in the environmental 
management of Ghana’s oil and gas development? If you so, how?  
18.  Why do you think that your organization’s input ought to be taken seriously in the 
environmental management of Ghana’s oil and gas development? 
19. If (or since) your organization was not engaged in the policy-process, what resort 
do you have to compel the “powers that be” to engage you? How can (or do) you 
get attention for that? 
20. Has your organization benefitted (or achieved something) from the policy-
process? 
21. What are your general views about the policy-making process?  
22. What do find challenging about Ghana’s natural resources policy-making 
process? 
23. What would you recommend for the process in natural resources policy-making 
in Ghana? 
24. Who would you recommend to me that can also provide answers to these 




Questions to Guide Interview of Key Informants at Institutions 
(Academic Institutions, CSOs, and NGOs) 
1. What is the mandate/role of your organization in relation to Ghana’s oil and gas 
development? 
2. What do you know about Ghana’s environmental policies relating to oil and gas 
development? Do you know about Ghana’s Guidelines on Environmental 
Assessment and Management of oil and gas? 
3. Was your organization involved in formulating the policies/guidelines? What role 
did your organization play? 
4.  Do you think your organization is adequately represented at events and 
processes in Ghana’s oil and gas development? 
5. Do you think that the environmental policy-process involved the key 
stakeholders? If not, name the stakeholders that should have been part. Why 
should they have been part? 
6.  Do the environmental policies and guidelines on oil and gas reflect your 
organization’s policy objectives? What would have being your organization’s 
policy objectives? 
7. Is avoiding environmental injustice in Ghana’s oil and gas sector important to 
your organization? 
8. Does your organization have any program, project or activities relating to 
environmental justice? What is your operational understanding of environmental 
justice?  
9. Do you think the environmental policies and guidelines on oil and gas address 
environmental justice issues in: 
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a. Current offshore development and gas processing? 
b. Future onshore development? 
c. Future expansion in oil refining?  
10.  Do you think your organization is entitled to participation in the environmental 
management of Ghana’s oil and gas development? If you so, how?  
11.  Why do you think that your organization’s input ought to be taken seriously in the 
environmental management of Ghana’s oil and gas development? 
12. What are your general views about the policy-making process?  
13. What do find challenging about Ghana’s natural resources policy-making 
process? 
14. What would you recommend for the process in natural resources policy-making 
in Ghana? 
15. Who would you recommend to me that can also provide answers to these 
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